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ARGUMENT
I.

THE SUGGESTION OF DEATH FILED BY THE LAW FIRM ON
DECEMBER 28,1998 WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF
LAW TO TRIGGER THE 90-DAY LIMITATION PERIOD IN
WHICH TO MOVE FOR SUBSTITUTION.
A.

The Plain Language of Rule 25 Makes Clear a Suggestion of
Death Must 1) Be Filed by a Party or Successor or
Representative of the Deceased Party, 2) Be Served on
Nonparties, and 3) Identify the Person Who May Be Substituted
in Order to Trigger the 90-day Period.

When interpreting a statute or rule, the plain language of that statute or rule is
controlling. Brinkerhoff v. Brinkerhoff. 945 P.2d 113, 116 (Utah App. 1997). Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 25(a)(1) states:
If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court may order
substitution of the proper parties. The motion for substitution may be made
by any party or by the successors or representatives of the deceased party and,
together with the notice of hearing, shall be served on the parties as provided
in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in the manner provided in Rule 4 for
the service of a summons. Unless the motion for substitution is made not later
than ninety days after the death is suggested upon the record by service of a
statement of the fact of the death as provided herein for the service of the
motion, the action shall be dismissed as to the deceased party.
(Emphasis added.) The rule clearly states that the suggestion of death must be served
"as provided herein for the service of the motion." Id Looking above to the
requirements for the motion for substitution, it is obvious that only a party or
successor or representative of the deceased may make the motion for substitution and
that the motion must be served on parties and interested nonparties. Id Therefore,
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be filed by parties or by successors or representatives of the deceased.1
Additionally, because the suggestion of death must be served on interested
nonparties, Kiile 2S unpin i(l\ ii»(|iiur> lint suggestion of death to identify the party
who may be substituted for the deceased party. Fehrenbachei v Ouackenbush ~fc • •
F. Supp. 1516,1519 (D. Kan. 1991). While not binding on this court, Form 30 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure supports this interpretation. This form—based upon

1

This interpretation of Rule 25(a)(1) is also supported by Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure Rule 38(a), which limits the entities who can file a suggestion
of death once a notice of appeal has been filed;
If a party dies after a notice of appeal is filed or while a proceeding is
otherwise pending in the court, the personal representative of the deceased
party may be substituted as a party on motion filed by the representative or
by any party. The motion of a party shall be served upon the representative
in accordance with the provisions of Rule 21. If the deceased party has no
representative, any party may suggest the death on the record and
proceedings shall then be had as the court may direct
(Emphasis added.) Appellate Rule 38 states that only parties to the action, or
implicitly the decedent's personal representative, may suggest death upon the
record.
Significantly, Appellate Rule 38—like Rule 25—does not authorize a
deceased party's attorney to suggest the death. Appellate Rule 38 only authorizes
a deceased party's attorney to file a notice of appeal if there is no personal
representative when a party dies before filing a notice of appeal. This is consistent
with public policy because there is no requirement that a final order be served on
nonparties, and nonparty representatives of the deceased party (whether a plaintiff
or defendant) may not know of the need to file a notice of appeal within 30 days of
the final order. In contrast, Rule 25 requires a suggestion of death to be served "as
provided herein for the service of the motion," which means that a suggestion of
death must be served on parties and nonparties. If the drafters of Rule 25 had
intended to authorize a deceased party's attorney to suggest the death upon the
record and limit the time in which to move for substitution to 90 days, they would
have expressly done so.

Federal Rule 25, which is identical to Utah Rule 25—requires that the suggestion of
death identify the person who may be substituted for the deceased party. Rende v.
Kav. 415 F.2d 983, 985-986 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
This interpretation of Rule 25 is supported by the vast majority of the federal
circuits which have addressed this issue. Of the six circuits which have had to
determine what makes a suggestion of death valid to trigger the 90-day period, five
have required that the suggestion of death meet the same requirements as the motion
for substitution. See Bass v. AttardL 868 F.2d 45, 50 n. 12 (3rd Cir. 1989); Fariss v.
Lynchburg. 769 F.2d 958, 961 (4th Cir. 1985); National Labor Relations Board v.
International Measurement and Control Company. 978 F.2d 334, 338-339 (7th Cir.
1992) (basing its decision on Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(a), which is the
appellate substitution rule, but citing McSurelv v. McClellan. 753 F.2d 88, 97-99
(D.C. Cir. 1985), which is based on Federal Rule 25(a)(1), for support); Barlow v.
Ground. 39 F.3d 231, 233-234 (9th Cir. 1994); Grandbouche v. Lovell. 913 F.2d 835
(10th Cir. 1990); and McSurelv v. McClellan. 753 F.2d 88, 97-99 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
The majority requires a suggestion of death to be filed by a party or representative of
the deceased, served on parties and nonparties, and identify the person who may be
substituted in order to limit the time in which to move for substitution to 90 days.
The Second Circuit stands alone among the federal circuits in declining to
require the suggestion of death to identify the party who may be substituted. Unicom
Tales. Inc. v. Baneriee. 138 F.3d 467 (2nd Cir. 1998). However, Unicorn Tales is
easily distinguished from the present case and appears to be consistent with the

majority construction. In Unicorn Tales, the widow of the deceased party—not the
deceased party's attorney—filed the suggestion of death. Id at 469. Therefore, she
was a successor and/or representative of the deceased and was a proper person to file
the suggestion of death. Moreover, because the widow filed the suggestion of death,
the suggestion of death identified who could be substituted as a party. Thus, the
suggestion of death in Unicorn Tales satisfied the criteria the other federal circuits
require for a suggestion of death to trigger the 90-day limitation period.
Numerous state courts with substitution rules similar to Federal Rule 25 have
adopted the interpretation of the majority of the federal circuits. Hoffman v, Cohen,
538 A.2d 1096,1099 (Del. 1988); Jones v. Montgomery Ward & Company, Inc., 725
P.2d 836, 839 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985); Barto v. Weishaar, 692 P.2d 498, 499 (Nev.
1985): Campbell v. Campbell, 878 P.2d 1037, 1043 (Okla. 1994); Varela v. Roman,
753P.2dl66,168 (Ariz. App. 1987): Wick v. Waterman, 421N. W.2d 872,873 (Wis.
App. 1988).
Most of the state court cases that the lawfirmcites to support its interpretation
of Rule 25 distinguish themselves from Rende, the principal case of the majority's
interpretation of the rule. In LesCarbeau v. Rodrigues. 286 A.2d 246, 247 (R.I.
1972), the Rhode Island Supreme Court stated that the holding in Rende was not
applicable because Rhode Island's Rule 25 did not contain a 90- day "trigger" for
dismissal as does Federal Rule 25.
We have no quarrel with the court's finding [in Rende] relative to the
termination of the attorney's agency. We do believe, however, that the

conclusion reached in Rende stems from a provision present in Federal Rule
25(a)(1) which is not found in our rule.
Id (italics in original). The court continued to explain that a suggestion of death
made in a Rhode Island Superior Court "triggers nothing except to alert the court that
rigor mortis may be setting in on a case which has a pending status."2 Id.
Likewise, the case Holmes v. Arbeitman, 857 S.W.2d 442 (Mo.App.E.D. 1993) is
distinguishable since Missourri Rule 25 differs substantially from Federal Rule 25:
We note that the federal rules upon which the federal decisions are based
differfromthose of Missourri... [T]he federal rules specify with particularity
who may make the suggestion of death, limiting those persons to 'any party or
. . . the successors or representatives of the deceased party . . .' Our rule
authorizes the suggestion of death to be made by 'any party or person in
interest '
Id at 443 (italics added) (citations omitted). See also Mullis v. Bone, 238 S.E.2d
748,750 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977) (distinguishing itself on the grounds that Georgia's rule
differs from the Federal rule by allowing 180 days to move for substitution); King v.
Twee's of Tampa. Inc.. 315 So.2d 538, 539-40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)
(distinguishing itselffromRende on the facts, as the plaintiffs counsel in King never
sought an extension of time); Brown v. Wheeler, 437 So.2d 521, 523 (Ala. 1983)
(basing its decision on the Alabama Rules' Advisory Committee notes, which are
different than the Federal Advisory Committee notes; also Alabama Rule 25 has a six
month limitation period).

2

A more detailed reading of the holding in LesCarbeau reveals that the
plaintiffs case was dismissed essentially for failure to prosecute.

The only case the law firms cites which is not easily distinguished from the
present case is Farmers Insurance Group v. District Court of the Second Judicial
District 507 P.2d 865 (Colo. 1973). However, the reasoning of Farmers Insurance
is faulty. In holding that the deceased party's attorney could file the suggestion of
death and that there is no requirement that the suggestion of death identify the party
to be substituted, the Colorado Supreme Court relied on the duty that an attorney has
to notify the court of a party's death and on the fact that the Colorado rule makes no
mention of an identification requirement. As discussed below in section LB.3.,
however, the attorney's duty to notify the court of his or her client's death does not
give that attorney the authority to make motions on behalf of a deceased person that
the attorney no longer and as a matter of law can no longer represent. Nor should the
attorney's ethical duty give him or her authority to take actions which could clearly
prejudice the rights of persons to whom the attorney has no relationship. Campbell
878 P.2d at 1043. Additionally, as explained above, the language of Rule 25 limits
those who may file a suggestion of death to those who may move for substitution and
implies that the suggestion of death must identify the party to be substituted.
B.

Adopting the Federal Construction of Rule 25 Is in the Interest of
Public Policy and Is Consistent with the Purpose of Rule 25, as Set
Forth in the Advisory Committee Notes to the 1963 Amendment.

"Utah courts 'may look to the federal advisory committee notes as well as
federal court interpretation of the federal rules to aid in interpreting the Utah rules.'"
State v.Kinross, 906 P.2d 320, 324 n.2 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting Statev.Cude. 784
P.2d 1197, 1200 n.3 (Utah 1989)). Even if this Court finds that the language of Rule

25 is ambiguous and looks to other sources to determine the meaning of the rule, the
federal advisory committee notes to Rule 25 make clear that the majority construction
of Rule 25 as explained above in section LA. is the interpretation intended by those
who drafted the rules. Because Utah Rule 25 and Federal Rule 25 are nearly
identical, the logical reasoning and arguments of the federal advisory committee notes
and the cases cited by Plaintiff Donahue should persuade this Court to adopt the
majority interpretation of the requirements under Rule 25 for a suggestion of death.
1.

Rule 25 is intended to allow more flexibility in substituting
parties—not to require dismissal for failure to substitute
within 90 days of the death of a party.

Prior to the adoption of the 1963 amendment, Federal Rule 25 required
dismissal if substitution was not made within two years of the death of a party. To
avoid "the hardships and inequities of this unyielding requirement," the 1963
amendments to rule 25 sought to make the substitution requirements less rigid,
making clear that the rule "was not intended to act as a bar to otherwise meritorious
actions."

Fed.R.Civ.P. 25, Advisory Committee's Note (1963 amendment);

Continental Bank. N.A. v. Mever. 10 F.3d 1293, 1297 (7th Cir. 1993).
The amended rule measures the time for substitution not from the time of
death, but from the time of the filing and service of the suggestion of death.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(a)(1). In keeping with the advisory committee's goal to make
substitution after the death of a party more easily accomplished, there are restrictions
on how a suggestion of death must be filed in order to limit the time period in which
to move for substitution to 90 days. These requirements for a valid suggestion of

death insure that substitution is not overly burdensome, and that otherwise
meritorious claims can continue despite a party's death.
The law firm would construe Rule 25 to require that Plaintiff's Complaint be
dismissed for failure to substitute within 90 days of the death of Defendant
Smith—even though Defendant Smith's successors and representatives were never
served with the suggestion of death, and even though there was no person to be
substituted for Defendant Smith.3 Such a construction is not consistent with Rule
25's intended purpose—to make the substitution of parties more flexible.
2.

The purpose of a suggestion of death is to give notice of the
death of a party and to alert parties and nonparties of the
need to act. Therefore, the plain language of Rule 25
requires a suggestion of death to be served on parties and
nonparties.

The Tenth Circuit in Grandbouche v. Lovell. 913 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1990) and
the Ninth Circuit in Barlow v. Ground. 39 F.3d 231, 233-234 (9th Cir. 1994), among
other courts, have held that Rule 25 requires a suggestion of death to be served on the
decedent's personal representative or successors pursuant to Rule 4 for the service of
summons in order to trigger the 90-day limitation period under Rule 25. This is
because it is quite possible that a representative or successor to the deceased party
may have a valid claim against the surviving party that will be barred by res judicata
if the original claim is dismissed. Without service, the representative or successor
may never know of the need to make the motion to substitute.

3

Defendant Smith's personal representative was not appointed until 161 days
after his death.

In the present case, the trial court—while noting that Rule 25 required the
motion for substitution to be served upon parties as provided in Rule 5 and upon
persons not parties in the manner provided in Rule 4 for the service of
summons—expressly declined to follow the above cases and held that a suggestion
of death does not need to be served on parties and nonparties. The trial court
reasoned that the purpose of requiring service of the motion for substitution was to
give the personal representative notice of a potential claim against the decedent's
estate, or of a potential cause of action to pursue on the decedent's behalf.
The error in the trial court's reasoning should be apparent. Simply stated, the
trial court overlooked the fact that the personal representative may need to file the
motion for substitution.4 If a personal representative does not receive notice of the
death and notice of the pending lawsuit through service of the suggestion of death, the
representative will be unable to file a motion for substitution within 90 days of the
suggestion of death.
The law firm argues that the above reasoning only applies when the plaintiff
dies, and thus, is not applicable to the present case. (Brief of Appellee at 26-27.) Not
only does this argument assume that defendants either always lose or never have valid
counter- or cross-claims, but it also has no foundation in the language of the rule.

4

Contrary to the law firm's contention, Rule 25 does not place a "burden" of
moving for substitution upon the surviving party to the lawsuit. Rule 25 explicitly
states that the motion for substitution "may be made by any party or by the
successors or representatives of the deceased party." (Emphasis added.)

Rule 25 does not make a distinction between a deceased plaintiff or defendant. Rule
25 clearly begins "If a party dies." This is because the representatives or successors
of either plaintiffs or defendants may want to continue a lawsuit despite the plaintiffs
or defendant's death.5 Instead of attempting to make a distinction, which would be
complicated and lead to inconsistent results, the drafters of Rule 25 chose to make the
language of the rule neutral as to whether the decedent was a plaintiff or a defendant.

3.

The plain language of Rule 25 and the advisory committee
notes reveal that Rule 25 limits the entities who may suggest
death upon the record to those who may move for
substitution.

Rule 25 states that a suggestion of death is made "by service of a statement of
the fact of death as provided herein for the sennce of the motion [for substitution]."
(Emphasis added.) The rule limits the individuals that can make the motion for
substitution to "any party or by the successors or representatives of the deceased
party." This indicates that the suggestion of death may also only be made by a party

5

It is easy to see why a deceased plaintiffs representative or successor may
want to continue a cause of action, but the representative or successor of a
deceased defendant may want to avoid the dismissal of a lawsuit as well. For
example, the deceased defendant's representative or successor may have a valid
mandatory counterclaim that cannot be brought separate from the original cause of
action, or the representative or successor may have a valid cross-claim against
another defendant to the action. Because of the multiple circumstances in which a
nonparty may want to continue a cause of action after a party's death, Rule 25
makes no attempt to differentiate between the death of a plaintiff or a defendant
and requires that interested nonparties receive service of the suggestion of death.
This approach is in the interest of public policy because it provides a uniform
procedure upon the death of a party and prevents the inconsistent results that
would occur on a case by case basis.

or a successor or representative of the deceased. This interpretation is supported by
the federal advisory committee notes, which state that a party or the representative of
the deceased party are the proper entities to file a suggestion of death. Thus, a
decedent's former counsel cannot file a suggestion of death that triggers the running
of the 90-day period because the attorney is not a party or representative of the
deceased since the attorney-client relationship is severed upon the death of the client.
Al-Jundi v. Estate of Rockefeller, 757 F. Supp. 206,210 (W.D.N. Y. 1990); Campbell
v. Campbell 878 P.2d 1037, 1043 (Okla. 1994); Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry. 769
F.2d 958, 961 (4th Cir. 1985); Hilsabeck v. Lane Co.. Inc.. 168 F.R.D. 313, 314 (D.
Kan. 1996); Hoffman v. Cohen. 538 A.2d 1096, 1099 (Del. 1988); Jones v.
Montgomery Ward & Company. Inc.. 725 P.2d 836, 839 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985);
Rendev.Kav. 415 F.2d 983, 985 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Smith v. Planas. 151 F.R.D. 547,
549-550 (S.D.N. Y. 1993).
The trial court and the law firm both rely upon Farmers Insurance Group v.
District Court of the Second Judicial District. 507 P.2d 865 (Colo. 1973) to support
their argument that since an attorney has a duty to notify the court of his or her
client's death, an attorney also has the authority to file a suggestion of death. (Record
at 152; Brief of Appellee at 16-17.) The trial court and law firm's reliance on
Farmers Insurance is unreasonable, especially in light of the plain language of and
committee notes to Rule 25.
It is true that the attorney for a deceased client should notify the Court and
other parties of his or her client's death. Such practice is consistent with ethical

obligations. However, the attorney's duty to notify does not extend so far as to give
the attorney authority to file a suggestion of death which triggers the 90-day limitation
period.6 Rendev.Kav. 415 F.2d 983,985 (D.C. Or. 1969). This is because Rule 25
intends that only a party or a representative of the deceased may file the suggestion
of death. Fed.R.Civ.P. 25, Advisory Committee Note (1963 amendment). To allow
an attorney who formerly represented a party to limit the time in which to move for
substitution to 90 days is to allow the attorney to prejudice the rights of parties and
nonparties to whom the attorney has no legal relationship. Such a construction of
Rule 25 is inconsistent with the agency nature of the attorney-client relationship and
would not serve public policy.
4.

Requiring a suggestion of death to identify the person who may
be substituted as a party avoids tactical maneuvering and absurd
results.

"By requiring service of the suggestion of death on parties and non-parties,
[Rule 25] implicitly allocates the burden of identifying the substitute party to the
party making the suggestion of death." Fehrenbacher v. Ouackenbush. 759 F. Supp.
1516, 1519 (D. Kan. 1991). This identification requirement does not arise out of
Federal Form 30, as the law firm contends, but out of the language of Rule 25 itself,
as pointed out by Fehrenbacher.
The law firm argues that requiring a suggestion of death to identify the person
who may be substituted as a party in order to trigger the 90-day limitation period
6

Certainly, an attorney's duty to notify the court of his or her client's death
does not give the attorney authority to file a motion to dismiss on behalf of the
deceased client.

places an unduly heavy burden on the person filing the suggestion of death.7
However, Wick v. Waterman, 421 N.W.2d 872 (Wis. App. 1988), demonstrates the
sometimes absurd result of requiring the surviving party to move for substitution
when no substitute is identified in a suggestion of death. In Wick, the defendant died.
Id. at 872. The suggestion of death was mailed to the plaintiff by the defendant's
former attorney, in his own name. The suggestion did not identify a person who
could be substituted for the defendant. IcL The plaintiff, in order to preserve his
claim, petitioned the court to be appointed personal representative of the defendant's
estate. Id To avoid this ridiculous result in the future, the court held that the entity
filing the suggestion of death must identify the individual to be substituted in the
action. Id. at 873.
The Wick case illustrates how allowing a suggestion of death which fails to
identify the person who may be substituted to limit the time in which substitution may
be made places a heavy, even impossible "burden" on the surviving party. In many

7

Requiring a suggestion of death to identify whom may be substituted places
a minimal burden on a successor or representative of the deceased party when
suggesting the death upon the record. This is because the representative of the
deceased is often the proper party to be substituted. In contrast, some courts have
held that the identification requirement is too heavy a burden when the suggestion
of death is filed by z party. See In re Cardoza. 111 B.R. 906, 909 (Bkrtcy. S.D.
Cal. 1990) (explaining that the holding in Rende requiring identification "only
applies when the suggestion of death is filed by the representative or successor of
the estate. No such rule binds other parties who may file and serve the suggestion
of death."). If the law firm had been representing the personal representative when
it filed the suggestion of death, it would have been a simple matter for the law firm
to identify the person it purportedly represented.

instances, and in this case specifically, such a burden requires the plaintiff to initiate
probate proceedings. In fact, this burden could have easily lead to a result in this case
that is similar to the silly result of Wick—the plaintiff appointing himself as the
successor to the deceased defendant when no other substitute has been appointed.
H.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE LAW FIRM
WAS REPRESENTING THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE DECEDENT'S ESTATE WHEN IT FILED THE SUGGESTION
OF DEATH ON DECEMBER 28, 1998 BECAUSE THE PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE WAS NOT APPOINTED UNTIL JUNE 2,1999.
The trial court'sfindingthat the lawfirmwas representing Phyllis Myers, the

personal representative of the deceased Defendant Smith's estate, when the law firm
filed the suggestion of death on December 28, 1998 is clearly erroneous and "against
the clear weight of the evidence." Young v. Young, 979 P.2d 338, 342 (Utah 1999)
(citations omitted). Simply stated, the law firm could not have represented the
personal representative until after June 2,1999—the date on which the representative
was appointed.8 By finding that the lawfirmrepresented the personal representative
on December 28,1998, when the suggestion of death wasfiled,the trial court ignored
undisputed court records and issued an erroneous finding based upon factual
impossibility. See In re Klein, 36 B.R. 390 (Bkrtcy. E.D. N.Y. 1984) (holding that
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It is important to note the hearing in which Phyllis Myers was appointed as
personal representative was initiated by Plaintiff Stoddard in the companion case
to this one. Plaintiff Stoddard had filed an Appointment of Personal
Representative on May 12, 1999, seeking to have Clair Jaussi appointed as
personal representative. The law firm appeared at the hearing and requested that
Phyllis Myers be appointed as personal representative. But for Plaintiff
Stoddard's pursuit of this matter, there would be no personal representative for the
law firm to purportedly represent.

a suggestion of death filed by the deceased plaintiffs attorney before he was acting
for the deceased plaintiffs representatives was insufficient to trigger the 90-day
period because the attorney was not a person authorized to suggest the death under
Rule 25(a)(1)).
Moreover, the trial court also erred by ignoring representations made by the
law firm that explicitly indicated it did not represent the personal representative or the
deceased Defendant's estate. In the present case, it is undisputed that the law firm
filed papers—including the suggestion of death, the motion to dismiss and supporting
memorandum, the notice to submit for decision, and the objection to Plaintiffs 59(e)
motion. (Record at 50, 61, 127.) Nowhere in the record does the law firm submit or
sign papers on behalf of the estate or on behalf of the personal representative Phyllis
Myers. Indeed in its opposition to Plaintiffs Rule 59(e) motion filed June 14, 1999,
the lawfirmunequivocally stated that it "had no idea who the successor party would
be," that at the time of Defendant Smith's death it "was not aware of whether any
testamentary instrument existed which named a personal representative of Mr.
Smith's estate," and that it "did not know any details of [decedent's] estate." (Record
at 119-120.) Indeed, the law firm even requested the Notice to Submit for Decision
on the motion to dismiss on behalf of the deceased Defendant.9

9

It appears that the law firm may be judicially estopped from claiming it
represented the estate and the personal representative after it has filed documents
as "Attorneys for the Defendant, Seth Albert Smith." (Record at 50 and 61.)
"[J]udicial estoppel is the doctrine which 'prevents a party from seeking judicial
relief by offering statements inconsistent with its own sworn statement in a prior
judicial proceeding.'" Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline. 913 P.2d 731, 734

The evidence before the trial court clearly demonstrated that the lawfirmcould
not have represented the personal representative on December 28,1998, because the
personal representative was not appointed until June 2, 1999. The evidence also
clearly demonstrated that the law firm did not file documents on behalf of the estate
or representative. Thus, the trial court clearly erred by finding that the law firm "was
acting as lawyer for the deceased party and the lawyer for the estate of that party"
when it filed the suggestion of death.10 (Record at 216.)
III.

EVEN IF THE LAW FIRM'S SUGGESTION OF DEATH HAD BEEN
SUFFICIENT TO TRIGGER THE 90-DAY LIMITATION PERIOD,
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY NOT
ENLARGING THE 90-DAY PERIOD FOR GOOD CAUSE AND
EXCUSABLE NEGLECT.
The trial court should have granted Plaintiff Donahue' s Motion to Enlarge the

Time for Filing a Motion to Appoint a Personal Representative, even though the
motion was made more than 90 days after the law firm filed the suggestion of death.
This is because Plaintiff Donahue demonstrated good cause and excusable neglect for
failing to substitute a party within the 90 days following the law firm's suggestion of
death.

(Utah 1995) (quoting Condas v. Condas. 618 P.2d 491, 496 (Utah 1980)).
10
The trial court apparently relied upon the Affidavit of Phyllis Myers which
was attached to the law firm's Notice of Authority of Appearance filed on June 30,
1999. (Record at 134.) This reliance was not supported by the evidence because
the affidavit is 1) inconsistent with the law firm's prior representations on June 21,
1999 that it knew no details of the decedent's estate when it filed the suggestion of
death, and 2) inconsistent with the court documents indicating that Phyllis Myers
was appointed as personal representative on June 2, 1999, well after the suggestion
of death was filed on December 28, 1998. (Record at 130-129.)

In Dietrich v. Burrows, 164 F.R.D. 220, 222 (N.D.Ohio 1995), the court
explained that the 90-day period under Rule 25 should have been enlarged under Rule
6(b) because no personal representative was named until after the 90-day time period
had run. In Dietrich, the defendants filed a suggestion of death following the
plaintiffs death.11 Brian Dietrich, who had just recently been appointed the
decedent's personal representative, moved to substitute himself as plaintiff 106 days
later. Id at 221. The court explained that the motion for substitution was timely,
even if the 90-day period had already passed, because good cause was shown to
enlarge the Rule 25 time pursuant to Rule 6(b)—Brian was unable to move to
substitute himself until he was appointed as the personal representative of the
deceased party. Id. at 222.
In the present case, a personal representative of the deceased Defendant Smith
was not appointed until June 2, 1999—156 days after the law firm had filed the
suggestion of death. Prior to this date, Plaintiff Donahue could not have made a
motion to substitute Defendant Smith's personal representative since no representative
had been named. Like the plaintiff in Dietrich. Plaintiff Donahue has shown good
cause for an enlargement of time pursuant to Rule 6(b).
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit has upheld a finding of excusable neglect for
failure to move for substitution until eight months after a suggestion of death was

11

The defendants' suggestion of death was held to be insufficient to limit the
time for substitution to 90 days because the suggestion of death did not identify
the successor or representative of the deceased. Dietrich. 164 F.R.D. at 222.

filed when the attorneys who had previously represented the deceased defendant
"continued to file papers on his behalf and continued to participate in settlement
discussions in his behalf" Continental Bank. N. A. v. Mever. 10F.3d 1293, 1297 (7th
Cir. 1993). The court explained that the 90-day period under Rule 25 may be
extended by Rule 6(b): "[T]he history of Rule 25(a) and Rule 6(b) makes it clear that
the 90 day time period was not intended to act as a bar to otherwise meritorious
actions, and extensions of the period may be liberally granted." Id (quoting Tatterson
v. Koppers Co., 104 F.R.D. 19, 20 (W.D.Pa. 1984)).
In the present case, after Defendant Smith's death, the law firm that had
previously represented him continued to file documents, and even moved the court
to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint, on his behalf. Similar to the plaintiff in Continental
Bank, Plaintiff Donahue has shown excusable neglect for an enlargement of time
under Rule 6(b) in which to move for substitution.
Furthermore, in support of its claim that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to enlarge time, Defendant asserts that if the
trial court had granted Plaintiffs motion then the "Defendant would have been
required to incur additional expenses and costs in defending against Plaintiffs
claims." Br. of Defendant, pp. 33-34. In this case, there is no showing of legal
prejudice. The Defendant has made no showing that it would be harder for them to
defend the case had the motion been granted.
Also of note, the Defendant has completely failed to respond to Plaintiffs
argument that the lower court ened in construing the dismissal for failure to file a

Rule 25 motion as a dismissal with prejudice, when it should have dismissed the
action without prejudice. Br. of Plaintiff, p. 37. Accordingly, the order of dismissal
should be vacated and the trial court should be instructed to enter a new order
dismissing the case without prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant Donahue respectfully requests that
the Court adopt the logical reasoning of the majority of the federal courts in
interpreting Federal Rule 25 and hold that in order to trigger the running of the 90-day
limitation period under Rule 25, Utah Rule 25 requires a suggestion of death 1) to be
filed by a party or representative of the deceased, 2) to be served upon nonparties, and
3) to identify the person who may be substituted as a party. Accordingly, Appellant
respectfully requests the Court to reverse the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiffs
Complaint for failure to substitute a party within the 90 days of the law firm's
suggestion of death—which was not filed by a party or representative of the deceased,
was not served on nonparties, and did not identify who may be substituted as a
party—and to remand this case for further proceedings.
Dated this JH day otJuSe, 2000.

[. SNYDER and
PHILLIP E. LOWRY
Attorneys for Plaintiff /Appellant
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A. Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 38.

RAP Rule 38, RULE 38. SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES
*587 Rules App.Proc, Rule 38
WEST'S UTAH RULES OF COURT
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE
TITLE V. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Current with amendments received through
11-1-1999
RULE 38. SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES
(a) Death of a Party. If a party dies after a
notice of appeal is filed or while a proceeding is
otherwise pending in the court, the personal
representative of the deceased party may be
substituted as a party on motion filed by the
representative or by any party. The motion of a
party shall be served upon the representative in
accordance with the provisions of Rule 21. If
the deceased party has no representative, any
party may suggest the death on the record and
proceedings shall then be had as the court may
direct. If a party against whom an appeal may
be taken dies after entry of a judgment or order
in the trial court or agency but before a notice of
appeal is filed, an appellant may proceed as if
death had not occurred. After the notice of
appeal is filed, substitution shall be effected in
accordance with this paragraph. If a party
entitled to appeal dies before filing a notice of
appeal, the notice of appeal may be filed by the
deceased party's personal representative or, if

Page 1
there is no personal representative, by the
deceased party's attorney of record. After the
notice of appeal is filed, substitution shall be
effected in accordance with this paragraph.
(b) Substitution for Other Causes.
If
substitution of a party is necessary for any
reason other than death, substitution shall be
effected in accordance with the procedure
prescribed in paragraph (a) of this rule.
(c) Public Officers; Death or Separation From
Office.
(1) When a public officer is a party to an
appeal or other proceeding in an official
capacity and during its pendency dies, resigns or
otherwise ceases to hold office, the action does
not abate and the public officer's successor is
automatically
substituted
as
a
party.
Proceedings following the substitution shall be
in the name of the substituted party, but any
misnomer not affecting the substantial rights of
the parties shall be disregarded. An order of
substitution may be entered at any time, but the
omission to enter such an order shall not affect
the substitution.
(2) When a public officer is a party to an
appeal or other proceeding in an official
capacity, the public officer may be described as
a party by official title rather than by name; but
the court may require the name to be added.

Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works

B. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Form 30.

APPENDIX OF FORMS

Form 30

F o r m 3 0 . Suggestion of Death Upon the Record Under Rule
25(a)(1)
A. B. [describe as a party, or as executor, administrator, or other
representative or successor of C. D., the deceased party] suggests
upon the record, pursuant to Rule 25(a)(1), the death of C. D.
[describe as party] during the pendency of this action.
(Added Jan. 21, 1963, eff. July 1, 1963.)
WESTLAW ELECTRONIC RESEARCH
See WESTLAW guide following the Explanation pages of this volume.

C. Bass v. Attardi, 868 F.2d 45 (3rd Cir. 1989).

Gerhard BASS, Appellant,
v.
Sylvester ATTARDI, individually and as a
member of the South Amboy Planning
Board; H. Thomas Carr, individually
and as a consultant to the South Amboy Planning Board; Alice Christina,
individually and as a chairperson of the
South Amboy Planning Board; Mayor
J. Thomas Cross, individually and as
Mayor of the City of South Amboy and
as a member of the South Amboy Planning Board; Gregory F. Kusic, individually and as attorney for the South
Amboy Planning Board; Robert Levins, individually and as a member of
the South Amboy Planning Board; Andrew Markovich, individually and as a
member of the South Amboy Planning
Board; Michael Marrone, individually
and as a member of the South Amboy
Planning Board; Councilman Thomas
O'Brien, individually and as a member
of the South Amboy Planning Board;
Edward CLeary, as Chief of Police of
South Amboy; Madeline Purcell, individually and as a member of the South
Amboy Planning Board; Wilbur
Schmidt, individually and as a member
of the South Amboy Planning Board;
and Frederick H. Kurtz, individually
and as a Director of the Department of
Engineering of the City of South Amboy and as Code Enforcement Officer
of the City of South Amboy.
No. 88-5511.
United States Court of Appeals,
Third Circuit.
Submitted Under Third Circuit Rule 12(6)
Dec. 15, 1988.
Decided Feb. 14, 1989.
Property owner who sought to establish methodone-maintenance treatment center brought civil rights action against members of municipal planning board and municipal code enforcement officer, alleging
that they selectively enforced municipal
parking regulations to prevent him from

securing certificate of occupancy. Prior to
completion of owner's presentation of his
case, the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey, Charles R.
Weiner, J., dismissed case involuntarily on
grounds of absolute and qualified immunity. Property owner appealed. The Court
of Appeals held that, although dismissal of
complaint against members of board and
their agents in their individual capacities
was appropriate, complaint should not have
been dismissed against members and their
agents in their official capacities or against
code enforcement officer.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and
remanded.

1. Federal Courts <s=>755
Even if district court's involuntary dismissal of civil rights complaint prior to
plaintiffs complete presentation of his case
on grounds of absolute immunity was effected without any notice to plaintiff, that
decision was subject to appellate review
because question of defendants' absolute
immunity was quintessential^ legal. Fed.
Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 41(b), 28 U.S.C.A.
2. Civil Rights $=>13.8(3)
Members of New Jersey municipal
planning board were absolutely immune, in
their individual capacities, from suit under
§ 1983 for alleged equal protection and
First Amendment violations arising out of
statutory site plan review. NJ.S.A.
40:55D-25, subd. a(2); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983;
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 1.
3. Civil Rights e=>13.8(3)
Absolute immunity of members of
New Jersey municipal planning board in
§ 1983 action arising out of site plan review extended to board's legal counsel and
board's consultant in their individual capacities. NJ.S.A. 40:55D-25, subd. a(2); 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983; U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 1.
4. Civil Rights <S=>13.8(3)
Members of New Jersey municipal
planning board were not entitled to absolute immunity in their official capacities in
§ 1983 action because board, as govern-
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mental entity, had no immunity whatsoever. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
5. Federal Courts <s=*701
District courts involuntary dismissal
of civil rights action before plaintiff had
completed presentation of his case, on
ground that one defendant was entitled to
qualified immunity, was not reviewed on
appeal and remand was necessary because
record was devoid of any evidence supporting conclusion that qualified immunity was
available. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 41(b), 28 U.S.C.A.
Susan E. Champion, Hunziker, Merrey &
Jones, P.A., Paterson, NJ., for appellant
James B. Smith, Metuchen, NJ., for
Gregory Kusic and Frederick Kurtz.
John R. Lanza, Thatcher & Lanza, Flemington, NJ., for Alice Christina, Robert
Levins, Andrew Markovich, Michael Marrone and Madeline Purcell.
James B. Convery, Convery, Convery &
Shihar, Metuchen, N.J., for Sylvester Attardi, J. Thomas Cross and Thomas
O'Brien.
Before: GIBBONS, Chief Judge,
HUTCHINSON and HUNTER •, Circuit
Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
PER CURIAM:
1. Once again, we return to the much-litigated struggle between plaintiff-appellant
Gerhard Bass ("Bass") and various defendant-appellee officials of the city of South
* Judge Hunter participated in the consideration
of this appeal but died before the entry of judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1982).
1. When this claim arose, defendant-appellee Alice Christina chaired the Planning Board. Defendant-appellee J. Thomas Cross was mayor of
South Amboy and a member of the Planning
Board. Defendant-appellee Thomas O'Brien
was a member of the South Amboy City Council
and the Planning Board. Defendants-appellees
Sylvester Attardi, Robert Levins, Andrew Markovich, Michael Marrone, Madeline Purcell, and
Wilbur Schmidt were all members of the Planning Board. When appropriate, we will refer to
all th#*v defendants-appellees collectively as "the

Amboy, New Jersey, over the establishment of a methadone-maintenance treatment center in South Amboy. Bass contends that members of the South Amboy
Planning Board ("Planning Board"),1 their
agents,2 and the South Amboy Code Enforcement Officer3 violated his rights to
equal protection and freedom of speech by
thwarting his efforts to establish a methadone-maintenance treatment center at 124
Broadway, South Amboy.4
2. In this appeal, Bass asks us to vacate
an order finding defendant-appellee members of the South Amboy Planning Board
and their agents absolutely immune from
Bass' action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1982) and to vacate an order grant
ing South Amboy Code Enforcement Officer Frederick Kurtz ("Kurtz") qualified immunity. As a procedural matter, Bass contends that the district court erroneously
entered judgment for the defendants prior
to the completion of his case, thus impinging on his right to due process. As a
substantive matter, Bass contends that
none of the defendants are entitled to any
immunity. While we hesitate to affirm a
judgment entered prior to the completion
of a plaintiffs case, with regard to the
Planning Board members and their agents
in their individual capacities we will do so
because they are absolutely immune as a
matter of law. On the other hand, we will
vacate the order to the extent it dismisses
the complaint against the members of the
Planning Board and their agents in their
official capacity because the Planning
Board itself has no immunity. We will also
vacate the order in favor of Kurtz in light
members of the Planning Board." The Planning
Board itself is not a defendant in this action.
2. When this claim arose, defendant-appellee
Gregory F. Kusic was the legal counsel for the
Planning Board and defendant-appellee H.
Thomas Can* was a consultant to the Planning
Board.
3. When this claim arose, defendant-appellee
Frederick H. Kurtz ("Kurtz") was the Code Enforcement Officer of the city of South Amboy.
4. The parties agreed to the dismissal of the
complaint against defendant Edward O'Leary,
Chief of Police of South Amboy.

Cite at 868 F2d 45 (3rd Or. 1989)

of the incomplete record to allow Bass to
complete the presentation of his case and
to allow both parties to complete the
record.
I.
3. Bass began his efforts to secure permits necessary to establish a methadonemaintenance treatment center in South Amboy in May 1981. In November 1981, Bass
sought a use variance for 124 Broadway
from the South Amboy Board of Adjustment The site in question was located in a
B-l zone for which business and professional offices were permitted uses under
the South Am>oy Zoning Code. The Board
of Adjustment denied Bass' request on
March 10, 1982. The Board of Adjustment
relied on Amendment 1066 of the South
Amboy Zoning Code adopted on July 16,
1981, which regulated the location of treatment facilities.
4. Bass appealed the decision of the
Board of Adjustment to the New Jersey
Superior Court. On June 17, 1983, Judge
Stroumtsos of the Law Division ruled from
the bench that Bass' proposed facility fell
within the definition of a professional office and hence was a permitted use in the
B-l general business zone in which 124
Broadway is located. Judge Stroumtsos
also held that Amendment 1066 was not
applicable to Bass' project.
Judge
Stroumtsos did not, however, direct Kurtz
to issue a certificate of occupancy. Instead, he held that the proposed methadone-maintenance treatment center must
meet the same requirements any other
business would have to meet in order to
operate in a B-l zone. On June 24, 1983,
Judge Stroumtsos entered an order reflecting his decision from the bench.
5. On June 21, 1983, Bass* applied to
Code Enforcement Officer Kurtz for a certificate of occupancy. Near the end of
June 1983, Bass advised Kurtz that he had
secured parking for five cars within lk
block of 124 Broadway. As evidence, Bass
submitted a copy of a money order evincing
payment, although he did not include a
copy of his lease.

6. %On June 29, 1983, Kurtz refused
Bass' request for a certificate of occupancy
because he did not have a copy of Judge
Stroumtsos' opinion and because Bass had
not secured site plan approval. On July 14,
1983, Kurtz told Bass that sanitary, heating, and air conditioning facilities were
"presently inadequate." On August 8,
1983, Kurtz rejected Bass' parking plan
and raised the issue of Bass' failure to
comply with New Jersey's Barrier Free
Design Regulations. During the period
May 1981 to March 1983, however, Kurtz
issued three other certificates of occupancy
to businesses in the immediate vicinity of
124 Broadway in the B-l zone.
7. On August 15, 1983, Bass filed an
application with the Planning Board requesting site plan approval and a parking
variance. The Planning Board did not
reach Bass' application at its September
1983 meeting. The Planning Board took
up Bass' application at its October meeting
where it claimed that it was not bound by
Bass' suit against the Board of Adjustment Bass, accordingly, initiated yet another suit in the New Jersey Superior
Court. The same judge who had ruled
against the Board of Adjustment held on
November 16, 1983, that the Planning
Board was bound by his prior ruling in the
Board of Adjustment case. The Planning
Board appealed. Notwithstanding the Superior Court's decision, however, the Planning Board voted to table Bass' application
at its November 21, 1983 meeting.
8. On December 1, 1983, Bass filed this
section 1983 suit in the District of New
Jersey. His principal complaint was that
the defendants were selectively enforcing
municipal parking regulations, thus preventing him from securing a certificate of
occupancy for the methadone-maintenance
treatment center. Bass sought a preliminary injunction ordering the defendants to
issue him a certificate of occupancy, as
well as damages.
9. On February 16, 1984, the district
court denied Bass' claim for immediate r e
lief. Bass appealed to this court. On November 13, 1984, for reasons having no
bearing on this appeal, we reversed and
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remanded in Bass v. Attardi 751 F.2d 875
(3d Cir.1984) (mem. op.) [hereinafter Bass I].
10. Meanwhile, on January 25, 1984,
February 20, 1984, and March 14, 1984, the
Planning Board finally considered Bass' application of August 1983. On March 14,
1984, the Planning Board denied the application. Bass appealed that decision to the
City Council which upheld the Planning
Board on July 9, 1984. Bass then appealed
to the New Jersey Superior Court, which
dismissed his complaint on April 9, 1987.
11. In federal court, Bass' claim for
damages proceeded toward trial from the
time of our remand in Bass I to July 30,
1987.6 The docket sheet states that on
July 30, 1987, 'TRIAL WITHOUT JURY
MOVED BEFORE THE [district court] IN
PHILA., PA. Minutes of non-jury trial of
7-30-87 . . . filed." Docket Entry #50.
The transcript of that proceeding does not
indicate whether Bass had completed the
presentation of his case-in-chief by the end
of the day.6
12. Sometime on or before August 4,
1987, the defendants moved to dismiss the
suit on the grounds of qualified and/or
absolute immunity, standing, and the absence of a case or controversy. The defendants also asked the district court to
abstain from hearing the case in light of
pending litigation in the New Jersey state
courts.7
13. On January 22, 1988, the district
court entered judgment for Planning Board
members and their agents. According to
the district court, the Planning Board was
5. Prior to trial, Bass abandoned his injunctive
claim.
6. For example, the Pre-Trial Stipulation and
Order indicates that Bass intended to call Kurtz
as a witness. Docket Entry # 44 at 10. Kurtz
did not testify on July 30, 1987, however. Docket Entry #50 (Minutes of Proceeding). Trial
counsel for Christina concluded the July 30,
1987 proceeding by stating: "I would like an
opportunity to confer with the judge if he could
give us some time now regarding scheduling for
next week." Docket Entry # 52 at 39 (transcript
of proceeding).
7. Unfortunately, we cannot find the actual motion to dismiss from any of the defendants in
the district court record. On the other hand,
Bass acknowledges that such a motion was
made. We presume, therefore, that the motion

a quasijudicial body; as such, its members
and agents were absolutely immune from
suit. The district court explicitly grounded
its order on its power under Fed.R.Civ.P.
41(b) (involuntary dismissal). The district
court refused, however, to extend qualified
immunity to Code Enforcement Officer
Kurtz and scheduled the trial to reconvene
on February 26, 1988.
14. The trial never reconvened. On
May 26, 1988, the district court entered
judgment for defendant Kurtz on the
ground that he was entitled to qualified
immunity.
15. On June 24, 1988, Bass timely filed
this appeal. We have jurisdiction to review
this final order pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292.
II.
16. Our review of the selection, interpretation, and application of legal precepts
is plenary. See Dent v. Cunningham, 786
F.2d 173, 175 (3d Cir.1986).
III.
[1] 17. As an initial matter we must
address Bass' procedural objection. Bass
claims that the district court entered judgment for the defendants without permitting
him to complete presentation of his case.
The district court grounded its decision
granting absolute immunity for the members of the Planning Boai^ and their
relied on the grounds indicated in the notice of
motion in limine filed by counsel for defendantsappellees Christina, Levins, Markovich, Marrone, and Purcell. Docket Entry # 48. Counsel
for those defendants certified that he delivered
a copy of his notice to the chambers of the judge
sitting by designation in New Jersey, but trying
the case in Philadelphia, on July 30, 1987, the
first day of trial. The time stamp on the notice
and the docket sheet, on the other hand, indicate that the notice was filed with the clerk in
the District of New Jersey on August 4, 1987.
Docket Entry # 48 at 3. We suspect, but need
not resolve, that this five-day discrepancy arises
from the fact that the judge hearing the case sits
in Philadelphia, and the clerk for the district
court is in Trenton, New Jersey.
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agents and involuntarily dismissing Bass'
complaint on Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b).
18. The second sentence of that rule
states:
After the plaintiff, in an action tried by
the court without a jury, has completed
the presentation of evidence, the defendant, without waiving the right to offer evidence in the event the motion is
not granted, may move for a dismissal on
the ground that upon the facts and the
law the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) (emphasis added). The
plain language of this sentence states that
a motion to dismiss the case with prejudice
is not ripe for disposition until the plaintiff
has had an opportunity to present evidence.8 Cognizant of the district court's
inherent authority to dispose of its own
caseload in a prompt and efficient manner,
we have allowed a district court to terminate an action under Rule 41(b) when the
plaintiff acknowledged that it would be
presenting no evidence of a nature absolutely essential to its case. See Lentino v.
Fringe Employee Plans, Inc., 611 F.2d
474, 482 (3d Cir.1979). Thus in Lentino,
the plaintiff was given an opportunity to
present evidence; his case was properly
terminated, because he failed to avail himself of the opportunity. Id. at 482.9 Our
interpretation of Rule 41(b) in Lentino is
consistent with the Supreme Court's more
recent statement in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91
L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), that a district court can
sua sponte enter summary judgment. Key
to Celotex is the requirement that the district court put the losing party on notice to
8. Of course, there is a difference between affording a party the opportunity to "present"
evidence under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) and "admitting" the evidence pursuant to the Federal Rules
of Evidence.
9. We explicitly admonished the district court,
however:
As a general rule, ... we note that the interest
of justice will be better served if involuntary
dismissals for failure to show right to relief
are not ordered until the close of plaintiffs'
case.

bringtforthevidence. Id. at 326, 106 S.Ct.
at 2554.
19. In this case, Bass complains that he
was not afforded the opportunity available
in Lentino because the district court terminated the case against the Planning Board
members and their agents without informing Bass of its intention to do so. For the
purpose of this discussion, we will accept
Bass' assertion as true. Nonetheless, we
can review the district court's decision because the question of whether the members
of the Planning Board and their agents in
their individual capacities acting within the
scope of their authority are entitled to absolute immunity is a quintessentially legal
question.10 In contrast to Lentino, where
the plaintiff was afforded the opportunity
to present evidence and none was forthcoming, in this case, there is no evidence
Bass can present that will disturb our resolution of this legal question.
IV.
20. We turn then to the substantive
question—are the members of the Planning
Board and their agents acting within the
scope of their authority in their individual
and official capacities entitled to absolute
immunity? To answer this question, we
must look to the governmental function
performed by the defendants. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 108 S.Ct. 538,
542, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988); Lake Country
Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 405 n. 30, 99 S.Ct.
1171, 1179 n. 30, 59 L.Ed.2d 401 (1979).
[2] 21. In Jodeco, Inc. v. Hann, 674
F.Supp. 488 (D.N.J., 1987), Judge Brotman
painstakingly addressed this very issue as
Lentino, 611 F.2d at 482 n. 15. That admonition
is no less true today.
10. Contrary to Bass' assertions, the fact that the
members of the Planning Board may have tarried with Bass' application does not put their
actions outside the scope of their authority.
The Planning Board had 45 days to act upon
Bass' application or else run the risk of having
Bass' application deemed automatically approved, unless the Planning Board could subsequently show that Bass' application was incomplete. See N.J. Stat.Ann. § 40:55D-50(b) (West
Supp.1988).
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it relates to the members of the Planning
Board acting within the scope of their authority. Although the existence of an absolute immunity to a section 1983 action is
a question of federal, not state law, Judge
Brotman turned to the statutorily-defined
powers of planning boards in New Jersey
and the decisions of the New Jersey courts
in ascertaining the governmental functions
performed by members of planning boards
in New Jersey. Judge Brotman concluded
that "the duties of planning . . . board
members in the state of New Jersey are so
integrally related to the judicial process as
to warrant shielding from liability those
individuals acting in performance of them."
Id. at 496.
22. We need not retravel the path followed by Judge Brotman to simply say we
agree.11 We therefore conclude that members of municipal planning boards in New
Jersey are absolutely immune in their individual capacities from damage actions
11. In Anastasio v. Planning Board, 209 NJ.Super. 499. 507 A.2d 1194, certification denied, 107
NJ. 46, 526 A.2d 136 (1986), Judge Greenberg,
now of this court, noted an additional important public policy argument supporting our
conclusion and that of Judge Brotman:
We think that the public interest requires that
persons serving on planning boards considering applications for development act with independence and without fear that developers,
who will frequently have significant financial
resources and the ability to litigate, not bring
them into court. The possibility of facing
expensive and aggravating litigation as a result of making a decision on an application
for development may in a subtle way impact
on the decision making process.
Id at 526, 507 A.2d at 1208.
12. To foresta)) any confusion regarding the
members of the Planning Board, we use this
note to tie up two loose ends. First, defendant
Cross was formally sued in his dual capacities
as mayor of South Amboy and as a member of
the Planning Board. In Aitchison v. Raffiani,
708 F.2d 96 (3d Cir.1983), we noted that a mayor can act in a nonexecutive capacity, thus entitling him to absolute immunity. Id at 99. This
litigation has proceeded solely on the theory
that Cross' liability arises from his role as a
member of the Planning Board. We therefore
find it unnecessary to remand this case for
consideration of whether Cross is only entitled
to qualified immunity.
Second, counsel for defendants Kusic and
Kurtz ("Counsel") purports to continue to repre-

brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983 alleging equal protection and first amendment
violations arising out of site plan review
conducted pursuant to
NJ.Stat.Ann.
§ 40:55D-25(a)(2) (West Supp.1988). Consequently, we will affirm the district
court's order to the extent it relates to the
members of the Planning Board in their
individual capacities.12
[3] 23. We must also consider whether
the absolute immunity of the members of
the Planning Board extends to their agents
acting in their individual capacities. By
New Jersey statute, a planning board.is
empowered to employ counsel and experts
"as it may deem necessary." NJ.Stat.Ann
§ 40:55D-24 (West Supp.1988). In Aitchison v. Raffiani, 708 F.2d 96 (3d Cir.1983),
we held that absolute immunity accorded to
the members of a municipal council extended to their attorney "because the borough
attorney was acting in direct assistance of
[the activity] entitled to absolute immunisent defendant Can* in this appeal. Carr, as
well as defendant Schmidt, evidently died during the pendency of this litigation, more than
three months prior to the district court's entry
of the final order. Counsel filed separate purported suggestions of death for Can* and
Schmidt upon which the district court failed to
act In his submission to us, Counsel contends
that the district court erred in failing to dismiss
the complaint against Can: because Can* died
and Bass failed to substitute Carr's representative or successor.
Counsel's argument is flawed. First, Counsel's attorney-client relationship with Canceased at Carr's death. See United States v.
Dwyer, 855 R2d 144, 145 (3d Cir.1988) (per
curiam) (relying on agency principles); Cheramie v. Orgeron, 434 F2d 721, 724-25 (5th Cir.
1970) (authority of defense counsel for group of
defendants terminated as to one defendant upon
death of that defendant to avoid conflicts of
interest). Counsel thus lacks standing to act on
behalf of Can* in this appeal. Second, the suggestion of death in the cases of both Can* and
Schmidt was deficient because the suggestion
was not served on the decedents' successors or
representatives as required by Fed.R.Civ.P.
25(a)(1). See Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983, 986
(D.C.Cir.1969) (expressing concern that decedent's "counsel" would, as a tactical matter, file
a suggestion of death and thus unfairly shift the
burden to the plaintiffs to locate the decedent's
successor or representative in 90 days). Consequently, we do not list Counsel as "representing"
Carr in the caption of this opinion, although we
will affirm the judgments in favor of both Carr
and Schmidt in their individual capacities.
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ty." /<£ at 99-100. The rule in Aitchison
is equally applicable to this case where
Kusic, the Planning Board's legal counsel,
and Carr, the Planning Board's consultant,
were acting in their dealings with Bass on
behalf of the members of the Planning
Board. Accordingly, we will also affirm
the order finding Kusic and Carr entitled to
absolute immunity in their individual capacities as agents of the members of the Planning Board.
[4] 24. We cannot, however, affirm
the district court's order dismissing the
suit against the members of the Planning
Board and their agents in their official
capacity. The Supreme Court has stated:
Official-capacity suits . . . "generally represent only another way of pleading an
action against an entity of which an officer is an agent." As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity
suit is, in all respects other than name, to
be treated as a suit against the entity.
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 16566, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3104-05, 87 L.Ed.2d 114
(1985) (citations omitted). Thus in this
case, the suit naming the members of the
Planning Board in their official capacities
in effect makes the Planning Board a defendant. The Planning Board as a governmental entity has no immunity whatsoever.
See Owen v. City of Independence, 445
U.S. 622, 657, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 1418 (1980)
(no immunity for municipality); Aitchison,
708 F.2d at 100 (absolute immunity of individual defendants does not preclude liability of municipality); Jodeco, 674 F.Supp. at
499 (planning board in New Jersey has no
immunity). Consequently, we will vacate
the order dismissing the suit against the
members of the Planning Board and their
agents in their official capacities.
V.
[5] 25. We turn next to the procedural
context in which the district court ruled
that Kurtz, the Code Enforcement Officer,
is entitled to qualified immunity. Bass con13. A transcript of that deposition was included
in Bass' appendix but does not appear in the

tends again that he was not given warning
by the trial judge that he intended to enter
summary judgment in favor of Kurtz. The
district court's opinion relies heavily on a
purported deposition given by Kurtz.13 According to the district court:
While we find some element of purposefulness in Kurtz's application of the
parking ordinance to Bass' methadone
clinic we also find that Kurtz had other
nondiscriminatory bases for denying a
certificate of occupancy.
Memorandum Opinion of May 19, 1988.
26. In contrast to the purely legal question of absolute immunity, Kurtz' entitlement to qualified immunity has a quasifactual component. "[W]hether an official
protected by qualified immunity may be
held personally liable for an alleged unlawful official action generally turns on the
'objective legal reasonableness' of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules
that were 'clearly established' at the time it
was taken." Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3038, 97 L.Ed.2d
523 (1987) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818-19, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738-39,
73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). We have held that
for a right to be "clearly established,"
there must be "some, but not precise, factual correspondence" between the case at
hand and prior decisions. See People of
Three Mile Island v. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'rs, 747 F.2d 139, 144 (3d Cir.1984).
27. Our ability to review the district
court's analysis of this "factual correspondence" is limited to the district record as
we find it. "It is, of course, black letter
law that a United States court of appeals
may not consider material or purported evidence which was not brought upon the
record in the trial court." United States
ex rel. Bradshaw v. Alldredge, 432 F.2d
1248, 1250 (3d Cir.1970).
28. In this case, the district court record
is totally devoid of any papers other than
the decision explaining why it believed that
Kurtz was entitled to qualified immunity.
Consequently, we cannot determine whethdistrict court record.
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er Kurtz was entitled to qualified immunity. The fact that this evidence may exist,
but the parties failed to file it with the
clerk, does not help us now.
29. The sparsity of the record also
makes it impossible for us to determine
whether Bass was afforded the opportunity
to present his case to the extent required
by Lentino.14 That shortcoming, in tandem with the questions posed by the claim
of qualified immunity, suggests that we
stay our hand.15 We therefore decline to
address whether the district court properly
afforded Kurtz qualified immunity and remand the case against Kurtz to the district
court.16
VI.
30. For the foregoing reasons, we will
affirm the district court's order of January
21,1988 to the extent that the district court
dismissed the complaint against the members of the Planning Board and their
agents in their individual capacities based
on their absolute immunity. We will vacate that order, however, to the extent that
the district court dismissed the complaint
against the members of the Planning
Board and their agents in their official
capacities. In addition, we will vacate the
order of May 19, 1988, in which the district
court dismissed the complaint against Code
Enforcement Officer Kurtz and remand the
case against him to the district court for
further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
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MUTUAL FIRE, MARINE & INLAND
INSURANCE COMPANY
v.
NORAD REINSURANCE
COMPANY, LTD.
Appeal of GTE REINSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., in No. 88-1743.
Appeal of NORAD REINSURANCE
COMPANY, LTD., in No. 88-1750.
Nos. 88-1743, 88-1750.
United States Court of Appeals,
Third Circuit
Submitted Under Third Circuit Rule 12(6)
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Reinsurer moved to confirm arbitration awards in a dispute between the reinsurer and its re-reinsurers about retrocession agreements. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, James McGirr Kelly, J., confirmed the award and denied the re-reinsurers' motion to alter or amend the order.
Re-reinsurers appealed. The Court of Appeals, Seitz, Circuit Judge, held that: (1)
the arbitrators did not exceed their authority in reducing the re-reinsurers' participation in the agreement by 10.8% for each
underwriting year, rather than rescinding
the agreements for improperly ceded risks,
and (2) the re-reinsurers failed to demonstrate that they were prejudiced by alleged
ex parte contacts between the arbitrators
and a representative of the reinsurer.
Orders affirmed.

14. For that same reason, we decline to consider
the arguments summarily advanced by Kurtz in
defense of the judgment in his favor. For example, Kurtz claims that Bass is barred by res
judicata; we cannot, however, determine whether Kurtz was even named as a defendant in the
state court suit Kurtz refers to in his submission
to this court. See Charlie Brown of Chatham,
Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 202 N.J.Super. 312,
327, 495 A.2d 119, 127 (A.D.1985) (identity of
parties is element of res judicata).

15. Because both these issues concern us, we
decline to exercise our authority under Fed.R.
App. P. 10(e) to correct the record.
16. Nothing in our decision today precludes
Kurtz from immediately completing the record
and moving for summary judgment on remand,
if appropriate. Bass then will have notice and
an opportunity to respond. Bass' opportunity to
respond does not require oral argument, unless
the district court requests it. See Fed.R.Civ.P.
78.

D. National Labor Relations Board v. International Measurement
and Control Company, 978 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1992).
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We reverse the district court's order and
hold that the Retirement Board cannot be
compelled to grant full retroactive seniority
ity
benefits to the plaintiffs without receiving
ng
full contributions from either the plaintiffs,
fs,
or the City on their behalf. On remand,
*d>
[
the district court must determine which
ch
ia
party is required to provide the additional
'
contributions under the consent decree.
*eiat
The court must then address whether that
a
party may be equitably required to pay
y
lrt
those contributions. If not, the court
ve
should first consider whether it can resolve
the issue by modifying the consent decree.
*ea
If it is unable to do so, the court may
y
vacate the decree and then determine, in1 aa
subsequent damages trial, the amount ooff
ity
back pay and seniority credits that the City
owes the plaintiffs in order to remedy its
its
previous discrimination against them.' -The
he
City clearly must provide plaintiffs, with
th
the amount of back pay and seniority credit
lit
necessary to make them whole.. If the,
he
consent decree is vacated the district court
trt
must determine the total amount and distriribution of damages owed by the City,
y,
whether that amount is $9 million, $10.5
>.5
million, or some other amount, not just
ist
which party must pay the $1.5 million at
at
issue in this appeal. Alternatively, - the
he
court may permit the parties to draw up a
a
new consent decree.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD, Petitioner,
v.
INTERNATIONAL MEASUREMENT
AND CONTROL COMPANY,
INC., et al., Respondents.
No. 92-1073.
United States Court of Appeals,
Seventh Circuit.
Argued Sept. 30, 1992.
Decided Oct. 27, 1992.

der imposing its unfair labor practices
award previously ordered against allegedly
liquidated employer on affiliated business
entities and individuals. The Court of Appeals, Easterbrook, J., held that: (1) NLRB

could properly award interest on its previous back pay award; (2) pursuant to Illinois Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act,
claims could be satisfied from assets of
family members; and (3) evidence supported finding that owners used their three
corporations and two partnerships to operate different aspects of one electronic-controls enterprise, having single pool of employees to whom they applied single laborrelations policy, and, thus, supported
Board's finding that there was single employer.
Enforced.
1. Interest *»21
National Labor Relations BoarjJ
(NLRB) could properly award interest
against individuals and entities which were
related to employer on an unfair labor practices award for back pay, even though interest had been mounting for almost ten
years; fact that almost ten years had
passed was a reason to award interest, not
to deny it

2. Labor Relations $=>514
National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) did not act too Jate when it added
individuals and other firms and partnerships in unfair labor practices proceeding
involving employer; there was no need to
add the individuals and the other firms and
partnerships until firm that was properly
named as the employer was liquidated.
National Labor Relations Act, §§ 1 et seq.,
10(b), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151 et
seq., 160(b).
3. Corporations <s=>254
Supplemental proceedings to recover
from distributees are normal under state
law and appropriate in labor law.
4. Labor Relations <$=>514
>o~+«oi*cV»inc thrpp oomora-

gle employer, then notice to one that it was
being added to proceeding to enforce unfair
labor practices back pay award was notice
to all. National Labor Relations Act, §§ 1
et seq., 10(b), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A.
§§ 151 et seq., 160(b).
5. Labor Relations <S=>687
Court of Appeals would not remand to
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
for new hearing on basis that administrative law judge (AU) had discussed fact
that an individual defendant in unfair labor
practices action might be a security problem at hearing; there was no evidence that
the NLRB was aware of, let alone influenced by, the ALTs discussion. National
Labor Relations Act, § 10(e), as amended,
29 U.S.C.A. § 160(e).
6. Corporations <S=>542(1)
Pursuant to Illinois Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, claims of employees
against whom employer had committed unfair labor practice could be satisfied from
assets of family members to whom the
family business' assets had been distributed. I11.S.H.A. ch. 59, 1111101-112, 103(a),
lfoVhV
7; Labor Relations «=»510
National Labor Relations' Board
ftfLRB) does not have superintendence
WSr how corporations under common ownership arrange their relations.
8. Labor Relations <3=*394
Evidence failed to support National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB) finding that
corporations and partnerships which had
same owners could be held liable for unfair
labor practices of one of the corporations
on theory that they cooperated in production and sale of electronic devices; mere
fact that the entities all were in same line
of business was not sufficient to hold the
entities responsible for each others debts.
9, Corporations e=>1.6(3)
Affiliated firm cannot be held liable for
each other's obligations to workers merely
on basis that they are affiliated.
* Hon, William C. Lee, of the Northern District of

10. Labor Relations <3=>555
Evidence supported finding that owners used their three corporations and two
partnerships to operate different aspects of
one electronic-controls enterprise, having
single pool of employees to whom they
applied single labor-relations policy, and,
thus, supported National Labor Relations
Board's (NLRB) finding that there was single employer, and NLRB could enforce unfair labor practices award against all the
corporations and partnerships. National
Labor Relations Act, § 8(a), as amended, 29
ILS.C.A.-§ 158(a).
11. Labor Relations <s=>394
There is no requirement that firms
have employees to be part of single employer, but, rather, it is enough that they
be part of common enterprise with common
labor policy. National Labor Relations
Act, § 8(a), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 158(a),

Elizabeth Kinney, N.L.R.B., Region 13,
Chicagor 111., Aileen A. Armstrong, William
A. Baudler (argued), N.L.R.B., Appellate
Court, Enforcement Litigation, Paul J.
Spielberg, N.L.R.B., Litigation Branch.
Washington; D.C.; for petitioner.
Michael H. Moirano (argued), Kristen E.
Crisp, Nisen & Elliott, Dennis R. Schlemmer, Leydig, Voit & Mayer, Chicago, 111.,
for respondents.
Before CUDAHY and EASTERBROOK,
Circuit Judges, and LEE, District Judge.*
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge.
For more than twelve years the Dybel
family business has avoided its obligations
under the labor laws. Now it contends
that the wronged employees cannot receive
their remedy, because while it waged a
rear guard action before the Board and this
court, the corporation that had employed
these persons distributed its assets to family members. It even contends that its ability to string out the process is an independent bar to enforcement. Unfazed, the
Indiana, sitting by designation.

336

978 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES

Board ordered the Dybels to pay personally. So they must
In 1980 the International Measurement
and Control Company ("Manufacturing"}—
which made electronic controls and transducers invented by Frank and William Dybel—fired three employees who joined a
union and complained about working conditions. One employee believed that the cat
excrement the Dybels allowed to accumu-*
late in the plant was making her ill. The
Dybels closed the plant to clean it, falsely
telling their workers that the health department had directed this, and on reopening
the facility did not recall the union supporters. In 1982 the Board concluded that in
doing these things Manufacturing committed an unfair labor practice and must'make
the employees whole, a remedy that includes back pay. 261 NXJ8LB71323 (1982).
(One of the Dybels testified at the Board's
hearing that he viewed union organizing as
"horseshit" Wrong sentiment, wrong setting, wrong species.)
Manufacturing neither complied nor
sought judicial review but waited for the
Board to apply for enforcement. When it
did so, we enforced the order without published opinion. 732 F.2d 158 (7th Cir.l984>.
Manufacturing next waited for the Board
to calculate the amount of back pay that
was due for the period before it offered
reinstatement. In 1985 the Board fixed
this at a little less than $50,000, plus interest. 277 N.L.R.B. 962 (1985). Once again,
Manufacturing neither complied nor sought
judicial review but waited for the Board to
apply for enforcement. When it did so, we
enforced the order without published opinion. 808 F.2d 837 (7th Cir.1986).
Manufacturing did not comply with our
order, contending that the cupboard was
bare. In November 1984 Manufacturing
began selling its assets and turning the
proceeds over to members of the Dybel
family. The process was completed in September 1985 (shortly before the Board's
second order). All of these payments,
Manufacturing contends, were on account
of accumulated salary obligations rather

ey, and it had deferred executive compensation. Even after liquidating all of its assets, Manufacturing contends, it had not
satisfied the debt to its managers.
Although Manufacturing shut down, the
Dybels continued to sell their products.
They subcontracted the manufacture of the
devices (Manufacturing's role in the business) while two other corporations and two
partnerships carried on: IMCO Sales Co.
assembled and sold the devices; IMCO Service Co. installed and repaired the devices;
Zoe Enterprises owned and leased the
premises to these two firms; Dybel Enterprises provided capital for these three.
[1] Not satisfied with Manufacturing's
explanation, the Board opened supplemental proceedings and concluded that "the
manner in which [Manufacturing]^ assetsr
were distributed among the other entities*
and the individual Dybels demonstrates intent to avoid backpay obligations/^ 304
NX.R.B. No. 94 at 7-8 (1991). J t conclude^
that the four remaining t)ybel businesses
and Manufacturing were a single entity, on
a variety of theories—common employer,
alter ego, corporate group liability—and
that all four, plus Frank, Margaret, William, and Palette Dybel personally, are responsible for the back pay obligation;
which with interest still mounting exceeds
$130,000. For a third time, the Dybels
neither complied nor sought judicial review
but waited for the Board to apply for enforcement It has done.-so.
Calling the interest "an enormous windfall", the Dybels say that enforcing the
award against them personally is "Fundamentally Unfair." That takes nerve! They
(or their corporate creatures) could have
paid a decade ago and cut short the accumulation of interest. Interest is not some
kind of penalty. "Prejudgment interest is
an element of complete compensation".
West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S.
305, 310, 107 S.Ct. 702, 706, 93 L.Ed.2d 639
(1987). See also, e.g., General Motors
Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 655-56,
103 S.Ct 2058, 2062, 76 L.Ed.2d 211 (1983).
It reimburses victims for the time value of
mnnpv thp benefit of which the workers

tion. "[T]he passage of time ... is a reason to award interest, not to deny it." In
re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d
1279, 1334 (7th Cir.1992). Cf. NLRB v.
Ironworkers, 466 U.S. 720, 104 S.Ct 2081,
80 L.Ed.2d 715 (1984) (long administrative
delay, while back pay accumulates, does
not prevent enforcement of the Board's
award); NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Manufacturing Co., 396 U.S. 258, 90 S.Ct. 417,
24 L.Ed.2d 405 (1969) (same). The funds
.the Dybels withdrew from Manufacturing
have been earning a return for them since
J984 and 1985, or, equivalently, have enabled the Dybels to avoid the interest they
itfould have had to pay to borrow the same
amount. Meanwhile the wronged employees have lacked funds that they could have
^vested (or that would have enabled them
to avoid the expense of borrowing). The
Return on the money belongs to the victim,
not the wrongdoer, and interest is the
means by which this transfer is accomplished.

[5] Having told us that the Board took
too long, the respondents also tell us that
we should defer enforcement while the
Board conducts a fourth hearing. The administrative law judge heard a member of
the NLRB's staff remark that Frank Dybel
possesses firearms and had in the past
made a threat of violence, a subject that
acquired significance in light of an anonymous call stating that there might be a
"security problem" at the hearing. Counsel and the ALJ discussed the phone call on
the record at the start of the hearing. Later the ALT granted a motion to strike the
dialog and said that she would attempt to
prevent the Board from receiving a copy of
the interchange.

Administrative judges can'trippages out
of transcripts, so the Board received the
full proceedings of the hearing. Claiming
that they learned this only recently, the
respondents ask us to remand for a new
decision at which the Board will be ignorant of the subject. Just how ignorance
can be achieved—short of waiting for a
[2-4] No more persuasive is the Dybels' new_ complement of members to take ofcontention that the Board acted too late— - fice—the respondents do not say. Nothing
that is, beyond the six months that § 10(b) in the Board's opinion suggests that its
M the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b), allows for members were, aware *of, let alone influ^charge—in adding them, and their other enced byf the contretemps. So there was
^frmtf and partnerehips, as parties. There no prejudice. A remand, with instructions
rwaSlno need to dcT so until they liquidated to ignore something the members probably
tfie firm that' was properly named as the did not know in the first place, would back-,
employer. Supplemental proceedings to re- fire. It would be like remanding a case
cover from the distributees are normal un- with instructions that none of the members
4$r state law and entirely appropriate in of the Board think about Greenland anylabor law. NLRB v. C.C.C. Associates, time during the next month. The nature of
fyc, 306 F.2d 534, 539 (2d Cir.1962). See the order would ensure its violation. At all
also, e.g., G & M Lath Plaster Co., 252 events, the record shows that a copy of the
N.L.R.B. 969, 978 (1980), enforced, 670 F.2d transcript, including the pages that respon550 (5th Cir.1982). If, as the Board found, dents say are not supposed to be there, was
the two partnerships, three corporations, mailed to them in January 1990, and they
and four Dybels are but a single employer, did nothing to alert the General Counsel to
then notice to one was notice to all. NLRB this supposed "violation" of the ALJ's orv. Deena Artware, Inc., 361 U.S. 398, 402, der. They did not raise the subject at all
§0 S.Ct. 441, 443, 4 L.Ed.2d 400 (1960). Cf. before the Board, or in this court until
Central States Pension Fund v. Slotky, April 1992. Such delay by persons who
956 F.2d 1369, 1375 (7th Cir.1992). And if accuse the Board of taking too much time
they are not, then everyone other than the is imprudent. See also 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)
defunct Manufacturing prevails without re- (precluding court from considering issues
gard to § 10(b). Either way, § 10(b) plays not presented to Board, save in exceptional
circumstances).
no role in the outcome.
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[6] Must the Dybels pay Manufacture
imj's debt to the three employees? The
Board devoted a page and a half to this
question, citing two of its own opinions and
no statutes or cases. Although it used the
jargon of shareholders' liability ("piercing
the corporate veil" and so on), the extent to
which investors are responsible for the cor*
porate debts is a question of state law—fojthe National Labor Relations Act regulates
employers, not shareholders or creditors.
State law has something to say about the
liability of investors who withdraw funds
from a corporation in order to avoid paying
its debts, but this comes under the heading
of fraudulent conveyances rather than
"veil piercing." The Board's reasoning
concentrated on the transfer, so although it
did not invoke the proper body of rules, it
wocatf be pointless to remand for the pa*
pose of patching up the opinion.
Manufacturing was incorporated in Illinois, which ' has adopted the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act. IH.Rev.Stat. ch.
59 MI 101-12. Section 6(b) of the Act
(11106(b) in Illinois) provides: "A transfer
made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a
creditor whose claim arose before the
transfer was made if the transfer was

aggregating $350,000 a year but had paid
them nothing sjnce 1981. By mid-1984 the
debt to the Dybels approximated $600,000.
Between July 1984 and the end of 1985,
Manufacturing sold all of its assets and
paid the proceeds (or delivered the assets),
worth $221,000 in all, to the Dybels. This
is their own reckoning, by which Manufacturing was insolvent in both 1984 and 1985.
A cred itor aggrieved by a fraudulent
c o n v e y a n c e m a y a v o id that transfer, req u j r j n g the preferred creditors to refund
t h e m o n e y to the debtor. If 108(a)(1). Alternatively, "[i]f a creditor has obtained a
judgment on a claim against the debtor, the
cre ditor, if the court so orders, may levy
exeC ution on the asset transferred or its
pr0 ceeds." H 108(b). The NLRB, acting as
a c o u r t for this purpose, used the latter
a pp roa ch, and quite proper/y^ Manufacturi n g distributed to its insiders assets, including two yachts, a condominium, and several
cars* worth three times^Uie competing crediters' claims. The Dybels received $221.000 in 1984 dollars; the three creditor em-ployees' claims were worth approximately
$70,000 in 1984 dollars. Accordingly, the
claims may be satisfied from the Dybels'
assets.*

made to an insider for an antecedent debt,
Execution may be complicated by Frank
the debtor was insolvent at that time, and D y D e ] ' s death. In February 1992 respons e insider had reasonable cause to believe d ents filed a notice of his death, Fed
that the debtor was insolvent." This rule R . A p p . p . 43(a), but did not identify or subfits our case like a glove. Manufacturing s t i t u t e t h e administrator of his estate or his
paid off debts to its insiders (past-due personal representative despite the Board's
wages are debts) at a time when it was r e q uest Actions to recover fraudulent
insolvent, and the insiders knew i t Re- conveyances survive the preferred credispondents' brief in this court proclaims the tor>s death. Frank Dybel's successor
insolvency of the firm, as if that justified s e e m s ^ devoted as he was to a policy of
preferential payments to the managers, passive resistance to the Board. Rule 43(a)
According to § 3(a), "[a] debtor is insolvent provides, among other things, that "substiif the sum of the debtor's debts is greater tution shall be effected in the court of
than all of the debtor's assets at a fair appeals in accordance with this subdivivaluation." Respondents insist that Manu- s j o n . " Any suggestion of death filed under
factoring ceased operations in July 1984 R u i e 43(a) in a case that does not abate on
because of declining sales and increasing death should identify the successor in intercosts. Manufacturing says that it had est. We direct respondents to identify
promised to pay the four Dybels salaries within seven days the administrator of
fThe Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act became
effective in Illinois at the beginning of 1990,
~f.„.. ,h* rwhels drained Manufacturing of as-

ch. 59 <"4. The Board made such a finding,
which we quoted in the text, so that the change
of law does not matter and we need not decide

Frank Dybel's estate or equivalent representative, who shall be substituted and
bound by our judgment enforcing the
Board's order. Cf. McSurely v. McClelIan, 753 F.2d 88, 97-99 (D.C.Cir.1985).
[7] Remaining for discussion is the
Board's order that IMCO Sales, IMCO Service, Zoe Enterprises, and Dybel Enterprises, also are liable for the back pay. The
Board threw the book at these four entities—the hornbook, that is. The Board's
opinion is filled with blackletter terms such
as alter ego and piercing the corporate veil.
If the firms really are alter egos, then the
surviving entities are liable for all of Manufacturing's debts, not just its obligations
under the labor laws. Once more, however, the NLRB 'neglects to identify the
source of law. The Board cited four of its
own cases and nothing else. Nary an Illinois opinion is to be found. Although this
might be appropriate if it were enforcing
simple provisions of federal statutes, theBoard does not quote or even refer to any
statute. Nothing in the Board's portfolio
gives it superintendence over how corporations under common ownership arrange
theg relations, Cf. United States v. Kim"^'foods, Inc., 440 IJ.S. 715, 99 S.Ct
$£>59 L.Ed.2d 7U (1979) (holding thatj>
tjje absence of a federal statute displacing
it state law supplies the legal rules even
xphen the obligation runs directly to the
tlnited States). Although we do not rule
out the possibility that the NLRB could
create a federal common law of corporate
groups, see Wilson McLeod, Shareholders9
Liability and Workers* Rights: Piercing
the Corporate Veil Under Federal Labor
Law, 9 Hofstra Lab.LJ. 115 (1991) (arguing that this is appropriate), the Board has
not tried to do so. Its enduring disregard
of the choice-of-law question, see Esmark,
Inc. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 739, 755 n. 26 (7th
Cir.1989), does not permit a court to defer
to its non-resolution.
[8] The Board's principal theory is that
the four Dybel entities cooperated in the
production and sale of the electronic devices: Manufacturing made them, Sales
sold them, Service serviced them, Zoe
owned the building, and Dybel Enterprises

put up the dough. After Manufacturing
folded, the Dybels contracted for the manufacture of the controls and went on selling
them. Yet no state of which we are
aware—and certainly not Illinois—holds
members of brother-sister groups responsible for each other's debts just because they
are in the same line of business. See Phillip I. Blumberg, The Law of Corporate
Groups § 8.03 (1987). States require
more, such as systematic disregard of the
corporate form or arranging one's affairs
to deceive creditors. SeaLand Services,
Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519 (7th
Cir.1991) (Illinois law); see also, e.g., Perpetual Real Estate Services, Inc. v. Michaelson Properties Inc., 974 F.2d 545 (4th
Cir.1992) (Virginia law); Walkovszky v.
Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585,
223 N.E.2d 6 (1966). If shareholders exercise control over a group of related corporations "in disregard of the separate corporate identity" of these firms, Esmark, 887
F.2d at 759, the Board may consider all to
be one; we held in Esmark, however, that
an investor's (or parent's) participation in
.the management of a firm is not the same
as disregarding the corporate form and
does not permit the Board to lump all of
the affiliated firms into a single enterprise.
Id. at 760.
[9] The Dybels did not form IMCO
Sales, IMCO Service, and the two partnerships to evade the labor laws. All four
entities predated the first efforts to organize the employees. None of the employees was defrauded about the identity of his
employer. There was no shell game; Manufacturing's assets were bailed out to the
Dybels, not to other family corporations.
(Dybel Enterprises bought some assets
from Manufacturing, which distributed the
cash to the Dybels, but the Board does not
contend that the partnership disregarded
Manufacturing's separate existence or paid
less than fair market value.) The Board's
observation that the corporations and partnerships "employ the same accounting firm
and bank at the same institutions" hardly
aids its cause. Under what legal rule does
holding an account at the same bank as a
sibling corporation justify ignoring the cor-
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porate form? "[T]he Board may not disregard settled principles of corporate law."
Esmark, 887 F.2d at 753. Dwelling on
such common, and irrelevant, particulars
reinforces the impression that the Board
has tossed corporate law out the window
and wants to hold all affiliated firms responsible for each other's obligations to
workers. We forbade such an approach in
Esmark, a case the Board did not trouble
to cite or distinguish. (Of course it was
not discriminating against Esmark; it did
not rely on, distinguish, criticize, or otherwise address, a single opinion of any state
or federal court.)

ground that the factor of joint control
over labor relations is not present among
all the entities and individuals named,
because not all the corporations and partnerships had or have employees. For
those Respondent entities that have or
have had employees, however, labor relations authority has been shared by the
Dybels. Thus, as to those entities, this
criterion is satisfied. Because all other
pertinent single employer criteria are
met with respect to the five entities, and
because there is no arms-length relationship among them, the single employer
finding is warranted.

[10] Nonetheless, the Board invoked a
genuinely federal theory of liability to employees, a theory sufficient in these circumstances to support its order. Section 8(a)*
of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a), lists adts
that are unfair labor practices "for an employer". What is the "employer",for this
purpose? Presumptively the corporation
that writes the paychecks. But perhaps
the "employer" is he who calls the tune,
and not just whoever pays the piper. ,Por
decades the Board has treated the enterprise with effective direction over labor
relations as the "employer," and the Supreme Court has referred approvingly io
both the "joint employer" and the "single
employer" variants of this doctrine. E.g.,
Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians v. Broadcast Service of Mobile, Inc.,
380 U.S. 255, 256, 85 S.Ct. 876, 13 L.Ed.2d
789 (1965); South Prairie Construction
Co, v. Operating Engineers, 425 U.S. 800,
802-03, 96 S.Ct 1842, 1843-44, 48 L.Ed.2d
382 (1976). We have held that the Board
acts within its discretion in treating as a
single employer firms that operate as an
integrated enterprise and "exert[] significant control over" the employees in question. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. NLRB,
879 F.2d 1526, 1530 (7th Cir.1989); see also,
e.g., W.W. Grainger, Inc. v. NLRB, 860
F.2d 244, 247 (7th Cir.1988); NLRB v.
Western Temporary Services, Inc., 821
F.2d 1258, 1266-67 (7th Cir.1987). Here
the Board wrote:
[T]he facts establish that the five entities

304 N.L.R.B. No. 94 at 8. In other words,
the Dybels used their three corporations
and two partnerships to operate different
aspects of one electronic-controls enterprise, having a single pool of employees to
whom they applied a single labor-relations
policy. Substantial evidence in the record
supports this conclusion,
[11] Respondents do not deny that the
corporations and partnerships embarked on
a common enterprise, and that when Manufacturing shut down IMCO Sales took over
its final-assembly functions while continuing to sell parts made by outside contract
tors. They do not deny that IMCO Sales
hired new employees (some of whom used
to work for Manufacturing) to carry out
these tasks. They do not deny that the^
Dybels have one labor-relations policy.
But they insist that Zoe Enterprises, Dybel
Enterprises, and IMCO Service never had
any employees and so cannot be a "single
employer" with Manufacturing and IMCO
Sales. We see how partnerships can lack
employees. But IMCO Service Corporation? A corporation must have employees;
in what other way can it act? Maybe the
Dybels mean that they were its only employees (independent contractors provided
the service to purchasers of the electronic
gizmos). No matter. Neither the Board
nor this court requires that firms have
employees to be part of a single employer.
It is enough that they be part of a common
enterprise with a common labor policy.
*rr D D „, i?*»c„\>n>0 Zii'nPTmnrkeL

Inc.. 8 7 2

can belong to the single employer by giving
as well as by receiving directions about
labor policy.
* We have now enforced the Board's orders three times, and we remind the respondents that disobedience to these judgments is contempt of court.
ENFORCED.

SZ\
( O f X ! Y NUMBER SYSTEM>

UNITED STATES of America,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Marcos M. COJAB, DefendantAppellant.
No. 91-3903.
United States Court of Appeals,
Seventh Circuit.
Argued May 27, 1992.
Pecided Oct._£7, 1992.
Reheariftg Snd:feehe^ring En Banc
Denied Dec 28:nfi92.
Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy
to distribute in excess of five kilograms of
cocaine and was sentenced by the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, Robert W. Warren, Senior District Judge, and he appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Kanne, Circuit Judge,
held that: (1) denial of reduction in offense
tevel under Sentencing Guidelines for acceptance of responsibility after defendant
failed to provide financial information to
probation office did not violate privilege
against self-incrimination; (2) record supported denial of reduction despite guilty
plea; and (3) record supported increase in
offense level on ground that activity was
otherwise extensive, regardless of whether
it involved five or more participants.
Affirmed.
*78F 20-10

1. Criminal Law <3=»1252
Witnesses o=>297(8)
Refusing to grant two-level reduction
under Sentencing Guidelines for acceptance
of responsibility for failure of drug dealer
to provide financial information to probation office did not penalize defendant for
exercising Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination; denial of reduction was a "denied benefit," rather than a
"penalty."
U.S.S.G.
§ 3E1.1,
18
U.S.C.A.App.; U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
2. Criminal Law <^1139, 1158(1)
Court of Appeals reviews challenges to
district court's sentencing determination
under deferential standard, and to extent
determination turns on questions of fact,
district court's findings will not be disturbed unless Court of Appeals is left with
definite and firm conviction that mistake
has been committed, but question involving
interpretation of Sentencing Guidelines
term is matter of law subject to de novo
review. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 et seq., 18
U.S.C.A.App.
3. Criminal Law. e»1252
Record supported denial of two-level
reduction under Sentencing Guidelines for
acceptance of responsibility where defendant pleaded guilty to obtain dismissal of
charges against his wife but there was no
additional evidence of affirmative recognition of guilt and defendant failed to provide
probation office with requested financial
information.
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, 18
U.S.CA.App.
4. Criminal Law <s>1252
Entry of guilty plea combined with
truthful admission of involvement in offense and related conduct constitutes significant evidence of acceptance of responsibility for purposes of reduction under Sentencing Guidelines, but this evidence may
be outweighed by conduct inconsistent with
acceptance of responsibility. U.S.S.G.
§ 3E1.1, 18 U.S.C.A.App.

E. Continental Bank, N.A. v. Meyer, 10 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1993).

We think this is'tfte souna consu-ut-uwi w
the statute. It was adopted in EEOC v.
Continental Oil Co., 548 F.2d 884 (10th Cir.
1977), the most recent decision on the subject, concluding that a construction authorizing separate actions would render inconsequential both the provision for permissive
intervention, and the requirement of a certificate. Earlier EEOC v. Missouri Pacific
R.R., 493 F.2d 71, 74 (8th Cir.1974), reached
the same result, emphasizing the avoidance
of "duplicitous lawsuits when both actions
find their genesis in one unlawful employment practice charge." In 1975, the Sixth
Circuit had disagreed with the Eighth, holding that if "the EEOC investigation of the
[individual's] charge could reasonably have
been expectedto^disclosethat company practices had a racial impact extending beyond
[the individual's] particular situation, the
EEOC was entitled to bring its own suit
based on its investigation's revelations."
Equal Employment Op. Com'n. v. KimberlyClark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1363 n. 15 (6th
Cir.1975).

CONTINENTAL BANK, N.A., formerly
known as Continental Illinois National
Bank & Trust Company of Chicago,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Andrew C. MEYER, Jr., Nancy M. Lubin,
as Administratrix of the Estate of Donald M. Lubin, and Philip J. Crowe, Jr.,
Defendants-Appellants.
No. 91-3476.
United States Court of Appeals,
Seventh Circuit.
Argued June 8, 1992.
Decided Dec. 1, 1993.

Bank which had loaned money for investment in horse-breeding limited partnership sued borrowers on notes, and borrowers
counterclaimed for fraud. The United States
The construction permitting separate suit District Court for the Northern District of
was adopted in EEOC v. North Hills Passa- -- Illinois, Eastern Division, Ann Claire
vant Hosp.y 544 F.2d 664, 667-672 (3d Cir. Williams, J., dismissed counterclaim, struck
1976), rejecting the implication from the pro- affirmative defenses, and allowed substitution
vision for permissive intervention, relied on of administratrix in place of deceased defenby the Eighth and, later, the Tenth Circuits. dant, and granted bank's motion for sumWe, however, are persuaded that the implica- mary judgment. Borrowers appealed. The
tion is sound.
Court of Appeals, Fairchild, Senior Circuit
Judge, held that: (1) borrowers waived deInsofar as the judgment appealed from
dismissed the EEOC's ADEA claim, it is fense of lack of personal jurisdiction, though
they raised it in answer, where they fully
REVERSED and the cause REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. participated in litigation of the merits for
In all other respects, the judgment is AF- over two and one-half years without actively
contesting personal jurisdiction; (2) there
FIRMED. Each party shall bear its own costs.
was no error in not dismissing deceased defendant though bank did not move for substitution of administratrix until over eight
months after such defendant's death was
suggested; (3) there was no abuse of discreO f MYNUMB1P SYSTEM >
tion in denying motion to amend, to assert
counterclaim and affirmative defense based
on "aiding a fraud" theory; and (4) borrowers did not allege false statements of fact by
bank, but only opinion, and thus did not have
cause of action for fraud under Illinois law.
Affirmed.
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1. Federal Courts 0 9 5
Defendants in suit on notes waived objection to lack of personal jurisdiction, although they pled lack of jurisdiction in their
answer, where they fully participated in litigation of the merits for over two and one-half
years without actively contesting personal
jurisdiction, including pailicipation and
lengthy discovery and filing and opposing
various motions. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule
12(h), (h)(1), 28 U.S.C.A.
2. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>751
Federal Courts <3>95
Privileged defenses of lack of jurisdiction over the person, improper venue, insufficiency of process, or insufficiency of service
of process may be waived by formal submission in a cause or by submission through
conduct, and party need not actually file answer or motion before waiver is found. Fed.
Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 12(h)(1), 28 U.S.CA
3. Federal Civil Procedure <S=>365
There was no error in not dismissing
suit against deceased defendant in suit on
notes though plaintiff did not move for substitution of administratrix until over eight
months after decedent's death was suggested, where district court found excusable neglect on theory that, after decedent's death,
his attorneys, who represented all three defendants, continued to file papers on decedent's behalf and continued to participate in
settlement discussions, creating reasonable
belief that estate would be substituted without prejudice. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rules
6(b), (b)(2), 25(a)UX 25 note, 28 U.S.CA
4. Federal Civil Procedure <3>364
Though rule providing that action shall
be dismissed as to deceased party unless
motion for substitution is made not later than
90 days after death is suggested on record is
couched in mandatory terms, the 90-day requirement may be extended on ground of
excusable neglect. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rules
6(b), (b)(2), 25(a)(1), 25 note, 28 U.S.CA.
5. Federal Courts 0817
District court's refusal to permit amendment nf pnmnlaint is reviewed for abuse of

6. Federal Civil Procedure <S»841
In suit on notes in which defendants had
asserted fraud counterclaim and defense,
there was no abuse of discretion in refusing
to allow amendment to assert second counterclaim and defense based on "aiding a
fraud," where complaint had been filed over
two years previously, facts of transaction
were known to defendants and could have
been pled at any time after filing of initial
complaint, and allowing amendment would
have put plaintiff to additional discovery and
thus prejudiced it. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule
15(a), 28 U.S.CA.
7. Fraud ^ l l ( l ) , 12
To establish fraud under Illinois law,
parties claiming it must prove misrepresentation of fact, and statement which is merely
expression of opinion or.relates to future or
contingent events, expectations or probabilities ordinarily does not constitute actionable
misrepresentation*
8. Federal Civil Procedure e=*636
Counterclaim against bank which had
loaned money for investment in limited partnership and was suing on borrowers' notes,
alleged representation by bank to borrowers
that partnership wag "structured" so as to
make a profit was only opinion that partner;
ship, not yet in existence, would produce a
profit, and thus wras not actionable fraud
under Illinois lawT, absent pleading of the
circumstances with particularity to showr that
term "structured" was statement of fact concerning the form of the partnership. Fed.
Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 9(b), 28 U.S.C.A.
9. Fraud <S>12
Though representations as to past income of business are actionable under Illinois
law concerning fraud, representations as to
future income are not.
10. Banks and Banking O100
Alleged representations by bank which
loaned money for investment in limited partnership, not yet in operation, that partnership wras a 4trisk free" investment expressed
only opinion, and wras not actionable by borrowers under Illinois law, and the same wras

bred by the partnership would oe 01 mgnesi
quality and partnership would be managed
by competent general partners.

Stephen Novack, Bruce Braverman (argued), Eric N. Macey, Novack & Macey,
Lester Stone, Thomas D. Sullivan, Robert D.
Hughes, Stone & Hughes, Chicago, IL, for
plaintiff-appellee.

On appeal* we address whether the district
court properly struck the defendants most
recent affirmative defenses and dismissed
the counterclaims. We drawT on defendants'
pleading for the facts.

The three defendants were partners in a
law firm in Massachusetts. They invested in
and became limited partners in Sunrise
Farm Breeding Partnership No. 3, operating
Joanne A. Sarasin (argued), Stuart M. in Illinois. The general partners were
r
Widman, Much, Shelist, Freed, Denenberg & Charles Schmidt and Edw ard Zurek. The
Ament, Chicago, IL, for defendants-appel- bank had financed two similar partnerships,
Sunrise No. 1 and No. 2. Lubin and Meyer
lants.
had invested in No. 2. The purpose of the
Before CUMMINGS and BAUER, Circuit partnership was "to breed world class and
champion thoroughbred stallions to proven
Judges, and FAIRCHILD, Senior Circuit
stakes brood mares with internationally recJudge.
ognized pedigrees so as to breed world class
thoroughbred yearlings which wrould be sold
FAIRCHILD, Senior Circuit Judge.
at a profit."
In 1984, Continental Bank lent funds to
Defendants' pleading is not very specific as
Andrew C. Meyer, Jr., Donald M. Lubin and to what happened. We gather that each
Philip J. Crowe, Jr, to invest in a horse- defendant borrowed $200,000 from the bank
breeding limited partnership. In 1988, the and invested that amount. The breeding
bank sued each of these individuals to recov- program is said to have "failed." It seems
er on the unpaid renewal notes. In July reasonable to assume that defendants claim
1989, the. actions were consolidated and the they received no profits and their interests
bank filed an amended, consolidated combecame valueless because in their counterplaint against all defendants.1 The defen- claim theyl seek to recover the part of the
dants filed an answer including several affirloans they had repaid, and their affirmative
mative defenses. The district court struck defenses sought to prevent the bank recoverall the defenses, but gave leave to amend the
ing the unpaid balances. Their allegations of
defense based on fraud. The defendants information the bank failed to reveal sugamended that defense and added another
gests a claim that the failure was caused by
("aiding a fraud") and a two-count counter- Schmidt's selling to the partnership stallion
claim. The court dismissed the counterclaim
breeding seasons which he owned for excesand struck the affirmative defenses. The sive fees and without arm's length negotiabank moved for summary judgment, and the
tion. Other allegations suggest that the
defendants responded solely by challenging mares were not of good quality or value.
personal jurisdiction. The court found the
The claim of fraud includes alleged oral
defendants' active participation in the litigation for two-and-a-half years constituted a representations by a bank officer and failure
waiver of the personal jurisdiction defense to inform defendants of other facts, including
and granted summary judgment. The court untruths in a Private Placement Memoranadditionally allowed for substitution of the dum prepared by the General Partners, and
administratrix of defendant Lubin's estate in approved by the bank officer and attorney.
place of the deceased Lubin, discussed more The representations were made before the
fully below. The defendants now appeal. defendants borrowed the money or the partWe affirm.
nership began to operate.
1. Federal jurisdiction is based upon diversity.

Illinois law governs all substantive issues.
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The oral representations alleged, as sum- ferred to. The bank people allegedly knew
manzed in appellants* brief, were uthat Sun- of the representations and omissions, and
rise No. 3(1) was structured so as to make a knew they were false or had been made with
profit, (2) was a 'risk free' investment, (3) reckless disregard of their truth. It was
had highest quality horses, and (4) was man- alleged that the bank assisted Schmidt and
aged by competent General Partners."
Zurek in perpetrating the fraud by "endorsThe alleged omissions were failures to say ing" Sunrise No. 3, confirming that Zurek's
(1) that Schmidt would personally sell stallion statements were correct, and failing to give
seasons to the partnership, (2) that the part- information omitted by Schmidt and Zurek.
nership "was structured primarily to benefit
The district court struck the second affirthe Bank and the General Partners," and mative defense and dismissed the second
failures to correct statements in the Private count of the counterclaim. The district
Placement Memorandum, (3) that the bank judge's first reason was that they were not
had investigated the partnership when it had timely filed, noting defendants' admission
not, (4) that Zurek was the owner of a partic- that the "aiding a fraud" theory is "simply a
ular farm in Kentucky, when he was not, and new legal theory which arises out of the same
(5) that the bank had committed to fund the facts of which Plaintiff [sic] has alwrays been
investments of limited partners based solely aware." She also concluded that defendants
on the value of the horses and foals, when in did not sufficiently allege that the bank bene:
fact it also relied on the credit of the inves- fitted from the fraud.
tors.
The bank then moved for summary judgThe pleading did not allege that the bank
ment, and the defendants raised only their
had.a duty to disclose to defendants the
claim of lack of personal jurisdiction. This
matters allegedly omitted or to correct the
defense had been pled in the defendants*
allegedly untrue statements in the Memorananswer, but had not been raised since that
dum.
time. The court found that the defendants
The district court concluded that the de- had waived the personal jurisdiction defense
fendants had failed to allege that the bank by extensively participating in litigation of
made any false statements of fact, as re- the merits for two-and-a-half years before,
quired for fraud under Illinois law\ Instead, affirmatively pressing the challenge to perthe court determined that the bank's repre- sonal jurisdiction.
sentations were only opinions. The district
court further decided that the defendants
II. DISCUSSION
had not pled scienter with the required specificity. The district court also found that the A Waiver of Personal Jurisdiction
defendants had failed adequately to plead
[1] The defendants contend that the disloss causation. For these reasons, the court
struck the defendants1 fraud defense and dis- trict court erred in finding that they had
missed the fraud count of the counterclaim. waived their objection to personal jurisdiction. The district court held that although
In the second affirmative defense and sec- the defendants pled lack of jurisdiction in
ond count of the counterclaim, defendants their answer, they had waived the defense by
alleged that the bank assisted Schmidt and extensive participation in the merits of the
Zurek in their scheme to defraud defendants lawsuit without raising the defense affirmaand other limited partners. The bank's mo- tively.
tive allegedly was to help Schmidt and Zurek
repay their own debts to the bank. They
[2] Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
alleged that Zurek orally made misrepresen- 12(h)(1) provides that "[a] defense of lack of
tations to defendants concerning the struc- jurisdiction over the person . is waived ...
turing of the partnership and the quality of if it is neither made by motion under this
the horses, and made representations in the rule nor included in a responsive pleading or
™„:._4_ Di^nmont Wpmorandum soi?iewrhat an amendment thereof permitted by Rule

defendants did raise the defense in their B. Substitution oj asiaie
answer, and therefore the waiver provided
[3] Defendant Donald Lubin died on
for by Rule 12(h) did not occur. See Adden June 22, 1990, and in August 1990, the Lubin
v. Middlebrooks, 688 F.2d 1147, 1156-57 (7th estate was opened. The bank, however, did
Cir.1982). However, the privileged defenses not move for substitution of the Administrareferred to in Rule 12(h)(1) "may be waived trix until March 12, 1991, over eight months
by 'formal submission in a cause, or by sub- after Lubin's death was suggested. The dismission through conduct/ " Trustees of Cen- trict court granted the bank's motion to subtral Laborers' Welfare Fund v. Lowery, 924stitute. The court permitted the late filing,
F.2d 731, 732 (7th Cir.1991) (quoting Marcial finding that the failure to file in time was the
Vein, S.A. v. SS Galicia, 723 F.2d 994, 996- result of excusable neglect. All three defen97 (1st Cir.1983)); Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem dants were represented by the same attorShipbuilding Coiy., 308 U.S. 165, 168, 60 neys (as they are on this appeal). The court
S.Ct. 153,154, 84 L.Ed. 167 (1939); Yeldell v. found that "the fact that after Lubin died his
Tutt, 913 F.2d 533, 539 (8th Cir.1990); see attorneys continued to file papers on his
Burton v. Northern Dutchess Hosp., 106 behalf and continued to participate in settlement discussions on his behalf created a reaF.R.D. 477, 481 IS.D.N.Y.1985) (asserting
sonable belief in plaintiffs attorneys that Lujurisdictional defect in answer does "not prebin's estate would be substituted without observe the defense in perpetuity"). Indeed,
jection." March 14, 1991 Tr. at 2-3.
"[a] party need not actually file an answer or
[4] The defendants assert that the dismotion before waiver is found." Central Latrict
court erred in not dismissing Lubin
borers' Welfare Fund, 924 F2d at 732-33;
O'Brien v. Sage Group, Inc., 141 F.R.D. 81, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
83 (N.D.I11.1992), judgment afFd, 998 F.2d 25(a)(1). The Rule provides: "Unless the
motion for substitution is made not later than
1394 (1993).
90 days after the death is suggested upon the
record
... the action shall be dismissed as to
Here, the defendants fully participated in
litigation of the merits for over two-and-a- the deceased party." While couched in manhalf ye^rs without actively contesting person- datory terms, the Advisory Committee Notes
al jurisdiction. They participated in lengthy to Rule 25 indicate that the 90-day requirediscovery, filed various motions and opposed ment may be extended by Federal Rule of
a number of motions filed by the bank. Civil Procedure 6(b). Rule 6(b)(2) states that
.While the defendants literally complied with a district court "for cause shown may at any
Rule 12(h), "they did not comply with the time in its discretion ... upon motion made
spirit of the rule, which is 'to expedite and after the expiration of the specified period
permit the act to be done where the failure
simplify proceedings in the Federal Courts.'"
to act was the result of excusable neYeldell 913 F.2d at 539 (quoting C. Wright &
glect. ..." "[T]he history of Rule 25(a) and
A. Miller, 5A Federal Practice and ProceRule 6(b) makes it clear that the 90 day time
dure § 1342, at 162 (2d ed.1990)). The dis- period was not intended to act as a bar to
trict court could properly conclude that the otherwise meritorious actions, and extensions
defendants' delay in urging this threshold of the period may be liberally granted."
issue manifests an intent to submit to the Tatterson v. Koppers Co., 104 F.R.D. 19, 20
court's jurisdiction. See, e.g., id. (defendants (W.D.Pa.1984).
waived defense of personal jurisdiction where
they participated in discovery, filed motions C Dismissal of "Aiding a Fraud" Counterand participated infive-daytrial without raisclaim and Defense
ing issue); O'Brien, 141 F.R.D. at 83-84
[5,6] The defendants contend that the
(failure to assert defense of improper service district court erred in dismissing its second
waived when defendant moved to set aside affirmative defense and Count II of the coundefault without objecting to validity of ser- terclaim based on an "aiding a fraud" theory.
vice).
This theory was pled for the first time in the
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defendants' amended affirmative defenses
and counterclaim, filed on October 4, 1990.
The distinct court found that (1) the defense
and counterclaim were untimely and (2) the
claims were legally deficient. We review a
district court's refusal to permit amendment
of a complaint for an abuse of discretion.
Murphy v. White Hen Pantry Co., 691 F.2d
350, 353 (7th Cir.1982) (citing Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Hazeltinc, 401 U.S. 321, 330, 91 S.Ct.
795, 802, 28 L.Ed.2d 77 (1971)); Kleinhans v.
Lisle Sav. Profit Sharing Trust, 810 F.2d
618, 625 (7th Cir.1987).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that leave to amend the pleadings
"shall be freely given when justice so requires." The Supreme Court elaborated in
FoTnan v. Davis;

D. Dismissal of Fraud Counteixlaim and
Defense
The defendants assert that the distinct
court erred in dismissing its first affirmative
defense and Count I of the counterclaim.
This defense and counterclaim were based on
alleged fraudulent misrepresentations and
omissions made by the bank. The district
court struck this claim and defense on three
grounds: (1) that the alleged misrepresentations were statements of opinion, not fact,
and therefore were not actionable as fraud;
(2) that the bank's knowledge was not properly pleaded; and (3) that loss causation was
not properly pleaded. The defendants contend that the district court erred on all
grounds. In the alternative, the defendants
contend that we should reverse and remand
for leave to amend.

The defendants alleged that a bank officer
If the Underlying tacts or circumstances
made
statements that Sunrise No. 3 was
relied upon by a plaintiff may be.a proper
structured
so as to make a profit, that it wras
subject of relief, he ought to1>e afforded an
opportunity to test his claim on* the merits. a "risk free" investment, that the horse^
were of highest quality, and that Sunrise No.*
In the absence of any apparent or declared
3 was managed by competent General Part :
reason—such as undue delay, bad faith or
-ners. The district court found that the dedilatory motive on the part of the movant,
fendants "failed to allege that the Bank made
repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
any false statements of fact and instead only
amendments previously allowed, undue allege[d] that they relied on the Bank's opinprejudice to the opposing party by virtue ions. This cannot form the basis for a frauff
of allowance of the amendment, futility of claim." Mera.Op. at 5.
amendment, etc.—the leave sought should,
[7,8] To establish fraud under Illinois
as the rules require, be "freely given."
law, the defendants must prove a misrepre371 U.S. 178, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 sentation of fact. Nieinoth v. Kohls, 171
(1962); quoted in Murphy, 691 F.2d at 353. Ill.App.3d 54, 121 IU.Dec. 37^46, 524 N.E.2d
1085, 1094, appeal denied 122 I11.2d 578, 125
The complaint in this action wras filed in
IlLDec. 222, 530 N.E.2d 250 (1988) (citing
September 1988; the defendants did not file
Mercado v. United Investors, Inc., 144 111.
their amended affirmative defenses and App.3d 886, 98 IU.Dec. 702, 494 N.E.2d 824
counterclaim until October 4, 1990. Al- (1986)). A "statement which is merely an
though other maneuvers occurred during this expression of opinion or which relates to
time, the facts of the 1984 transaction and future or contingent events, expectations or
representations preceding it did not change probabilities, rather than to pre-existent or
and must have been known to defendants. present facts, ordinarily does not constitute
These facts could have been pled at any time an actionable misrepresentation" under Illiafter the filing of the initial complaint. See nois law. Peterson Indus., Inc. v. Lake View
Kleinhans, 810 F.2d at 625. If the amend- Trust & Sav. Bank, 584 F.2d 166, 169 (7th
ment were allowed, the bank would have Cir.1978) (quoting Metro. Bank and Trust
been put to additional discovery, and thus Co. v. Oliver 4 Ill.App.3d 975, 283 N.E.2d 62,
prejudiced. We conclude that the district 64 (1972)); Banington Press, Inc. v. Morey,
-x J : J .^4. oKuco itc Hkrrption in refusing 752 F.2d 307, 310 n. 1 (7th Cir.1985); Niem-

The statements pled here do not fall within Illinois law, a representation concerning proiany recognized exception to this general rule. it expectations may be a promise of a future
First, the defendants allege that the bank event which is actionable if used to perpestated that Sunrise No. 3 was structured so trate a fraud). We agree with Judge
as to make a profit. Their pleading did not Williams in distinguishing Peterson because
allege what they understood was meant by there the defendant "making the representa"structured." It sounds like a reference to tion regarding the 'expected return' on inthe form or design of the partnership. Al- vesting in the company was an officer, dithough a statement that a partnership or rector, and majority shareholder of the comother entity was "structured" in a specified pany" already in existence.
manner could be a statement of fact concern[10] Second, the defendants allege that
ing its form, the alleged statement did not
the
bank represented that the partnership
supply those specifics, nor is there any allegation as to how the form of the partnership was a risk free investment. No one could
caused it to fail to make a profit Without take literally a statement that a program of
more specificity in this and other allegations, breeding thoroughbred horses was "risk
the pleading fails to state the circumstances free." The defendants do not allege that the
constituting fraud \*ath particularity. Rule of partnership was in operation at the time this
Civil Procedure 9(b). We agree with the statement was made. We conclude that this
district court that the statement was only an statement only expresses an opinion and is
opinion that the partnership, not yet in exis- not actionable under Illinois law.
tence, would produce a profit, and was not a
The defendants also allege that the bank
representation of a pre-existent or present officers stated that the horses wTere (necesfact.
sarily r"would be") of the highest quality, and
[9] "It is well settled in Illinois that al- that the partnership would be managed by
though representations as to the past income competent general partners. These stateof a business are actionable, representations ments are no more than opinion. See, e.g.,
as to future income are not." Niemoth, at Nanlawala v. Jack Carl Assoc, Inc., 669
46, 524 N.E^d at 1094 (citing Mother Earth, F.Supp. 204, 207 (N.D.I11.1987) (statements
Ltdu Strawberry Camel, Ltd., 72 Ill.App.3d that defendant had "expertise" and that he
37, 28 IlLDec. 226, 390 N.E.2d 393 (1979)). would "pick good trades" not actionable deSee Barrington Press, 752 F.2d at 310 n. 1 ception under Commodity Exchange Act, 7
(four-year projections of future sales and U.S.C. § 6h); Royal Business Machines,
profitability of ongoing business are predic- Inc. v. Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34, 41, 45
tions or opinions regarding future business (7th Cir.1980) (statements that machines
performance); Ziskin v. Thrall Car Mfg. Co., "were of high quality" not a factual represen106 IU.App.3d 482, 62 Ill.Dec. 255, 259, 435 tation under Indiana law); Forbis v. Reilly,
N.E.2d 1227, 1231 (1982) (representation of 684 F.Supp. 1317, 1322 (W.D.Pa.), affd withfuture profitability is an opinion of future out opinion, 862 F.2d 307 (3d Cir.1988)
occurrence, and without more, not action- (statement that "this colt was one of the
finest ever bred" and "perfect for use as a
able).
Defendants argue that when the bank stat- foundation stallion" no more than puffing and
ed that "Sunrise No. 3 'was structured so as not actionable as fraud in Pennsylvania).
to make a profit/ " they "were representing
Defendants make no argument on appeal
that the tangible features such as the hoi%ses concerning the bank's omissions except to
used, fees paid and foal sharing agreements point out that the judge "failed to address
were sound," and were not simply "predict- the bank's omissions which were sufficient to
ing earnings potential." Opening Brief at 17. support the fraud claim." Several of the
We do not deem that a reasonable interpre- alleged omissions were in terms of opinions
tation.
or predictions of future happenings or referDefendants rely on Peterson v. Baloun, ences to the "structure" of the partnership
715 F.Supp. 212, 216 (N.D.I11.1989) (under without disclosing what was wrong about the
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"structure." Defendants' brief suggests no
theory as to the duty of the bank to supply
defendants with the omitted information or
to correct the alleged errors in the Private
Placement Memorandum. We shall not endeavor to devise arguments for them.
The district court also found that the defendants did not properly allege scienter, and
that they had failed to allege loss causation.
Because we conclude that the defendants
have not alleged false statements of fact under Illinois law, we need not address these
alternative grounds.
Accordingly, we

AFFIRM.

motion for leave to file third amended complaint; (2) plaintiff waived claims of hospital's
negligence based on additional negligent acts
and failures not alleged in first three complaints; and (3) physician who treated patient in hospital was not agent of hospital.
Affirmed.
1. Federal Courts e=>817
Court of Appeals reviews district court's
denial of plaintiffs motion for leave to file
proposed amended complaint for abuse of
discretion; denial will be overturned only if
there was no justifying reason for it. Fed.
Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 15(a), 28 U.S.CA

2. Federal Civil Procedure <s>840
District court did not abuse its discretion in medical malpractice action brought
against hospital and physicians when it denied plaintiffs motion for leave to file third
amended complaint four years after comDe Etta JOHNSON, Individually and as mencement of action; proposed complain^
Conservator of the Estate of Wanda brought in additional actors, such as hospiJohnson and as Next Friend of Dom- tal's nursing staff, who took alleged actions
-that were distinct from allegations raised in
iauant Johnson, Plaintiff-Appellant,
second amended complaint, and amendment
v.
would have prejudiced hospital if granted by
METHODIST MEDICAL CENTER OF
forcing it to respond to additional allegations
ILLINOIS, Defendant-Appellee.
and engage in substantial additional discovery. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 15(a), 28
No. 92-2937.
U.S.CA.
United States Court of Appeals,
3. Federal Courts <3=>776
Seventh Circuit.
Court of Appeals reviews district court's
Argued Sept. 29, 1993.
grant of summary judgment de novo. Fed.
Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56(e), 28 U.S.CA
Decided Dec. 1, 1993.
4. Federal Civil Procedure <3>1811
Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing
En Banc Denied Dec. 28, 1993.
Medical malpractice plaintiff who pled
specific failures of three named doctors, unnamed residents and hospital employees in
Patient's mother brought medical mal- her first three complaints waived claims of
practice action against hospital and three hospital's negligence based on additional negphysicians. The United States District ligent acts and failures not alleged in first
Court for the Central District of Illinois, three complaints. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rules
Michael M. Mihm, Chief Judge, denied plain- 8(a), 56(e), 28 U.S.CA.
tiffs motion for leave to file third amended
complaint and granted summary judgment in 5. Federal Civil Procedure O=>650.1
favor of hospital, and plaintiff appealed. The
Complaint's allegations of negligence
Court of Appeals, Fairchild, Senior Circuit may be so specific that plaintiff waives claim
TnHcrp HPIH that: (1) district court did not of negligence based on other and different
O § KEY NUMBER SYSTEM

F. Dietrich v. Burrows, 164 F.R.D. 220 (N.D.Ohio 1995).
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might be, to a certain extent, logically inor entitlement to a limited fund, like in those
consistent, Rule 19 does not speak of incases. The absent parties in this case apconsistent "results." Rather, it speaks of
pear, at most, to be "slandered outsiders"
inconsistent "obligations."
that are not necessary under Pujol
Lastly, defendant contends that the absent Bedel 103 F.R.D. at 81. Thus, while defenpersons' interests in the present suit will dant may be subject to inconsistent judgleave the defendant subject to a substantial ments, it will not be subject to a substantial
risk of incurring double, multiple, or other- risk of double, multiple, or inconsistent obliwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the gations, as those terms are used in Rule
claimed interest. Defendant argues that the 19(a)(2)(ii).
factfinder in the present case may apportion
Therefore, defendant has failed to demonliability between the defendant and the ab- strate that the owners or installer of the
sent persons differently than a factfinder in a systems are necessary parties under Rule
separate suit for contribution. This would, 19(a). Accordingly, it is unnecessary to conaccording to defendant, subject him to dou- sider whether they are indispensable under
ble, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obli- Rule 19(b).
gations under Rule 19(a). It is true that "the
defendant may properly wish to avoid multiORDER
ple litigation, or inconsistent relief, or sole
Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that
responsibility he shares with another."
Provident Bank, 390 U.S. at 110, 88 S.Ct. at defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to
737. Nonetheless, it takes more than the add an indispensable party pursuant to Fed.
threat of such a situation to make a person R.Civ.P. 12(b)(7) and 19 be DENIED.
necessary under Rule 19(a)(2)(ii). Janney,
SO ORDERED.
11 F.3d at 411-12; Field v. Volkswagenwerk
AG, 626 F.2d 293, 302 (3rd Cir.1980); Bedel
(o | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM >
103 F.R.D. at 81. But see Whyham, 96
F.R.D. at 561. Janney states:
the possibility that [defendant] may bear
the whole loss if it is found liable is not the
equivalent of double liability. It is instead
a common result of joint and several liability and should not be equated with preju- Kenneth G. DIETRICH, et al., Plaintiffs,
dice. Inherent in the concept of joint and
v.
several liability is the right of a plaintiff to
Richard W. BURROWS,
satisfy its whole judgment by execution
et al., Defendants.
against any one of the multiple defendants
who are liable to him, thereby forcing the
No. 3:93 CV 7505.
debtor who has paid the whole debt to
protect itself by an action for contribution
United States District Court,
against the other joint obligors.
N.D. Ohio,
Western
Division.
Janney, 11 F.3d at 412. Bedel referring to a
different apportionment of liability by a secNov. 8, 1995.
ond factfinder in a suit for contribution,
states:
[A] determination in the [suit for contribuIn action against several agents of towntion] of no liability on the part of [the ship, claiming, inter alia, violation of federal
absent person] would impose no "obli- constitutional rights, following death of one
gation" on the defendant, but rather would of the plaintiffs, another plaintiff moved to
be an adjudication concerning the obli- substitute himself as administrator of estate
* ' i L - J ™ — A *Jn\„+;&
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filed by defendants was infirm, and (2) motion to substitute was timely.
Motion granted.

1. Federal Civil Procedure <s=*365
Suggestion of death must identify successor or representative of the deceased.
2. Federal Civil Procedure 0363.1, 365
Suggestion of death, which did not identify successor or representative of deceased,
was infirm, and thus did not commence 90day period for filing motion for substitution.
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 25(a), 28 U.S.CA

MEMORANDUM OPINION
KATZ, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on a motion by Plaintiff Brian T. Dietrich to substitute himself, as Administrator of the Estate
of Kenneth Dietrich, for the late Kenneth G.
Dietrich, as plaintiff. Defendants have filed
an opposition to this motion and have moved
to dismiss Kenneth G. Dietrich as a party.
For the following reasons, the Court will
grant Plaintiffs motion. Defendants' motion
will be denied as moot, since granting Plaintiffs motion removes Kenneth Dietrich as a
party.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Kenneth G. Dietrich, Brian T.
a Federal Civil Procedure C=>363.1
Dietrich, and Firelands Investigative Agency,
Ninety-day time limit for filing motion Inc. brought this suit against several agents
for substitution after suggestion of death is of Perkins Township, claiming, inter alia,
filed is subject to enlargement if good cause violations of their rights under the First,
can be shown as to why timely motion is not Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the
possible. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rules 6(b), United States Constitution. On March 31,
1995, Plaintiff Kenneth Dietrich died.
25(a), 28 U.S.C A
A Suggestion of Death was filed by Defen4. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>363.1
dants on May 23, 1995. Defendants properly
served notice of the Suggestion of Death on
Ninety-day time limit for filing motion
parties Brian Dietrich and Firelands Investifor substitution after suggestion of death was
gative Agency. They did not serve the adfiled was subject to enlargement, where movministrator of the estate, Priscilla E. Dietant did not become deceased's personal reprich. Priscilla E. Dietrich died on June 21,
resentative until after the 90-day period had
1995. Plaintiff Brian Dietrich was made adelapsed and moved for substitution immediministrator of Kenneth Dietrich's estate on
ately on becoming personal representative.
August 30,1995.
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rules 6(b), 25(a), 28
In a motion dated August 30, 1995 and
U.S.CA
filed September 5, 1995, Plaintiff Brian Dietrich filed the motion for substitution that is
now at issue. Defendants oppose this substiEdward G. Kramer, Kramer & Nierman, tution on the grounds that the motion was
Cleveland, OH, for Kenneth G. Dietrich, Bri- filed more than 90 days after Defendants
an T. Dietrich and Firelands Investigative filed their Suggestion of Death. Plaintiff
Agency, Inc.
responds that service was never made on the
administrator of Kenneth Dietrich's estate,
Nick Tomino, Reminger & Reminger, so the 90-day period never began to run.
Cleveland, OH, for Richard W. Burrows, Marie Hildebrandt, William Dwelle, Donald SenDISCUSSION
ne, Lloyd Barcus, James Lang, James A.
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(a), a motion for
Jenkins and James Scheid.
substitution after the death of a party must
Dennis J. Niermann, Edward G. Kramer, be filed within 90 days of the date the SugKramer & Nierman, Cleveland, OH, for Bri- gestion of Death is filed and served on the
successors or representatives of the deceased
an T. Dietrich.
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party. The parties have identified the issue
before the Court as being whether the Court
should hold a motion for substitution to be
untimely filed where the motion isfiledmore
than 90 days after the personal representative of the deceased received service of the
Suggestion of Death, but was unable to comply with the time limit because he did not
become the deceased's personal representative until after the 90-day period had
elapsed.
[1,2] Before the Court addresses the issue of sufficiency of process, howrever, the
Court must determine whether the Suggestion of Death filed by Defendants was sufficient. The law is well settled that the Suggestion of Death must identify the successor
or representative of the deceased. McSurely
v. McClellav, 753 F.2d 88, 98 (D.C.Cir.1985);
Smith u Pianos, 151 F.R.D. 547 (S.D.N.Y.
1993). The Suggestion of Death filed in this
case does not do so.
Since the Suggestion of Death is itself
infirm, the Court need not address the sufficiency of process. The 90-day period never
began to run because no sufficient Suggestion of Death wasfiledwith the Court.1 Brian Dietrich's motion to substitute himself as
plaintiff was, therefore, timely filed.

Further, the Court finds it appropriate to
allow Brian Dietrich to substitute himself as
Kenneth Dietrich's personal representative
in this case.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Brian Dietrich's motion to substitute himself as Kenneth Dietrich's personal
representative is, therefore, granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the Memorandum Opinion filed contemporaneously with
this Judgment Entry, IT IS HEREBY OR.
DERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that
Plaintiffs motion for substitution (Doc. No.
50) is granted. Defendants' motion to dismiss Kenneth G. Dietrich as a party (Doc
No. 51) is denied.

s>
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[3,4] Even if the Suggestion of Death In re TELECTRONICS PACING SYSw ere sufficient on its face, the Court would
TEMS, INC, ACCUFIX ATRIAL "J"
find Plaintiffs motion to have been timely
LEADS PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIfiled. The 90-day time limit is subject to
GATION.
enlargement pursuant to Rule 6(b) if good
No. MDL-1057.
cause can be shown as to why a timely
motion is not possible. Continental Bank
United States District Court,
N.A v. Meyer, 10 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.1993);
S.D. Ohio,
Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983 (D.C.Cir.1969);
Western Division.
Staggers v. Otto Gerdau Co., 359 F.2d 292
Nov. 17, 1995.
(2d Cir.1966). In this case, Brian Dietrich
wras unable to move to substitute himself
as plaintiff until August 30, 1995, when he
became Kenneth Dietrich's personal repreNamed representatives moved for class
sentative. He moved for substitution im- certification in their action against the manumediately on becoming Kenneth Dietrich's facturer of allegedly defective pacemaker
personal representative. He was diligent lead retention wires, in which plaintiffs asin protecting his interests. The Court serted causes of action for, inter alia, strict
finds that Plaintiff has shown good cause liability, negligence, failure to warn, and
for his failure timely to file.
breach of warranty. The District Court,
r

-~^-

j -

tUo* Dn.n onrl PnQ.

*1 knowledge of the Dartv's death is not sufficient

G. InreCardoza, 111 B.R. 906 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Cal. 1990).
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ban all jury trials in bankruptcy courts, at
least in "core" matters. Statements made
by senators involved in drafting the 1984
Act su^^ort this conclusion, McCormicks
67 B.R. at 842.
Other authority provides further support
for bankruptcy judges performing jury trials. In Blackman v. Seton (In re Blackman), 55 B.R. 437, 440 (Bankr. D.D.C.
1985), another court noted that 28 U.S.C.
§1411 did not codify Emergency Rule
(d)(l)(D)'s prohibition on jury trials in bankruptcy courts. Instead the court noted
that § 1411 "specifically advertfed] to the
right to trial by jury without in any way
indicating that the bankruptcy court unit of
the district court is prohibited from conducting jury trials." Id. This court thus
found that § 1411 itself supports the notion
that bankruptcy courts may conduct jury
trials.

fiave therefore continued to hold that they
(:an. Price-Watson v. Amex Steel (In re
Price-Watson), 66 B.R. 144 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex.1987).
Lastly, the decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Jn re Ben Cooper, Inc., 896 F.2d 1394 (2nd
Cir., 1990), held that the bankruptcy court
may conduct jury trials in core proceedings
and conducting jury trials in core proceedings does not run afoul of Article III or the
Seventh Amendment.
For the foregoing reasons, I agree with
the majority of courts and hold that it is
appropriate for bankruptcy judges to hold
jury trials in core matters. I do not reach
the issue of whether jury jury trials in
bankruptcy courts are permitted in noncore
proceedings, since that problem is not now
before this court. The motion to withdraw1
reference as to the third party complaint
against Dames Pierce, which lias already,
been found to be a core proceeding, is
therefore DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

28 U.S.C. § 157 also sanctions jury trials
in bankruptcy courts. Macon Prestressed
Concrete v. Duke, 46 B.R. 727, 730 (M.D.
Ga.1985). Section 157(a) gives district
courts the authority to transfer "all pro( O f KEY NUMBER SYSTEM>
ceedings ... related to a case under title
11" to bankruptcy judges, id., and when
the proceedings transferred are core proceedings within the meaning of § 157(b)(2),
the bankruptcy court may enter a binding In re Arthur J. CARDOZA and Natalie
judgment on the jury's verdict under
H. Cardoza, Debtors.
§ 157(b)(1), which is appealable only under
David G. TREMBLEY, Plaintiff,
the terms of 28 U.S.C. § 158. Id. Thus, at
v.
least as far as core proceedings are concerned, § 157 "vests the bankruptcy court
FIRST SECURITY MORTGAGE, et
with the same authority to conduct a jury
al., Defendants.
trial as exists in [a district] court." Id.
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY,
One year after its decision in Northern
Cross-Complainant,
Pipeline, the Supreme Court adopted the
v.
since repealed Bankruptcy Rule 9015,
Walter L. CARPENTER,
which allowed jury trials in bankruptcy
Cross-Defendant.
court. Walsh v. Long Beach Honda (In re
Gaildeen Industries), 59 B.R. 402, 407
Adv. No. 89-90010-B7.
(N.D. Cal.1986). "Surely had the Court
Related Bankruptcy No. 88-03473-B7.
meant to preclude bankruptcy judges from
United States Bankruptcy Court,
conducting jury trials, it would not have
S.D. California.
adopted the Rule." Id. True, Rule 9015
has been repealed, but the advisory note
Feb. 12, 1990.
commenting on its repeal left open the
question of whether or not bankruptcy
Action was brought for damages and

Cite as HI BR. 906 (Bkrtcy.S.U.lai. i**u;

certain liens and dischargeability of debt.
Surety for one of defendants moved to
dismiss based on plaintiffs failure to timely move to substitute defendant's estate
following defendant's death. The Bankruptcy Court, Peter W. Bowie, J., held that:
(1) surety company which had filed bond on
notary public's behalf, and which was
named as additional defendant in action
arising from notary public's alleged acknowledgement of forged endorsement,
had authority to file suggestion of death
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
when notary public died during pendency
of action; (2) suggestion of death was not
deficient, for failing to include name and
address of representative of estate who
could be substituted as defendant; and (3)
plaintiff failed to demonstrate delay was
result of any "excusable neglect" and was
not entitled to enlargement of time within
which to move for substitution.
So ordered.
1. Federal Civil Procedure <e=>365
Surety company which had filed bond
on notary public's behalf, and which was
named as additional defendant in action
arising from notary public's alleged acknowledgement of forged endorsement,
had authority to file suggestion of death
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
^when notary public died during pendency
of action. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 25, 28
U.S.C.A.
2. Federal Civil Procedure <£=>365
Suggestion of death that was filed by
surety when notary public died during
pendency of action against him was not
deficient, and served to trigger 90-day time
limit on motion to substitute, though suggestion did not include name and address
of representative of estate who could be
substituted as defendant. Fed.Rules Civ.
ProcRule 25, 28 U.S.C.A.
3. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>365
Plaintiffs delay in moving for substitution of parties, after plaintiff had received suggestion of defendant's death,
was not result of any "excusable neglect,"
where only excuse offered was that sug-

gestion of death was delivered to cocounsel
responsible for trial matters, and that attorney in charge of procedural matters
learned of it only belatedly; plaintiff was
not entitled to enlargement of time within
which to move for substitution. Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rules 6(b), 25, 28 U.S.C.A.
4. Federal Civil Procedure <s=»365
Party who was allegedly injured by
notary public's acknowledgement of forged
endorsement, but who had not timely
moved to substitute notary public's estate
as defendant following notary public's
death, was not entitled to proceed directly
against surety company which had filed
bond on notary public's behalf, where surety company had never accepted defense of
cause or arranged for counsel to represent
notary public and to make appearance for
him. West's Ann.Cal.Prob.Code §§ 709,
709.1, 721 (Repealed); Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.
Rule 25, 28 U.S.C.A.

Robert L. Rentto, San Diego, Cal., for
plaintiff.
Franklin Geerdes, Chula Vista, Cal., for
defendants.
ORDER ON MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
PETER W. BOWIE, Bankruptcy
Judge.
On January 6, 1989 Plaintiff Trembley
filed an adversary complaint styled "Complaint to Determine Validity, Priority and
Extent of Liens and Other Interests in
Property, for Damages and to Determine
Dischargeability of Debt, and Demand for
Jury Trial." Named as defendants were
the debtors and many others.
The essence of the complaint is that
Trembley asserts he was part owner of a
piece of property with the debtors. Trembley alleges that the debtors and others
forged his name to a quit claim deed transferring his interest in the property to the
debtors. Among the other defendants is
Walter L. Carpenter who is alleged to have
acknowledged the forged signature on the
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quit claim deed in his capacity as a notary
public.
The Third Claim in the complaint is asserted directly against Mr. Carpenter for
his alleged actions as the notary on the quit
claim deed. In addition, Trembley sues
Does 46 through 50, who are alleged to be
''insurance corporations who had executed
their official bonds as surety for Mr. Carpenter
"
On February 3, 1989 Trembley filed an
amendment to the complaint naming Western Surety Company as Doe 46. On February 6, 1989 Anthony Erbacher, as attorney
for Walter Carpenter, filed Carpenter's verified answer to the complaint. On February 28, 1989 Franklin Geerdes, as attorney
for Western Surety Company, filed Western Surety's answer. In addition, on
March 1,1989 Western Surety filed a crosscomplaint against Walter Carpenter for reimbursement under California law if Western Surety is held liable on its bond.
On April 4, 1989 Attorney Geerdes, on
behalf of his client, Western Surety, filed
and served on all parties a document styled
"Suggestion of Death upon the Record Under Rule 25(a)(1)." The document asserts
that Western Surety is a party to the proceeding, and gives notice that Walter Carpenter died March 12, 1989. A copy of the
registered death certificate was attached as
an exhibit. The death certificate, in pertinent part, sets out the name, relationship
and address of the "informant" as "ROB
MOTTA; EXECUTRIX 1520 TYLER AVENUE # 3 SAN DIEGO, CA 92103".
Subsequently, Mr. Erbacher filed an
Amended Answer for Mr. Carpenter, reflecting that Mr. Carpenter was deceased,
and conforming the answer to District
Court Local Rule 110-7, as this Court had
required.
On August 14, 1989 Mr. Geerdes filed a
motion on behalf of Western Surety to
dismiss Trembley's Third Claim on the
ground that more than 90 days had elapsed
from the filing and service of the suggestion of death without any motion for substitution having been made. Western Surety
invoked the provisions of Rule 25(a), Fed.R.

ruptcy proceedings by Bankruptcy Rule
7025. The motion was noticed for hearing
for September 15, 1989.
On September 8, 1989 Trembley caused
to be filed a document styled "Ex-parte
Petition for Leave to Proceed Against Walter L. Carpenter in the Name of the Estate
of Walter L. Carpenter on an Insured
Claim Pursuant to Probate Code Section
709.1 and Section 721." On September 15,
1989 the hearing on Western Surety's motion was held and the motion was granted.
On September 18, 1989 this Court denied
Trembley's ex parte motion.
Substantial time elapsed while the order
dismissing the third claim was being drafted and circulated among counsel for approval. Ultimately, an order was filed and
entered on October 24, 1989. On November 3, 1989 Trembley timely noticed for
hearing on December 18 his motion for
reconsideration of the order granting the
motion to dismiss. The essential premise
of the motion for reconsideration was that
Trembley believed that the Court had not
fully considered his arguments in opposition to the motion because his opposition
had been returned to his counsel by the
Cleric's Office because the pleading did not
conform to the rules of this district.
The motion for reconsideration was
heard on December 18, 1989 and was taken
under submission. This Court has jurisdiction of this matter under 2£ U.S.C. § 1334
and General Order 312-tf of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of California. This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(bX2)(A), (O).
[1] The essence of Trembley's position
is that the decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983
(1969) "remains controlling on the construction and interpretation of F.R.Civ.P.
25(a)(1). Mr. Geerdes' suggestion did not
trigger the 90-day time period." In the
alternative Trembley asks for an enlargement of time under Rule 6, F.R.Civ.P. in
which to seek a substitution for Mr. Car-

Cite as HI B R . 906 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Cai. lrai;

In this Court's view, reliance on Rende v.
[2] Trembley also argues that Western
Kay is misplaced. In Rende, suit was filed Surety's suggestion of death was deficient
by plaintiffs Rende against defendant Kay because it did not include the name and
for personal injuries, including those of a address of the representative of the estate
minor. Thereafter, Kay died. The attor- who could be substituted for the decedent.
ney Kay had hired to defend the action It is true that the court in Rende v. Kay
filed a suggestion of death and gave notice stated:
The Advisory Committee, in outlining
to the plaintiffs attorney. Seven or eight
that suggestion of death could be made
months later, the attorney hired by Kay
by "the representative of the deceased
"moved in his own name to dismiss the
party"
plainly contemplated that the sugaction ..." for failure of plaintiffs to subgestion emanating from the side of the
stitute for the decedent. 415 F.2d at 984.
deceased would identify a representative
The D.C. Circuit quoted the Committee
of the estate, such as an executor or
Notes on the 1963 revision to Rule 25.
administrator, who could be substituted
They emphasized one part in particular:
for the deceased as a party
(EmphaIf a party or the representative of the
sis added.)
deceased party^desires to limit the time
within which another may make the mo- 415 F.2d at 985. The same court concludtion [to substitute], he may do so by ed:
No injustice results from the requiresuggesting the death upon the record.
ment that a suggestion of death identify
415 F.2d at 985. The court thereafter statthe representative or successor of an esed:
tate who may be substituted as a party
Although the attorney for the defendant
for the deceased before Rule 25(aXl)
was retained to "represent" the deceased
may be invoked by those who represent
as his counsel, he is not a person who
or inherit from the deceased, (Emphacould be made a party, and is not a
sis added.)
"representative of the deceased party" in
415 F.2d at 986. To the extent Rende is
the sense contemplated by Rule 25(a)(1). asserted for the proposition that a suggesId. Because Kay's attorney was neither a tion of death must include the identity of
party nor a representative of the deceased the representative of the estate, that ruling
party, he was not one of the persons per- only applies when the suggestion of death
mitted by Rule 25 to make a suggestion of is filed by the representative or successor
death on the record which was sufficient to of the estate. No such rule binds other
trigger the 90 day period for bringing a parties who may file and serve the suggestion of death, such as Western Surety. Yomotion to substitute.
On its facts, Rende v. Kay does not nofsky v. Wernick, 362 F.Supp. 1005, 1012
apply to the case at bar. In the instant (S.D.N.Y.1973). The Court notes, in passcase, the suggestion of death was not filed ing, that the copy of the death certificate
by Mr. Erbacher, counsel hired by Mr. Car- served with the suggestion of death contained the name and address of a person
penter before his death. Instead, the sugidentified on that document as executrix.
gestion was filed by Western Surety, a
For the foregoing reasons, this Court
party, through its counsel Mr. Geerdes.
As a party, Western Surety is clearly au- concludes that Western Surety is a party
thorized to make the suggestion of death competent to file and serve a suggestion of
under Rule 25, as even the D.C. Circuit death sufficient to trigger the 90 day perirecognized in Rende v. Kay. Al-Jundi v. od specified in Rule 25, and that Western
Rockefeller, 88 F.R.D. 244, 246 (W.D.N.Y. Surety did so on or about April 4, 1989.
1980); National Equipment Rental v.
[3] The Court's consideration is not
Whitecrajl Unlimited, 75 F.R.D. 507, 510 completed, however, because Trembley
(E.D.N.Y.1977); In re Klein, 36 B.R. 390, asks that the time to move for substitution
392-393 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1984).
be enlarged pursuant to Rule 6(b), Fed.R.
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Civ.P., which is applicable in this proceeding by Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b). By the
terms of Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b), and because the request to enlarge is made outside the 90 days set forth in Rule 25, the
movant must show that "the failure to act
was the result of excusable neglect/'
Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(1); Yonofsky v.
Wernick, 362 F.Supp. 1005, 1012 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
Counsel for Trembley states that the reason no action was taken on the April 4,
1989 suggestion of death was that the
pleading "was delivered to the undersigned's co-counsel, and our allocation of
the work load is that the undersigned will
be responsible for the procedural matters
and Mr. Andreos for the trial matters, so
the undersigned was not aware of the
pleading until now." Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and Motion Alternatively
for Extension of Time to Move for Substitution of Parties. The "undersigned" is
attorney Robert Rentto.
The face of the complaint indicates it was
filed by Robert L. Rentto Professional Law
Corporation and George P. Andreos, A.P.
L.C. as attorneys for David G. Trembley.
Rentto and Andreos Share the same street
address and the same suite number, but
each are shown with different telephone
numbers. A similar heading was on the
amendment naming Western Surety as Doe
46. The suggestion of death was served
listing the names of both attorneys serially,
followed by the single address that served
them both. Apparently, Mr. Rentto is asserting through his memorandum that Mr.
Andreos did not show him the suggestion
of death filed and served by Western Surety.
Western Surety made part of the record
in support of its motion to dismiss a copy
of a letter from Western Surety's counsel,
Mr. Geerdes, to Mr. Rentto. The letter is
dated March 16, 1989, four days after Mr.
Carpenter's death, and nineteen days before the suggestion of death was filed and
served. The entire three page letter concerns the effect of Mr. Carpenter's death,

graph. At the bottom of the second page,
Mr. Geerdes inquired:
On the practical side, who will open a
probate estate so that your Plaintiffs
cause of action might survive, if it does,
as against the personal representative of
the estate of the decedent?
On page three of the letter, Mr. Geerdes
advised Mr. Rentto he was not going to
take any discovery at present because
"such discovery would be unnecessary/inappropriate unless the Plaintiff undertakes to revive his now dead claim
through service upon a personal representative of the decedent's estate." Mr. Rentto
may not have known of the filing and service of the Rule 25 suggestion of death,
although there is no declaration in the
record to that effect Nevertheless, Mr.
Rentto clearly knew from the March 16
letter, of the death of Mr. Carpenter and
Western Surety's position that either
Trembley or the estate had to bring in a
representative in order for the claim to
survive. See e.g., In re Bell, 92 B.R. 911
(Bankr.E.D.Cal.1988). Yet nothing happened until after Western Surety filed its
motion to dismiss, over four months after
filing and service of the suggestion of
death, and more than five months after
Western Surety's letter to Mr. Rentto.
While measuring excusable neglect involves a liberal standard and enlargements
of time are favored, this Court cannot conclude on the record before^t that the failure of Mr. Rentto or Mr. Andreos to timely
move to substitute a representative of Mr.
Carpenter's estate was the result of excusable neglect, particularly inasmuch as
Western Surety's liability on its bond is
derived from the liability of Mr. Carpenter,
now deceased. Breckenridge v. Mason,
256 Cal.App.2d 121, 130, 64 Cal.Rptr. 201
(Second Dist.1967).
[4] One last issue remains. Trembley
asserts that he should be permitted to proceed directly against Western Surety to the
limits of its policy pursuant to California
Probate Code sections 709, 709.1 and 721.
Probate Code section 709 provides in perti-

Cheat 111 U.K. 7 i i

If an action is pending against the
decedent at the time of his or her death,
the plaintiff shall in like manner file his
or her claim as required in other cases.
No recovery shall be allowed against decedent's estate in the action unless proof
is made of the filing. If, however, the
action which is pending is an action for
damages, the decedent was insured
therefor, the insurer has accepted the
defense of the cause, and an appearance has been made in such action on
behalf of the decedent, no claim shall be
required except for amounts in excess of
or not covered by the insurance. (Emphasis added.)
Section 709.1 provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, the court in which an action described in Section 709 is pending may
permit the action to be continued against
the defendant in the name of "Estate of
(name of decedent), Deceased," upon petition of the plaintiff, pursuant to the
same procedure, and upon the same
terms and conditions, as are provided in
Section 721 for claims which were not
the subject of a pending action at decedent's death. The procedure of this section is cumulative and does not supersede the procedure provided in subdivision (b) of Section 385 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.
"As already noted, Trembley did file with
this Court on September 8, 1989 a pleading
styled "Ex-Parte Petition for Leave to Proceed Against Walter L. Carpenter in the
Name of the Estate of Walter L. Carpenter
on an Insured Claim Pursuant to Probate
Code Section 709.1 and Section 721." However, as this Court reads Probate Code
sections 709 and 709.1, in order for an
action to continue under 709.1 by invoking
the procedure of section 721, the action
must meet the requirements of section 709.
That is, the action must be one "for damages, the decedent was insured therefor,
the insurer has accepted the defense of the
cause, and an appearance has been made in
such action on behalf of the decedent—"
While Trembley's suit against Carpenter
seeks damages and Carpenter was allegedly insured therefor, there is no showing

Western Surety accepted the defense of the
cause or arranged for counsel to represent
Carpenter and make an appearance for
him. Indeed, the contrary is the case, for
Western Surety filed its own cross-complaint against Carpenter before he died.
Because Trembley's action against Carpenter does not fall within Probate Code section 709, section 709.1 does not save it
For all the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs
motion for reconsideration is denied.
Counsel for Western Surety shall prepare,
serve and lodge a proposed judgment of
dismissal in accordance with Bankruptcy
Rule 7054(b) within fifteen (15) days after
the date of entry of this order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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In re Lewis C. MULLER and Lynn C.
Muller, Debtors.
Steven A; BERKOWITZf Plaintiff,
v.
Lewis C. MULLER, Defendant.
Bankruptcy No. 89-90561-LM7.
Related Bankruptcy No. 88-06673-LM7.
United States Bankruptcy Court,
S.D. California.
Feb. 27, 1990.

Chapter 7 trustee brought action
against debtor in another estate. On debtor's motion to dismiss, the Bankruptcy
Court, John J. Hargrove, J., held that Chapter 7 trustee of one estate had standing to
initiate complaint to determine nondischargeability of debt against debtor in another estate.
Motion granted in part and denied in
part.

H. In re Klein, 36 B.R. 390 (Bkrtcy. E.D. N.Y. 1984).
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390

has found that § 1325(a)(5)(B) does not require interest on the claim for which a
contract remains in force under which the
creditor can adequately provide for the time
value of money. By so holding, this Court
endeavors to give fair treatment to the
statute and to the bargain between the
parties.

O I KEYNUMBERSYSTEM

In re Emil Paul KLEIN, Debtor.
Joseph MELOHN, d/b/a Marjo
Enterprises, Plaintiff,
v.
Emil Paul KLEIN, Defendant

1. Federal Civil Procedure *=>365
Form of written "suggestion of death"
should substantially conform to that contained in appendix of forms to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed.Rules Civ.
ProcRule 25; Form 30, 28 U.S.C.A.
2. Federal Civil Procedure <&=>365
In addition to requirement that suggestion of death provide adequate information
to appropriate parties, suggestion may only
be served by appropriate party or representative of appropriate party. Fed.Rules
Civ.ProcRule 25; Form 30, 28 U.S.C.A.
3. Federal Civil Procedure <*=>365
Language in rule relating to "suggestion of death," requiring that death of party be suggested upon the record by service
of statement of fact of death as provided
ttherein for service of motion, limits entities
who may suggest death upon the record to
those who may move for substitution. Fed.
Rules Civ.ProcRule 25, 28 U.S.C.A.

Bankruptcy No. 882-81032-18.
Adv. No. 883-0066-18.

4. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>362, 365
Attorney for client who dies has no
United States Bankruptcy Court,
authority either to move to be substituted
E.D. New York.
or to suggest the death of his deceased
client upon the record; such action could
Jan. 20, 1984.
clearly prejudice rights of successor party
to whom that attorney bears no legal relationship. Fed.Rules Civ.ProcRule 25, 28
Chapter 7 debtor moved to dismiss ad- U.S.C.A.
versary proceeding after plaintiff therein
died. Coexecutors of plaintiffs estate 5. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>363
cross-moved to be substituted for decedent
Where attorney for client who died
in the adversary proceeding. The Bank- suggested client's death upon the record
ruptcy Court, C. Albert Parente, J., held prior to such attorney's retention by estate
that where attorney for deceased plain- representatives, the suggestion was insuffitiff suggested his client's death upon the cient to trigger period in which client's reprecord prior to such attorney's retention resentatives must move for substitution;
by estate representatives, the suggestion therefore, client's representatives' motion to
was insufficient to trigger period in which be substituted, though made more than 90
plaintiff's representatives were required to days after suggestion of death had been
move for substitution, and, therefore, repre- served upon counsel for defendant, was
sentatives' motion to be substituted, though timely. Fed.Rules Civ.ProcRule 25, 28 U.S.
made more than 90 days after attorney C.A.
served suggestion of death upon counsel for
debtor, was timely.
Substitution motion eranted: motion

Fensterheim & Fensterheim Attvs for
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Cite as 36 B.R. 2

Holland & Zinker, Smithtown, N.Y., for
defendant/debtor.
DECISION & 'ORDER
C. ALBERT
Judge.

PARENTE,

Bankruptcy

Defendant, Emil Paul Klein, moves to
dismiss the adversary proceeding commenced by deceased plaintiff, Joseph Melohn, d/b/a Marjo Enterprises. Leon Melohn and Alfons Melohn, co-executors of the
estate of Joseph Melohn, cross-move to be
substituted for decedent in the proceeding.
FACTUAL CONTEXT
On April 22,1982, defendant filed a petition under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978 ("Code"). Thereafter,
the case was converted from Chapter 13 to
Chapter 7. Plaintiff, a creditor of defendant, filed a complaint with the clerk of this
court on February 4,1983 commencing this
action objecting to defendant's discharge
under 11 U.S.C. § 727 and to the dischargeability of a debt defendant allegedly incurred in violation of § 523(aX2).
Plaintiff died on June 1,1983. His attorneys advised the court of this fact by letter
dated June 23,1983 and followed this letter
with the filing of a document entitled "Suggestion of Death" on July 11, 1983. An
affidavit of service transmitted with the
document recited that the "suggestion of
death" had been served upon counsel for
the defendant on July 8, 1983. On August
4, 1983, Leon Melohn and Alfons Melohn
were granted letters testamentary as co-executors of the estate of Joseph Melohn.
On November 11, 1983, the attorneys for
the defendant moved to dismiss this adversary proceeding premised upon the co-executors' failure to comply with Bankruptcy
Rule 7025, which incorporates by reference
Rule 25 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on the ground that they failed to
move to be substituted within the prescribed time period. The co-executors
cross-moved to be substituted. Decision
was reserved.

IVJjxjjii i

(Bkrtcy. 1984)

RULE 25 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Rule 25 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provides in pertinent part:
(a) Death.
(1) If a party dies and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, the court may order substitution of the proper parties.
The motion for substitution may be made
by any party or by the successors or
representatives of the deceased party
and, together with the notice of hearing,
shall be served on the parties as provided
in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in
the manner provided in Rule 4 for the
service of a summons, and may be served
in any judicial district. Unless the motion for substitution is made not later
than 90 days after the death is suggested
upon the record by service of a statement
of the fact of the death as provided herein for the service of the motion, the action shall be dismissed as to the deceased
party.
FED.R.CIV.P. 25 (West 1983).
Rule 25 was amended in 1963 to ameliorate the harshness of its predecessor section. Prior to 1963, under Rule 25, in the
event a motion to substitute was not made
within two years from the date of death of
a party, the court was constrained to dismiss the action with respect to the deceased
party. See 3B MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ^ 25.01-15 (2d ed. 1980).
Moreover, prior to the 1963 amendments,
Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which gives the court discretion to
enlarge time periods set forth in other
rules, by its terms did not apply to Rule 25.
However, Rule 6 was modified contemporaneously with Rule 25 so as to expand its
coverage to Rule 25 as well. Staggers v.
Otto Gerdau Company, Inc., 359 F.2d 292
(2d Cir.1966). As a consequence, although
under the current version of Rule 25 and
Rule 6 a motion for substitution must be
made no later than 90 days after the service
of the suggestion of death, the court may
enlarge the 90 day period upon request
made prior to the expiration of such period.
In addition, if the application for enlarge-
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ment is made after the conclusion of such
period, then the court may order substitution if the movant demonstrates excusable
neglect. 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1955 at 659 (1972).
DISCUSSION

tive or successor of CD., the deceased
party] suggests upon the record, pursuant
to Rule 25(a)(1), the death of CD. [describe as party] during the pendency of
this action. (Added Jan. 21, 1963, eff.
July 1, 1963.)
Yonofsky v. Wernick, 362 F.Supp. 1005
(S.D.N.Y.1973); Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983
(D.CCir.1969).

A significant difference separating the
current version of Rule 25 from its predecessor version is that currently the time in
[2] In addition to the requirement that
which a party may make a motion to substi- a suggestion of death provide adequate intute or to be substituted is measured from formation to the appropriate parties, the
the service of a "suggestion of death" as suggestion may only be served by an approopposed to from the actual date of death of priate party or representative of an approa party. In light of the importance of the priate party.
service of the "suggestion" in triggering
the running of the 90-day period, the courts
[3] The express language of Rule 25
have required certain formal requisites to carefully circumscribes those entities entibe met before a valid suggestion is deemed tled to move to be substituted under Rule
served. The basis for the formality re- 25. The applicable language states "the
quirement has been succinctly stated in Na- motion for substitution may be made by
tional Equipment Rental v. Whitecraft Un- any party or by the successors or representlimited, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 507, 510 (E.D.N.Y. atives of the deceased party,- It has been
1977): "The burden of providing formal held that this clause should be interpreted
notice is slight Yet it ensures that the strictly so as to preclude the attorney for a
information reaches all parties. Therefore "deceased party, from moving for substitu4
. . . insistence on the observance of proce- tion unless he acts for the "successors or
dural ritual is justified/ Dolgow v. Ander- representatives" at the time such motion is
son, [45 F.R.D. 470] at 471" (RD.N.Y.1968). made. Al-Jundi v. Rockefeller, 88 F.R.D.
[1] Under the rubric of procedural for- 244, 246 (W.D.N.Y.1980); Boggs v. Dravo
mality, and in the interest of providing Corp., 532 FA1 897 (3d Cir.1976); but see
adequate notice to all entities affected by Ten v. Svenska Orient Linen, 87 F.R.D. 551
the death who are involved in the proceed- (S.D.N.Y.1980). The underlying rationale
ing, the courts have required the suggestion supporting this proposition is that the attorof death to be embodied in a written state- ney for a decedent is no kfhger acting on
ment. 45 F.R.D. at 471, United States v. behalf of such decedent in light of the fact
Miller Brothers Constr. Co., 505 F.2d 1031, that his power of attorney would have ter1034-35 (10th Cir.1974). Rule 25 requires minated upon the death of his principal.
the suggestion to be "upon the record" and Yonofsky v. Wernick, 362 F.Supp. at 101L
thus it must be served upon "all parties to Nor is such attorney acting for decedent's
the action and thereafter, be filed with the successors and representatives until such
time as such successor or representative is
clerk of the court." 75 F.R.D. at 510.
Finally, the suggestion should substan- officially appointed, and after having been
tially conform to Form 30, contained in the appointed, retains the attorney.
Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which provides:

SUGGESTION OF DEATH UPON THE
RECORD UNDER RULE 25(a)(1)
A. B. [describe as a party, or as execu-

Rule 25 further requires that death be
"suggested upon the record by service of a
statement of the fact of death as provided
[tjherein for the service of a motion.'' (Emphasis added) The court is persuaded that
this language limits the entities who may

Cite as 36 B.R. 393 (Bkrtcy. 1984)

may move for substitution. See 88 F.R.D. 984; Al Jundi v. Rockefeller, 88 F.R.D. at
at 246, 75 F.R.D. at 510; see also 415 F.2d 246-47; Ten v. Svenska Orient Linen, 87
at 985.
F.R.D. at 552; National Equipment Rental
[4] Under the foregoing analysis, the Ltd. v. Whitecraft Unlimited Inc., 75 F.R.D.
attorney for a decedent has no authority at 509; Yonofsky v. Wernick, 362 F.Supp.
either to move to be substituted or to sug- at 1011. In the instant case, it would be
gest the death of his deceased client upon even more inequitable to penalize plaintiff's
the record. Such action could clearly preju- representatives for the filing of a suggesdice the rights of a successor party to whom tion made by their attorney prior to his
that attorney bears no legal relationship. retention.
The motion of Leon Melohn and Alfons
[5] In the instant case, the attorney for
Melohn,
co-executors of the Estate of Jothe deceased plaintiff suggested his client's
seph
Melohn,
to be substituted as plaintiffs
death upon the record prior to such attorney's retention by the estate representa- is granted.
tives. Thus, this suggestion is insufficient
Defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.
to trigger the^period in which plaintiffs
It is SO ORDERED.
representative^ must move for substitution.
Therefore, plaintiffs representatives' motion to be substituted is timely.
This conclusion is buttressed by the reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in a case involving a similar
factual predicate. In Staggers v. Otto Gerdau Company, Inc., 359 F.2d at 295, the
plaintiff in the action died and a representIn re William R. KONCHAN, Debtor.
ative of his estate was appointed who duly
served and filed a suggestion of plaintiffs QUADRA, LTD., an Illinois corporation,
death. The motion to be substituted was
and Donald Summers, individually,
made by plaintiffs representative but was
Plaintiffs,
made several days beyond the 90 day period
v.
triggered by the filing of (and presumably
William R. KONCHAN, Defendant
service of) the suggestion. The court reasoned that the representative "was under
Bankruptcy No. 81 B 05272.
no obligation to file his affidavit of . . .
Adv. No. 81 A 2592.
[plaintiffs] death on the date that he did.
United States Bankruptcy Court,
He could have filed it later." Id. at 296.
N.D. Illinois, E.D.
By clear implication, the court in allowing
the substitution was disinclined to penalize
Jan. 20, 1984.
the plaintiffs representative when the 90
day period was commenced solely as the
Adversary action was brought requestconsequence of his (or his attorney's) conduct and not as a tactical maneuver of an ing adjudication that certain debt of Chapadversary, premised upon expediting the ac- ter 7 debtor was nondischargeable by reation. This was not the typical scenario son of fraud. The Bankruptcy Court, Fredwhere a defendant would suggest either erick J. Hertz, J., held that: (1) plaintiffs
plaintiffs or defendant's death upon the failed to satisfy "clear and convincing" burrecord to impose upon plaintiff's side the den of proof necessary for finding of disobligation to move for the substitution of chargeability, and (2) debtor, who was a
either the plaintiff or defendant's repre- licensed real estate broker, violated provisentative. See Boggs v. Dravo Corp., 532 sions of the Real Estate Brokers and SalesF.2d at 898^-99; Rende v. Kay, 445 F.2d at men License Act by depositing subject

I. Unicorn Tales, Inc. v. Banerjee, 138 F.3d 467 (2m Cir. 1998).

/ vxna t~ir. 1770;

lessly costly if, as Donnelley believes, the
FTC's case carries a fatal flaw. Yet, by
this reasoning, any order denying summary judgment is "final" and appealable,
because it dooms the parties to lengthy,
expensive, and potentially wasteful endeavors. If cost, delay, and aggravation of
litigation made an order final, the distinction between interlocutory and final decisions would collapse, and courts of appeals
would be deluged.
Id. at 431. The court also rejected Donnell y ' s contention that claims of preclusion
overcome the finality requirement Id at
432-33.
The Postal Service has done nothing here
other than file an administrative complaint.
Ite% decision is not final until the time to
appeal the ALJ decision runs or the Judicial
Officer resolves the appeal. Thus, there has
been no definitive agency decision. See, e.g.,
United States Postal Serv. v. Notestine, 857
1 ^ , 9 8 9 , 992-93 (5th Cir.1988). Further,
the administrative complaint has no effect
except to force plaintiffs to respond, an effect
that does not amount to a cognizable legal
consequence. Review of the Postal Service's
^action is therefore premature.

al estoppel .before the Postal Service, and
thus there is no reason to believe that they
will be 'Vexed with needlessly duplicitous
proceedings." Safir, 432 F.2d at 143. Moreover, we would benefit from the development
of the record and the findings of fact that will
result from initial agency review. See, e.g.,
Greenberg, 938 F.2d at 12 ("[A] judicial determination as to whether any issues in the
current OCC proceedings have been settled
in prior proceedings would require a comparison of the facts and transactions underlying
both the prior and the current proceedings, a
comparison that best can be made in the first
instance by the OCC itself.").
Accordingly, because the Postal Service's
filing of an administrative complaint against
plaintiffs did not constitute a "final agency
action," the district court properly dismissed
the complaint
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

O | KCY NUMBER SYSTIM>

|v{3] Plaintiffs rely on Safir v. Gibson, 432 UNICORN TALES, INC., a Corporation of
FM 137 (2d Cir.1970), to argue that finality
the State of New York, Chippendales
should not be required when the plaintiffs
Universal, Inc., a Corporation of the
defend the administrative action on the
State of New York, Valentine DeNoia,
ground of res judicata or collateral estoppel.
Administrator of the Estate of Nicholas
But the defense of res judicata or collateral
DeNoia, Deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
estoppel does not as a general rule defeat the
v.
finality requirement, and we will waive finaliSomen BANERJEE, also known as
ty only in rare instances. See Greenberg v.
Steven Banerjee, Augustine Ralph
Comptroller of the Currency, 938 F£d 8, 11and Angel Colon, Defendants,
12 (2d Cir.1991) ("Although on occasion this
court has directed that the doctrine of res
Irene Banerjee, Appellee.
judicata be applied in an administrative proceeding without waiting until a final order
Docket No. 96-9629.
^as ready for review, see Safir v. Gibson, 432
United States Court of Appeals,
F.2d 137, 143-45 (2d Cir.1970), the circumSecond Circuit
stances of the instant case require adherence
•to the normal requirement of exhaustion of
Argued Dec. 4, 1997.
a(
kninistrative procedures.") (partial citation
Decided March 2, 1998.
emitted).
The facte of this case do not justify any
departure from the finality requirement.
*wntiffs can assert res judicata and collater-

New York corporations and estate of one
corporation's murdered shareholder brought
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federal racketeering and state law claims
against defendant, the alleged murder.
Subsequently, defendant's surviving spo\jSe
filed statement of fact of his death, and, n\ ore
than 90 days later, she moved to dismiss.
The United States District Court for' the
Southern District of New York, Kevin Thomas Duffy, J., granted motion. Plaintiffs a p.
pealed. The Court of Appeals, Wallace, Qjjr.
cuit Judge of the United States Court 0f
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by
designation, held that: (1) statement of fact of
death of litigant, triggering 90-day period for
filing motion for substitution of party, need
not be filed by party or formal or appointed
representative of decedent's estate; (2) ^UJ..
viving spouse's statement of fact of death ^ag
sufficient to trigger 90-day period, despite its
failure to identify legal representative or s u c .
cessor; and (3) plaintiffs were properly held
accountable for their attorneys' failure to gie
appropriate motions to substitute within §0day period.
Affirmed.

1. Federal Courts e»776, 870.1
District court's legal interpretation 0f
civil procedure rule governing substitution 0f
party upon death of litigant is reviewed de
novo, and court's factual findings are re.
viewed for clear error. Fed.Rules Civi*^
Rule 25(a)(1), 28 U.S.C A
1 Federa) Civi) Procedure e=#fi3J
Statement of fact of death of Utiga^
triggering 90-day period for filing motion for
substitution of party, need not be filed by
party or formal or appointed representative
of decedent's estate. Fed.Rules Civ.Pr^
Rule 25(a)(1), 28 U.S.CA
3. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>363.1
Statement of fact of death of litig^t,
triggering 90-day period for filing motion for
substitution of party, need not identify de ce .
*T*I-- u

„uu

T

riiffnrd Wallace, of the Un\tecj

dent's successor or legal representative of
estate; if there is inability or significant difficulty in identifying legal representative or
successor, motion can be brought to enlarge
time in which to file motion for substitution.
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rules 6(b), 25(a)(1), 28
U.S.CA
4. Federal Courts <S=>623
Plaintiffs waived any claim that district
court should have granted motion to substitute defendant's surviving spouse out of timfe,
where they did not move for substitution of
party within 90 days after < surviving spouse
filed statement of fact of defendant's death,
and they did not move at any time before
district court to substitute surviving spopse
out of time. Fed.Rules Civ.ProcRules §£b),
25(aXD, 28 U.S.C A.
5. Attorney and Client <8=>88
Plaintiffs would he held accountable for
their attorneys' failure tov either move f$r
substitution of party' within 90 days* after
defendant's surviving spouse filed statement
of fact of defendant's death, or to substitute
surviving spouse out of time, resulting in
dismissal of case. Fed.Rules Civ.ProcRules
6(b) 25(a)(1), 28 U.S.C A

Robert E. Margulies, Jersey City, NJf
(Frank E. Catalina, Margulies, Wind, Herrington & Knopf, Jersey City, NJ, on tiie
brief), for appellants.
Irene Banerjee, Playa Del Rey, CA, pro fie
appellee.
Before- WINTER, Chief Judge,
NEWMAN and WALLACE,* Circuit
Judges.
WALLACE, Circuit Judge:
In this case, we consider who may trigger
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(l)Js
90-day countdown by filing a statement of
sitting by designation

death of a litigant, and whether that statement must identify the legal representative
or successor.
I
We rely on the allegations of the pleadings
for the necessary facts in this appeal. Unicorn Tales, Inc. (Unicorn) and Chippendales
Universal, Inc. (Universal), New York businesses engaged in the operation of exotic
jnale dance shows, licensed the name "Chip-pendales" from Easebe Enterprises, Inc.
-{Easebe), a California business whose sole
•shareholder was Somen Banerjee (Banerjee).
-litigation over this agreement arose with
(Unicorn and Universal suing Easebe and, in
\tn extraordinary result, Baneijee had Nichgda&DeNoia, the sole shareholder of Unicorn,
,ffiurdered on April 27,1987.

findings for clear error. Barlow v. Ground,
39 F.3d 231, 233 (9th Cir.1994). Rule
25(a)(1) states in part:
If a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished^ the court may order substitution of the proper parties. The motion
for substitution may be made by any party
or by the successors or representatives of
the deceased party
Unless the motion for substitution is made not later than
90 days after the death is suggested upon
the record by service of a statement of the
fact of the death as provided herein for the
service of the motion, the action shall be
dismissed as to the deceased party.

It is undisputed that no motion for substitution was brought within 90 days after Irene
Banerjee filed a statement of the fact of
Banerjee's death. However, three arguIn 1993, a grand jury indicted Banerjee on ments are presented that Rule 25(a)(1)
seven counts of racketeering activity, includ- should not apply to this case.
ing DeNoia's murder. In 1994, Unicorn,
Universal, and the Estate of DeNoia filed a
A.
new action against Banerjee, asserting civil
HICO and state law claims. Banerjee plead[2] It is first contended that the stateed guilty to the criminal indictment on Aument of the fact of death must be filed by a
|just 9, 1994, and began to defend himself
against the civil action. However, on Octo- party or a, formal or appointed representative
bean23^1994, Banfeijee committed suicide of the estate of the decedent As Irene
Banerjee was not a party and not a formal or
Whileincarcerated.
appointed representative, it is argued that
OiTFebruary 22, 1996, Irene Baneijee, she1 could riot trigger the 90 day period of
Acting as Banerjee's surviving spouse, prop- Rule 25. See Alr-Jundi v. Est&te of Rockefelerly served and filed a statement of the fact ler, 757 F.Supp. 206, 210 (W.D.N.Y.1990).
of Banerjee's death. More than 90 days
%ter, she moved, Under Rule 25(a)(1) of the
However, the text of Rule 25(a)(1) contains
-Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss no such restriction on who may file the state^the action. The district court granted the ment. Moreover, such a restriction is inconf
todtion and dismissed the action. This ap- sistent with the purpose in amending the rule
Jpea) followed.
to its present format. Prior to 1963, Rule
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant 25(a)(1) "resulted] in an inflexible requireto 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), and ment that an action be dismissed as to a
28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have jurisdiction over deceased party if substitution [was] not carithis timely appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ried out within a fixed period measured from
the time of the death." Fed.R.Civ.P. 25 advi5 1291, and we affirm.
sory committee notes, 1963 Amendment.
The present version of the rule, on the other
II
hand, establishes a time limit starting from
the
time "information of the death is providU] We agree with our sister circuit that
*We review the district court's legal interpre- ed by means of a suggestion of death upon
tation of Rule 25(a)(1) de novo and factual the record." Id Thus, Rule 25(a)(1) is de-

470

138 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES

signed to prevent a situation in which a ca^ fied by the court in Rende, we might see the
is dismissed because a party never learned of wisdom of the requirement. However, the
the death of an opposing party. Instead, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do provide
party is given 90 days from the time when it what we believe is the proper solution. Rule
learns from compliance with Rule 25(a)(1) of 6(b) states:
the death of an opposing party to take appro,
When by these rules or by a notice given
priate action.
thereunder or by order of court an act is
required or allowed to be done at or within
Under Unicorn's proposed interpretation
a specified time, the court for cause shown
of Rule 25(a)(1), the estate must be probate^
may at any time in its discretion (1) with
and a representative selected before th§
or without motion or notice order the peristatement of the fact of death can be filed.
od enlarged if request therefor is made
There is simply nothing in the rule or th$
before
the expiration of the period origiadvisory committee notes to suggest that
nally prescribed or as extended by a previCongress intended Rule 25(a)(1) to be SQ
ous order, or (2) upon motion made after
inflexible. We therefore hold that Iren$
the expiration of the specified period perBanerjee was able to trigger the 90 day
mit the act to be done where the failure to
limitation period of Rule 25(a)(1).
act was the result of excusable neglect^
but
it may not extend the time for taking
B.
any action under Rules 50(b) and (c)(2),
tff/ It & next argue<f tAat the statement
52(b), 59(b), (d), and (e),, 60(b), and 74(a),"
of the fact of death must also identify th^
except to the extent and under the condirepresentative of the estate or the successor
tions stated in them.
of the decedent, and that Irene Banerjee'^
statement of death failed to satisfy this res Plainly, then, if there was an inability or &
significant difficulty in identifying Banerjee's
quirement
legal representative or successor, a motion
In Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983, 98$ could be brought under Rule 6(b) to enlarge
(D.C.Cir.1969), the D.C. Circuit held that the time in which to file the motion for'
a
[n]o injustice results from the requirement substitution.
that a suggestion of death identify the repres
Therefore, we hold that Irene Banerjeefr
sentative or successor of an estate who may
statement of the fact of death was sufficient
be substituted as a party for the decease^
to trigger Rule 25(a)(1) despite its failure to
before Rule 25(a)(1) may be invoked by thos^
identify a legal representative or successor
who represent or inherit from the deceased.**
The result in Rende was based on a concern
C.
that Rule 25(a)(1) would be used as a weapon
[4] The final argument is that the district
by civil defense attorneys to "place on plains
court
should have granted the motion to subttf? the bardea, (rhete a? c<?xrex&?/z£?/&?/&>
sentative was appointed for the estate in statute Irene Banerjee out of time, pursuant
probate court, of instituting machinery in to Rule 6(b). However, there was no motion
order to produce some representative of the for the district court to allow substitution out
estate ad litem, pending appointment of the of time under Rule 6(b); the motion was to
representative contemplated by law of the substitute Irene Banerjee for Banerjee under
Rule 25(a)(1). Since Unicorn did not make
domicile of the deceased." Id.
this motion in the district court, we deem it
With respect to our sister circuit, we diswaived. United States v. Margiotti 85 F.3d
agree with Renders interpretation of Rule
,
25(a)(1). The rule does not require that the 100,104 (2d Cir.), cert denied, — U.S.
117
S.Ct
324,136
L.Ed.2d
238
(1996).
statement identify the successor or legal representative; it merely requires that the
statement of death be served on the involve^
~„~^rto Wono than* no other manner ii\

[5] The appellants argue unpersuasively
that they should not be penalized with dismissal under Rule 25(aXl) for the actions of

-**held that clients must be held accountable
for the acts and omissions of their attorneys." Pioneer Investment Services Co. v,
'Brunswick Associates Ltd, Partnership, 507
U.S. 380, 396, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 1499, 123
L.Ed.2d 74 (1993).
AFFIRMED.

to appropriate damages for permanent injury
to property.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and
remanded.

1. Damages <3=>110,163(4)

( o f « Y NUMBER SYSTEM >

K. Douglas SCRIBNER and Laurie B.
Scribner, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v,
John M. SUMMERS, Stephen A. Summers, and Jasco-Sun Steel Treating,
Inc., Defendants-Appellees.

Under New York law, proper measure of
damages for permanent injury to real property is lesser of decline in market value and
cost of restoration; plaintiff, however, need
only prove one of two measures and it becomes defendant's burden to prove that lesser amount will sufficiently compensate for
loss.
2. Damages <3>39,109
Under New York law, plaintiff may recover temporary damages for iiyury to real
property, measured by reduction of rental or
usable value of property during pendency of
injury.

No. 131, Docket 96-9645.
United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit
Argued Sept. 15, 1997.
Decided March 9,1998

^Landowners filed action against neigh7jK)ring business, seeking recovery for barium
contamination of their property under Com^l^ehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), nui,sance, and trespass claims. The United
States District Court for the Western District of New York, David G. Larimer, J.,
(niled in landowners' favor on CERCLA
<3aim, awarded "response costs," and dismissed common law claims. Landowners appealed. The Court of Appeals, 84 F.3d 554,
reversed and remanded. The District Court,
•Larimer, Chief Judge, awarded landowners
412,000 as quality of life damages. Landowners appealed. The Court of Appeals held
that remand was required to permit supplementation of the record on matters relating
Hon. Manuel L Real, United States District
Judge for the Central Distnct of California, sit-

3. Federal Courts e=>941
Remand was required to permit supplementation of record on matters relating to
damages to which landowners were entitled
-under New York law for permanent injury to
.property resulting from barium contamination caused by neighboring business, given
^that record on appeal lacked sufficient evidence regarding such issues as business' obligations to clean up property pursuant to
consent decree with state agency, adequacy
of expert's estimation of cleanup costs, and
landowners' entitlement to damages for stigma arising from contamination.

Alan J. Knauf, Rochester, NY (Knauf &
Craig, LLP, of Counsel), for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Michael W. Malarney, Rochester, NY, for
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: FEINBERG and WALKER,
Circuit Judges, and REAL,* District Judge.
ting by designation

J. Farmers Insurance Group v. District Court of the Second
Judicial District, 507 P.2d 865 (Colo. 1973).

FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP, a corporation, Petitioner,

v.
The DISTRICT COURT OF the SECOND
JUDICIAL DISTRICT, City and County of
Denver, and the Honorable James C. Flanigan, one of the Judges of Said Court, Respondents.
No. 25789.
Supreme Court of Colorado,
En Banc.
March 12, 1973.
Rehearing Denied April 2, 1973.

Original proceeding on rule to show
£ause why motion to dismiss a deceased defendant as a party in a tort claim action
.was not granted and why the Second Judicial District Court granted plaintiffs* motion to substitute deceased defendant's administratrix as party defendant. The Supreme Court, Hodges, J., held that failure
of plaintiffs' attorney to file motion to
substitute deceased defendant's administratrix as party defendant in tort action with-it'90 days after receiving notification of
defendant's death because notification had
bwn placed in attorney's file and overlooked was not the result of "excusable neglect" within meaning of statute allowing
consideration of motion after expiration of
specified period where failure to act was
.due to excusable neglect.
Rule made absolute.
Groves, J., concurred in the result
only; Kelley, J., did not participate.

I. Parties €=»60
Plaintiffs who failed to move to substitute deceased defendant's administratrix
as party defendant in tort action within 90
days after service of notification of defendant's death had burden of proving that
failure to file motion for substitution within such period was due to excusable neglect. Rules of Civil Procedure, rules
6(b)(2), 25(a)(1).
507 P.2d—55

2. Motions <&=>I0
Failure to act due to carelessness and
negligence is not "excusable neglect" within meaning of statute allowing consideration of a motion made after expiration of
specified period where failure to act was
result of excusable neglect. Rules of Civil
Procedure, rule 6(b)(2).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
3. Motions <$=>I0

"Excusable neglect" within meaning of
statute allowing consideration of motion
after expiration of specified period where
failure to act was result of excusable neglect occurs when there has been a failure
to take proper steps at the proper time, not
in consequence of carelessness, but as the
result of some unavoidable hindrance or
accident. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule
6(b)(2).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
4. Attorney and Client <3=»I06
An attorney for a deceased defendant
has duty to notify court and other parties
in action that client has died.
5. Parties €=>60
A plaintiff's attorney who receives notification of defendant's death has the responsibility to properly initiate necessary
inquiries to determine identity of person to
be substituted for the deceased defendant
and to file motion for substitution. Rules
of Civil Procedure, rule 25(a)(1).
6. Parties <§=>6Q

Failure of notification of defendant's
death to specify the identity of the representative who would be substituted in defendant's place did not render notification
ineffective to trigger running of 90-day
period for filing motion to substitute deceased defendant's administratrix as party
defendant. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule
25(a)(1).
7. Parties $=*60
Failure of plaintiffs' attorney to file
motion to substitute deceased defendant's
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administratrix as party defendant in tort
action within 90 days after receiving notification of defendant's death because notification had been placed in attorney's file
and overlooked was not the result of "excusable neglect0 within meaning of statute
allowing consideration of motion after expiration of specified period where failure
to act was due to excusable neglect Rules
of
Civil Procedure,
rules 6(b)(2),
25(a)(1).

Wolvington, Dosh, DeMoulin, Anderson
& Campbell, Byron G. Rogers, Jr., Denver,
for petitioner.
Litvak, Schwartz & Karsh, Lawrence
Litvak, Denver, for respondents.
HODGES, Justice.
In this original proceeding, we issued a
rule to show cause why a motion to dismiss
a deceased defendant as a party in a tort
claim action was not granted, and why the
respondent court, on the other hand, granted the plaintiffs' motion to substitute the
deceased defendant's administratrix as a
party defendant The motion to dismiss as
to the deceased defendant was grounded on
the plaintiffs' failure to move for substitution of parties within 90 days of the service of notification of death upon the plaintiffs' attorneys. C R . C P . 25(a)(1) requires that: "If the motion for substitution
is not made within 90 days after such service, the action shall be dismissed as to the
deceased party." We make the rule absolute.
The respondent court under the facts of
this case should have granted the motion
for dismissal which would have thereupon
automatically rendered the plaintiffs' motion for substitution out of order.
Civil Action No. C-18322 in the respondent court is for personal injuries resulting
from an automobile accident. The plaintiffs are Judith A. and Lester J. Lambert.
John A. Shank and two corporations are
the named defendants. Defendant Shank

of his death was filed in the respondent
court. A copy of the notification was
mailed on February 29, 1972 to the plaintiffs' attorneys and to the attorneys for the
other defendants. The notification and
certificate of mailing was filed by the petitioner's attorneys acting on behalf of the
deceased who was represented by these attorneys in this action after it was commenced. At the time of the accident, the
petitioner was the liability insurance carrier for Shank.
In October 1972, the motion to dismiss
the case as to John A. Shank was filed in
the respondent court. At about the same
time, the plaintiffs filed their motion for
an extension of time within which to file a
motion for substitution of parties. This
motion stated that the failure to file a
timely motion for substitution was the result of excusable neglect by plaintiffs'
counsel in that the "Notification of Fact of
Death was placed in the file of the aboVe
case and thereafter overlooked."
Also, at this time, plaintiffs filed a motion for substitution of parties. This motion stated that the plaintiffs' claim is not
extinguished by the death of defendant
Shank and that Beulah L, Shank, administratrix of the estate of John A. Shank, deceased, should be substituted as a defendant in his place.
The motion to dismiss 'the motion for
extension, and the motion for substitution
came on for hearing before the respondent
court on November 6, 1972. The respondent court found that the motion for substitution had not been filed within the 90
days prescribed by C R . C P . 25(a)(1), but
that this failure was due to excusable neglect on the part of the plaintiffs' attorneys. The court thereupon commented
that this rule should be liberally construed
in this case and thereupon granted the
plaintiffs' motion for extension and for
substitution, and then denied the motion to
dismiss the action as to defendant Shank.
CR.CP. 6(b)(2) allows consideration of
a mntinn made after the expiration of a

specified period where the failure to act
was a result of excusable neglect.
[1] In our view, the sole issue here is
whether the failure to file a motion for
substitution within the required 90 days
under the facts here is the result of excusable neglect. The burden was clearly on
the plaintiffs to show that the failure to
comply with C.R.CP. 25(a)(1) was due to
excusable neglect. No fact situation or evidence was presented to the respondent
court which would even approximate a
showing of excusable neglect The plaintiffs' motion for extension states simply
that the notification of defendant Shank's
death was received; that it was placed in
the attorney's fil^in the case; and that it
:was "thereafter overlooked." During the
hearing before the respondent court, the
plaintiffs' attorney indicated to the court
$ie additional fact that until the motion to
dismiss was received, no inquiry or investigation was made to determine the identity
of a representative of the deceased who
could be substituted as a party defendant.
• [2,3] Excusable neglect involves a situation where the failure to act results from
xtrcumstances which would cause a reasonably careful person to neglect a duty. It is
impossible to describe the myriad situations
showing excusable neglect, but in general,
most situations involve unforeseen occurrences such as personal tragedy, illness,
family death, destruction of files, and other similar situations which would cause a
reasonably prudent person to overlook a
required deadline date in the performance
of some responsibility. Failure to act due
to carelessness and negligence is not excusable neglect. Doyle v. Rice Ranch Oil Co.,
28 Cal.App.2d 18, 81 P.2d 980. On the
other hand, "excusable neglect" occurs
when there has been a failure to take proper steps at the proper time, not in consequence of carelessness, but as the result of
some unavoidable hindrance or accident.
Government Emp. Ins. Co. v. Herring, 257
Or. 201, 477 P.2d 903.
On behalf of the respondent, it is argued
that the notification or suggestion of death

as filed was not proper in that it did not
specify the identity of the representative
who should be substituted in place of the
defendant Shank. Also, it was argued that
upon the death of defendant Shank, the attorneys who represented him in the personal injury case no longer represented him
for any purpose and was not a proper party to make the notification of death.
Therefore, it is argued that the notification of death filed here was ineffective to
trigger the 90-day period provided by the
rule. The authority for the validity of
these arguments is Rende v. Kay, 134 U.S.
App.D.C. 403, 415 F.2d 983 (1969). The
facts of that case are remarkably similar
to the facts of this case, with one important exception. In Rende, the plaintiffs
attorney was injured shortly over a month
after the suggestion of death was filed,
and he did not return to his practice until
after the expiration of the 90 days as provided in Rule 25(a)(1) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which rule is
substantially identical to our C.R.CP.
25(a)(1).
[+-6] In Rende, however, there is no
discussion of the excusable neglect which
appears to be present in that case. Rather,
the premise for not enforcing the 90-day
rule, was the conclusion that the attorney
who had represented the deceased defendant prior to death had no standing to file
the notification of death which was also
defective because it did not identify the
representative who should be substituted in
the place of the deceased defendant. We
decline to be persuaded by the rationale of
Rende. In our view, ah attorney for a deceased defendant has a duty to notify the
court and the other parties in the action
that his client has died; and further, we
see nothing in our rules which could reasonably be a basis for requiring that notification of death of a defendant should include the identity of the deceased defendant's executor, administrator, or representative. It seems quite basic and reasonable
that a plaintiffs attorney who receives notification of the defendant's death has the
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responsibility to promptly initiate the necessary inquiries to determine the identity
ol ^ ^W*<M\ to VK. %\jtast\tvjted icy: tta. deceased defendant, and to file a motion for
substitution in accordance with our Rules
of Civil Procedure.
[7] We therefore remand this cause to
the respondent court with directions to
grant the motion for dismissal as to defendant Shank.

or both, was not so great that the interest
of the state would not be protected by a
ijtQceeduuj; nud&c the caumci$al Qtdvamce.x
Reversed and remanded with direction
that judgment of the municipal court be
reinstated.
Kelley, J., did not participate.

1. Municipal Corporations <S=>592(2)

GROVES, J., concurs in result only.

The offense of assault and battery
may be viewed as a matter of "mixed"
state and local concern. C.R.S. '63, 40-235.

KELLEY, J., not participating.

2. Municipal Corporations €=>592(l)

The rule is made absolute.

O

I KEY NUMIEI SYSTEM>

There is nothing basically invalid
about legislation on the same subject by
both a home rule city and the state, absent
some conflict between the two regulations.
Const, art. 2&, § } et seq.
3. Municipal Corporations €=>592(l)

CITY OF AURORA, a municipal corporation, Petitioner,
v.
Marion J. MARTIN, Respondent.
No. C-224.

Supreme Court of Colorado,
En Banc.
March 5, 1973.
Defendant was convicted in the Aurora Municipal Court of violating the municipal assault and battery ordinance. The
District Court, Adams County, Jean J. Jacobucci, J., reversed the conviction on
grounds that assault and battery is a matter of statewide concern, and that the municipal ordinance was preempted by enactment of state assault and battery statute,
and certiorari was granted. The Supreme
Court, Groves, J., held that difference in
penalty provisions between municipal assault and battery ordinance, which provided for a maximum fine of $300 or for
imprisonment not to exceed 90 days, and
state statute relating to assault and battery,
which provided for up to one year's im-

There was no conflict between substantive portions of city ordinance dealing
with assault and battery and state statute
relating to the same subject, where the ordinance did not authorize what the state
statute forbade or prohibit what the state
statute expressly authorized. C.R.S. '63,
40-2-35.
4. Municipal Corporations $=>592(3)

If a statute provides for substantially
greater penalty than does a similar municipal ordinance, such fact may be considered
in deciding whether the Cieneral Assembly
intended, by enacting the statute, to
preempt that field of regulation, but mere
difference in penalty provisions of a statute and ordinance, except in felony categories, does not necessarily establish an impermissible conflict between the two.
5. Municipal Corporations <§=?592(l)

Mere enactment of a state statute does
not constitute a preemption by the state of
the matter regulated.
6. Municipal Corporations €=?592(3)

Difference in penalty provisions between municipal assault and battery ordinance, which provided for a maximum fine
rit t^nn r\r 4nr i m n r i e n n m e n t not to exceed

K. LesCarbeau v. Rodrigues, 286 A.2d 246 (R.I. 1972).
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4. Abatement and Revival <$=>7I

Arthur M. LesCARBEAU, Jr.
V,

Morelo RODRIGUES.
No. 1386-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
Jan. 20, 1972.

Appeal by plaintiff motorist from an
order of the Superior Court, Providence
and Bristol Counties, Cochran, J., granting
dismissal of his action against out-of-state
owner of automobile involved in intersectional collision with plaintiff's vehicle.
The Supreme Court, Kelleher, J., held that
where plaintiff failed to initiate probate
proceedings in such other state to have administrator appointed who could be substituted in place of owner who died after institution of suit, order granting dismissal
unless plaintiff, within six months, obtained appointment of an administrator
was proper.
Appeal denied and dismissed.

1. Attorney and Client <S»76(2)

Death of a client terminates attorney's
authority to act.
2. Attorney and Client @=>I4

Courts can pass upon questions raised
and listen to suggestions as to their disposal from attorney who is officer of court.
3. Abatement and Revival <§=>74(l)

Where plaintiff motorist, after instituting suit against out-of-state owner of
automobile involved in intersectional collision with plaintiff's vehicle, failed to initiate probate proceedings in such other state
to have administrator appointed who could
be substituted in place of owner who died
after institution of suit, order granting dismissal unless plaintiff, within six months,
obtained appointment of an administrator
was proper. Rules of Civil Procedure,

If a party dies before verdict or decision is rendered in action against him, such
action abates as to him and must be dismissed unless it is revived by substituting
his personal representative.
5. Abatement and Revival <§=>7I

Where there is no attempt to revive
action against party who dies before judgment is rendered in action against him,
court lacks jurisdiction to enter any judgment against deceased.

Kenneth M. Beaver,
plaintiff.

Providence,

for

Martin M. Zucker, Providence, for defendant,
OPINION
KELLEHER, Justice.
On October 27, 1965, the plaintiff
(LesCarbeau), a resident of East Providence, owned and operated a motor vehicle
which was involved in an intersectional
collision with another motor vehicle owned
by Morelo Rodrigues (Rodrigues) and
driven by his wife, Alice Rodrigues. The
collision occurred on a public highway located in the city of Providence. The Rodrigueses lived in Seeko/ik, Massachusetts.
LesCarbeau instituted this suit in April
1966 against Rodrigues pursuant to the
substitute service provisions of G.L.1956,
chap. 7 of title 31. Service was made upon
the Registrar of Motor Vehicles and notice
of such service and a copy of the process
was duly sent to Rodrigues at his Seekonk
address. The case was answered by a
Rhode Island counsel. The record shows
that the litigants took advantage of the
discovery processes available under the
new Rules of Civil Procedure of the Superior Court. Interrogatories and replies
thereto were filed by both parties.
Rodrigues died on August 9, 1969. A

d i e u » jjo\f **.

record by his counsel on November 5, 1969
and a copy of this notice was furnished to
LesCarbeau's attorney. On November 24,
1969, plaintiff's attorney wrote to Rodrig^s* daughter. She lived at home with
her parents. The daughter was informed
that, unless she took steps to have an administrator appointed in her father's estate
and have the administrator join the Rhode
Island action, steps would be taken to have
"some 3rd part> appointed as administrator."
The Rodngues family (the mother and
daughter) have evidenced no desire to institute probate proceedings. In March
1971, a motion was filed by a Rhode Island
counsel asking that this action be dismissed
because of LesCarbeau's failure to have an
administrator appointed who could be substituted in place of the deceased. A hearing on the motion was held before a Superior Court justice and thereafter an order
was entered which granted the motion unless LesCarbeau, within the ensuing six
months, had obtained the appointment of
an administrator or executor who could be
substituted as the party defendant.
This appeal is governed by SuperJR.Civ.
j * 25(a) (1). It reads as follows:
"If a party dies and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, the court may order substitution of the proper parties.
The motion for substitution may be made
by any party or by the successors or representatives of the deceased party and,
together with the notice of hearing, shall
be served on the parties as provided by
Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in
the manner provided in Rule 4 for the
service of a summons If no motion for
substitution is made the action shall be
subject to dismissal under Rule 41(b)."
LesCarbeau first stresses that portion of
the rule which states that a motion for
substitution may be made b> a successor or
representatne of the deceased litigant and
he then points out that Rodngues' death
terminated the authont) of his local counsel to file the March 1971 motion for dis-

missal. Consequent^, he urges us to vacate the dismissal order. In making this
contention, he refers us to Rende v. Ka>,
134 U.S.App.D C. 403, 415 F.2d 983 (1969).
There, as here, the suggestion of death and
the subsequent motion were made b> the
attorney who had been retained by the deceased to defend the action. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the attorne> was not a
"representative" of the deceased part)
within the contemplation of FedRCn.P
25(a) (1) and refused to invoke the rule
unless those wrho represent or inherit
from the deceased when they suggest the
litigants death, at the same time identify
the representative who ma> be substituted
as a part) in place of the deceased We
have no quarrel with the court's finding
relative to the termination of the attorneys
agenc). We do believe, however, that the
conclusion reached in Rende stems from a
provision present in Federal Rule 25(a)
(1) which is not found in our rule. The
Federal proviso specifically states that unless a motion for substitution is made not
later than 90 da)s after the suggestion of
death has been made, the action shall be
dismissed as to the deceased party. Super.R.Qv.P. 25(a) (1) does not contain
any such trigger.
[1,2] A suggestion of death made in
the Superior Court triggers nothing except
to alert the court that rigor mortis may be
setting in on a case which has a pending
status. Even though the proposition that
the death of a client terminates the attorney's authority to act is absolutely correct,
in the circumstances of the case at bar it is
a technicality which overlooks the fact that
courts can pass upon questions raised and
listen to suggestions as to their disposal
from an attorne) who is an officer of the
court. LeBaron v. Mom, 53 R I 385, 167
A. 108 (1933)
[3] The trial justice could not close his
e)es to the fact that LesCarbeau, despite
his letter to the deceased's daughter, has
done absolutel) nothing to initiate probate
proceedings in Massachusetts. At oral ar-
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gument, his counsel put this appeal in its
proper focus when he asked why should
his client be forced to go to Massachusetts
and expend the funds necessary to commence probate proceedings. This is truly a
rhetorical question.
[4,5] Rule 25(a) (1) speaks of dismissal. The only individual who is injured by
a dismissal is a plaintiff. It is of no moment to the deceased defendant or his heirs
or successors. Neither the estate nor the
heirs are under any obligation to take any
positive steps in the premises. There is no
reason why the Rodrigues' family should
incur the expense of a probate proceeding
which would benefit only LesCarbeau. It
is a basic common-law principle that if a
party dies before a verdict or decision is
rendered in an action against him, the action abates as to him and must be dismissed unless it is revived by substituting
his personal representative. Anderson v.
Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482, 67 S.Ct. 428, 91 L.
Ed. 436 (1947); Iovino v. Waterson, 274
F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1959); In re Estate of
Einstoss, 26 N.Y.2d 181, 309 N.Y.S.2d 184,
257 N.E.2d 637 (1970). When, however,
there is no attempt to revive the action, the
court lacks jurisdiction to enter any judgment against the deceased. See Pendleton
v. Russell, 144 U.S. 640, 12 S.Ct. 743, 36
L.Ed. 574 (1892). It should be noted that
procedure for revival of an action by substitution of the personal representatives is
not a mere technicality but rather it is the
sole means by which the court obtains jurisdiction over the personal representative.
Rule 25(a) (1) requires that service of notice of the motion upon the newly substituted party be made "in the manner provided in Rule 4 for the service of a summons."

LesCarbeau's reluctance to spend money
for the appointment of an administrator is
understandable. However, in this day of
interstate travel, there can be no guarantee
that a Rhode Island motorist will be involved in a collision with only Rhode Islanders. The law cannot assure a penurious plaintiff of an all-expense paid trip
through the judicial processes. The record
shows that LesCarbeau claims damages for
pain and suffering together with some
$400 in special damages. If he does not
wish to expend a modest sum to further
his claim, that is his business. However,
once the action is filed, it becomes the
court's business. We have said it before
but it bears repeating. The common goal
of litigants, bar, and bench must be the
prompt and expeditious disposition of litigation. Home Insurance Co. v. Sormanti
Realty Corp., 102 RJ. 187, 229 A.2d 296
(1967). Cases cannot be filed and then
permitted to stay in a perpetual state of
limbo. The record shows that, despite the
death of Rodrigues and LesCarbeau's intransigent attitude, the case at bar now
stands assigned to the jury trial calendar
for February 1, 1972. This comes about
because in January 1971 local counsel for
the deceased made a motion that the case
be assigned to the jury calendar for February 1, 1972 and the plaintiffs counsel made
no effort to oppose this motion. Such
cluttering of a calendar only underscores
the urgency for a willingness on the part
of all to make every effort to follow
through on litigation so that it can be terminated. Only then can dockets be cleared
for those cases which are truly in a ready
status.
The plaintiffs appeal is denied and dismissed.

L. Mullis v. Bone, 238 S.E.2d 748 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977).
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the Undersigned, or any of them, for payment of any qf the Obligations, whether or
not the Bank shall have resorted to or
brought suit against . . .
the Principal [NHA], or any other party primarily or
secondarily liable on any of the Obligations,
and whether or not the Bank shall have
exhausted its rights or remedies against
any of the foregoing." Furthermore, UCC
§ 3—416(1) provides that a guarantor of
payment "engages that if the instrument is
not paid when due he will pay it according
to its tenor without resort by the holder to
any other party." Ga.L.1962, pp. 156, 263
(Code Ann. § 109A-3-416(l)). Thus, it is
clear that there was no compelling reason
to join NHA and that "complete relief"
could be afforded the original parties to the
suit without the joinder of NHA. Ga.L.
1972, pp. 689, 694 (Code Ann. § 81A-119(a)).
Peoples Bank of LaGrange v. No. Car. National Bank, 230 Ga. 389, 197 S.E.2d 352.
The fact that the guarantors may have a
cause of action against NHA after the conclusion of this action does not demand otherwise. Id., p. 392, 197 S.E.2d 352.
[2] 2. Appellants contend that the
grant of summary judgment was error because issues of fact remained as to their
defense that the bank had altered the notes
signed by NHA. We disagree. An officer
of the bank testified that "certain administrative information was added to the back
of the forms marked Tor Bank Use Only/
but no changes have been made to the faces
of the notes themselves." The notes, as
introduced, confirm that the bank made
only administrative notations and did not
change "the contract of any party thereto
in any respect." UCC § 3-407(1) (Code
Ann. § 109A-3-407(l)). The bank having
pierced appellants' pleadings as to that defense, it became appellants' burden to introduce admissible evidence showing a factual
dispute existed on the issue of alteration.
Appellants failed to do so. Since the bank
carried its burden as to that defense and
since no genuine issue existed as to any

err in granting summary judgment for the
bank.
Judgment affirmed
BELL, C. J., and McMURRAY, J., concur.

fo | KEYNUMB£RSrSUM>

143 Ga.App. 407
J. L. MULLIS
v.
Morine S. BONE et al.
No. 54415.
Court of Appeals of Georgia,
Division No. 2.
Oct. 4, 1977.

Action was brought for specific performance of a written contract for the sale
of real estate or for damages in lieu thereof. Following the death of the defendant,
plaintiff moved for substitution of his exec^
utrix as a party defendant and executrix
and deceased defendant's widow moved id
dismiss. The Superior Court, Bibb County,
C. Cloud Morgan, J., dismissed and plaintiff
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Shulman,
J., held that: (1) a statement of the fact of
the defendant's death, ^hich included the
name of the deceased and the date of death,
was a sufficient suggestion of death to trigger the 180-day period allowed for filing a
motion for substitution and (2) the deceased
defendant's attorney had the duty to report
the defendant's death to the court and
there was no requirement that the suggestion of death be filed by a party to the suit
or a successor or representative of the deceased.
Affirmed.
1. Courts G=*97(1)
Decisions of federal courts are per-

MULLIS v. BONE

oa.

i-±t/

Cite as 238 S.E^d748

2. Abatement and Revival <s=>74(l)
Statement of fact of death which included name of deceased and date of death
was sufficient suggestion of death to trigger 180-day period allowed by statute for
filing motion for substitution. Code,
§ 81A-125(a)(l).
3. Abatement and Revival <§=>70
Attorney retained by deceased litigant
had duty to report death of litigant to court
and there was no requirement that suggestion of death be filed by another party to
the suit or successor or representative of
deceased. Code, § 81A-125(aXl).
L Appeal and Errojv<3=>366
Where order in multiparty action did
not settle all issues as to all parties, it was
not appealable, absent express determination that there was no just reason for delay
and express direction for entry of judgment. Code, § 81A-154(b).
Bush & Crowley, J. Wayne Crowley, Macon, for appellant.
J. Sewell Elliott, Mincey & Kenmore,
David L. Mincey, Jr., Macon, for appellees.
SHULMAN, Judge.
. This appeal presents for the first time in
Georgia the question of the sufficiency of a
suggestion of death of a party. Mullis
brought suit for specific performance of a
written contract for the sale of real estate,
or for damages in lieu thereof. Paul Bone
was made a defendant because he executed
the contract and held title to the land.
Mrs. Bone was included as a defendant because she was asserting an interest in the
land based on a pending divorce action.
Mrs. Bone filed an answer, a counterclaim
and a motion to dismiss. Paul Bone filed
nothing and allowed the suit to go into
default. Mullis survived the motion to dismiss and successfully opposed Paul Bone's
motion to open the default. The order denying Mrs. Bone's motion stated that her
divorce action had been dismissed by operation of law and that she had no valid claim
to the property. Mullis subsequently

amended his complaint to seek reformation
of the sales contract and allowed Paul Bone
to file defensive pleadings, opening the default. A little over a year later, in November, 1975, Paul Bone died. Two and onehalf months after his death, on January 22,
1976, the attorney who represented him
filed and properly served on the parties a
notice giving the date of Bone's death.
Some four months later, in May, 1976, Mrs.
Bone filed an amendment to her pleadings
stating a new basis for her claim to the
property which was the subject of the contract and the suit. In August, 1976, the
executrix of Paul Bone's will filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint as to Paul Bone for
failure to move to substitute a personal
representative for Bone within the 180 days
allowed by Code Ann. § 81A-125(aXl). In
September, Mrs. Bone filed a similar motion. Seven days later, September 15,1976,
Mullis moved for the substitution of the
executrix as a party defendant. Those motions and an oral motion by Mrs. Bone to
dismiss as to her were considered at one
hearing. The resulting order, from which
this appeal is taken, granted all the motions
to dismiss and denied Mullis' motion for
substitution. We affirm.
1. Code Ann. § 81A-125(aXl) provides
for the substitution of ". . . the proper
parties" for a party who dies during the
pendency of a suit. The last sentence of
that subsection establishes the time period
during which a motion for substitution
must be made: "Unless the motion for substitution is made not later than 180 days
after the death is suggested upon the record by service of a statement of the fact of
the death as provided herein for the service
of the motion, the action shall be dismissed
as to the deceased party." Appellant contends that there was no sufficient suggestion of death in this case for two reasons:
(1) the notice did not name the proper party
to be substituted for Bone and (2) the notice
was signed by the attorney who had represented Bone, in his capacity as Bone's counsel.
[1] Appellant's attack on the notice is
based largely on the authority of Rende v.
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Kay, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 403, 415 F.2d 983
(1969). That case involved Rule 25(a)(1) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which
is substantially the same as Code Ann.
§ 81A-125(a)(l) except that the time period
in the Georgia statute is 180 days, as opposed to 90 days under the Federal Rule.
The court in that case held that a ". . .
suggestion of death, which was neither filed
by nor identified a successor or representative of the deceased, such as an executor or
administrator, was ineffective to trigger
the running of the 90-day period provided
by the Rule." Id. at 984. The suggestion
of death involved here exactly fits the description of the suggestion in Rende v. Kay.
It read, "Notice is hereby given that Paul
Bone, Defendant in the above-styled action,
died on November 2,1975/' The title under
the signature of the lawyer who filed the
notice read, "Attorney for Defendant Paul
Bone, Deceased." If Rende were controlling authority in this jurisdiction, we would
be required to reverse the lower court.
However, decisions of federal courts 'are
persuasive authority only (Munn v< Munn,
116 Ga.App. 297, 298,157 S.E.2d 77), and we
are not persuaded by Rende v. Kay, supra.
[2] Our statute refers to the suggestion
of death without detailing the form in
which it must be filed,1 except that it be
44
. . . a statement of the fact of the
death
. . . "
Code Ann. § 81A125(aXl). Appellant would not only have
us engraft into this statute a requirement
that the suggestion of death include an
identification of the successor or representative of the deceased who may be substituted therefor but a requirement that the person filing notice be a party to the action or
a successor or representative of a deceased
party. This writer is opposed, generally, to
the accretion of procedural requirements by
judicial fiat. That is not to say that courts
may not impose, in cases where a statute is
1. (1.) The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide in Form 30 a model for a suggestion of
death: "A B. [described as a party, or as executor, administrator, or other representative or
successor of C. D., the deceased party] suggests upon the record, pursuant to Rule

silent as to details, procedures necessary to
the preservation of justice and fair play.
Compare Cherry v. Gilbert, 124 Ga.App
847(3), 186 S.E.2d 319 (1971) with Code
Ann. § 81A-103. This, however, is not such
a case.
The basic rationale advanced by the court
in Rende v. Kay for imposing on the person
who files the suggestion a greater burden
than is imposed by the language of the
statute is fairness. The court was concerned that a literal construction of the
statute would ". . . open the door to a
tactical maneuver to place upon the plaintiff the burden of locating the represent*
tive of the estate within 90 days." Id. at
986. Appellant here urges that same rai
tionale, but we reject it. In the first plaice,
our statute provides twice as much time aa
Federal Rule 25(aXl). Secondly, the pro\$
sions of Code Ann. § 81A-106(b), allowing
extensions of time, alleviate the burden a
literal construction places on the party whtf
desires the substitution. The court in
Rende discussed the analogous Federal Rule
6(b) but did not consider its application'tn
this situation.
Although our legal tradition places a premium on fairness, litigation still involves m
adversary system. The burden of ^ascertaining the proper party to be substituted for a deceased litigant is properly placed
on the party who would effect the substitution. We hold, therefore, that ". ,:.- a
statement of the fact of'the death . .*
which includes the name of the deceased"
and the date of death is a sufficient suggest
tion of death as contemplated by Code Ann,1
§ 81A-125(a)(l) to trigger the 180-day peri-'
od allowed by that statute for filing a mo-*'
tion for substitution.
[3] Appellant's second attack on the sufficiency of the suggestion of death filed in
this case is directed to the question of by
whom must the suggestion be filed. Appelduring the pendency of this action." Although
it would appear from the language in brackets
that the drafters of Federal Rule 25(a)(1) expected that the suggestion would identify the
proper party to be substituted, it must be noted
that our legislature chose not to adopt that '

MUL.L1S V. m / n r i
Cite as 238 S.E.2d 748

lant insists it must be filed by a "proper
party/' i.e., someone already a party to the
suit or a successor or representative of the
deceased. The statute, however, imposes no
such requirement. The reference to a
"proper party" in the statute is concerned
with who may be substituted for the deceased. While the statute provides that the
motion for substitution may be made by
".
. any party or by the successors or
representatives of the deceased party
. . .," it is silent as to the identity of
the appropriate person to. suggest the death
on the record. Appellee cites, in support of
the position that the attorney retained by
the deceased is empowered to suggest the
death, the duty e\ved by an attorney to
report to the court the death of a client who
is a party to pending litigation. Appellant
responds with the principle that an agency
relationship is dissolved upon the death of
the principal. While that, as a general
proposition, is true, we agree with appellee's view of the duty owed to the court by
the attorney of a deceased litigant. We
hold that the suggestion here was properly
filed. Further support for this position is
found in Jernigan v. Collier, 134 Ga.App.
£37, 213 S.E.2d 495, affd 234 Ga. 837, 218
j5rE.2d 556. Although the sufficiency of the
suggestion of death apparently was not
questioned in that case, this court noted
that it was filed by the attorney for the
deceased defendant and went on to affirm
an order granting a motion to dismiss under
Code Ann. § 81A-125(aXl).

tor, or representative. It seems quite basic
and reasonable that a plaintiffs attorney
who receives notification of the defendant's
death has the responsibility to promptly
initiate the necessary inquiries to determine
the identity of a person to be substituted
for the deceased defendant, and to file a
motion for substitution in accordance with
our Rules of Civil Procedure." Id. 181 Colo,
at 90, 507 P.2d at 867.
The notice of death in this case, filed
January 22, 1976, was in all respects sufficient to start the running of the 180-day
period in which a motion to substitute may
be made. As no motion for substitution
was made within that period, the trial court
was correct in granting the motion of the
executrix to dismiss as to Paul Bone.
2. One of appellant's enumerations of
error is directed to the court's denial of his
motion to substitute the executrix of Paul
Bone's will. The motion for substitution
was made 237 days after the filing of the
suggestion of death, 57 days late. Two
motions to dismiss had already been filed.
Appellant made no request for an extension
of time during the period and made no
allegations of excusable neglect to justify
an extension after the period. The time for
making the motion having passed, the trial
court was correct in denying the motion to
substitute.

[4] 3. Appellant complains that appellee, Mrs. Bone, had no standing to move for
The rationale of Rende v. Kay, supra, has dismissal as to Paul Bone because of a prior
been rejected by the Supreme Court of Col- order holding that she had no claim to the
orado also. That state has adopted the property at issue. That argument must
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with mod- fail. This case is a multi-party action. For
ifications, as has Georgia. In Farmers Ins. an order to be final in such a case, when it
v. Dist. Court, 181 Colo. 85, 507 P.2d 865, does not settle all the issues as to all the
an exthe court held: "We decline to be per- parties, there must be ". .
suaded by the rationale of Rendz. In our press determination that there is no just
an express
view, an attorney for a deceased defendant reason for delay and . . .
has a duty to notify the court and the other direction for the entry of judgment." Code
parties in the action that his client has died; Ann. § 81A-154(b). There was no such
and further, we see nothing in our rules determination and direction, and the order
subject to revision at any
which could reasonably be a basis for re- was ".
quiring that notification of death of a de- time before the entry of judgment adjudifendant should include the identity of the cating all the claims and the rights and
deceased defendant's executor, administra- liabilities of all the parties." Id. The order
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not being final, Mrs. Bone was still a party
and was entitled to make any proper motion.
4. Appellant's final complaint is that the
court erred in granting Mrs. Bone's oral
motion to dismiss the complaint as to her.
His argument, based on standing, was the
same as in Division 3 of this opinion and is
disposed of with the same response. Appellant's remaining argument against the
granting of Mrs. Bone's motion presupposes
the reversal of the portion of the order
granting the motion to dismiss filed by the
executrix. Since we affirmed that grant,
this argument fails.
The order granting the motions to dismiss
and denying the motion to substitute was
proper in all respects.
Judgment affirmed.
QUILLIAN, P. J., and BANKE, J., concur.

143 Ga.App. 406

Nathaniel JACKSON
v.
The STATE.
No. 54393.
Court of Appeals of Georgia,
Division No. 2.
Oct. 4, 1977.
Defendant was convicted before the
Superior Court, Dougherty County, Asa D.
Kelley, Jr., J., of criminal attempt to commit armed robbery and possession of a firearm during commission of a crime, and he
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Banke, J.,
held that: (1) evidence established sufficient connection between defendant and attempted robbery to support his conviction

firearm was involved in attempted commission of armed robbery, its possession became a lesser included offense in armed
robbery, and defendant could not be convicted of both offenses, and his conviction
for possession of firearm during commission
of a crime would accordingly be reversed.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.

1. Robbery <^24.1(4)
Evidence, which included testimony
that defendant entered store only seconds
before a masked gunman, who announced
"This is a holdup and we want all of your
money," at time when no one else was
present in store, that cashier heard defends
ant and gunman engage in a barely audible
conversation, that after cashier obtained
pistol, all three were wounded in ensuing
gunfire, that upon finding defendant lying
in parking lot a few moments later, defendant allegedly told cashier not to shoot him
any more and that "we didn't mean to hurt
you/' established sufficient connection between defendant and attempted robbery to
support his conviction for criminal attempt
to commit armed robbery. Code, § 26801(bX3).
2. Criminal Law <s=>29
Where only one firearm was involved
in attempted commission of armed robbery,
its possession became a lesser included offense in armed robbery and defendant could
not be convicted of both criminal attempt to
commit armed robbery and possession of a
firearm during commission of a crime, and
his conviction on latter charge would according!} be reversed. Code, § 26-506.

Clayton Jones, Jr., George W. Woodall,
Albany, for appellant.
William S. Lee, Dist. Atty., Hobart M.
Hind, Asst. Dist. Atty., Albany, for appellor
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due 30 days from the date the loan was
made. The note specifically gave plaintiff
the right to demand immediate payment
upon default. The one-year stay of execution served as an extension of time for
repayment and therefore was a material
alteration. This material alteration was
granted without the knowledge or consent
of defendant, thereby, extinguishing any
guarantor liability of defendant. Plaintiffs second point is denied.
We affirm the trial court's ruling granting defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
CRANE and CRAHAN, JJ., concur.

substitution after 90 days from suggestion
of death.
Appeal dismissed.
1. Judgment <3=>7
Courts have jurisdiction to render
judgments for or against viable entities
only.
2. Judgment <3=>12
Dead person is by definition not "viable entity," and, thus, court may not render
judgment for or against such person.
V.A.M.R. 52.13(a)(1).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and,
definitions.
3. Appeal and Error @=>1109
Appellate court decision issued aft&i$
death of party to appeal has no legal effect;
in absence of substitution of partfeft
V.A.M.R. 52.13(a)(1).

Jerry and Martha Ann HOLMES,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
Harold ARBEITMAN, DefendantRespondent
No. 62008.
Missouri Court of Appeals,
Eastern District,
Division Three.

4. Appeal and Error <£»334(7)
On appeal of suit for money had and
received, court lacked authority to allow;
substitution of defendant's estate for de-'
fendant after 90 days from suggestion of
death. V.A.M.R. 52.13(a)(1).
Mark D. Pasewark, Virginia G. Pase^
wark, St Louis, for plaintiffs-appellants^
Peter B. Hoffman, Robert E. Tuctoe^
Kortenhof & Ely, P.C., St. Louis, for defendant-respondent.

June 8, 1993.
Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to
Supreme Court Denied July 14, 1993.

SMITH, Judge.

Application to Transfer Denied
Aug. 17, 1993.

Plaintiffs appeal from the action of thi
trial court in granting defendant's motion
for directed verdict in plaintiffs' suit for
money had and received. We dismiss the
appeal.

In action for money had and received,
the Circuit Court, St. Louis County, George
R. Gerhard, J., granted defendant's motion
for directed verdict. Plaintiffs appealed
and, more than 90 days after defendant's
counsel filed suggestion of death, plaintiffs
moved to substitute defendant's estate for

Notice of appeal was filed on May 7,
1992. On August 18, 1992, counsel for the;
sole defendant filed in this court a suggestion of death of defendant on August 9^
1992. Notice of that suggestion of death
was maDed to counsel for plaintiffs on that
day. On October 2 this court wrote to

Cite as 857 S.W.2d 442 (MOJipp. C~V, I 7 7 j ;

opened and a personal representative appointed. It was further suggested that if
so a motion for substitution would be appropriate. Copy of that letter was sent to
counsel for plaintiffs. On October 7 an
attorney in Springfield, Illinois sent a letter
to this court advising that the St Louis
County Circuit Court had granted letters
testamentary on September 10 to Mark Rabin, whose address was listed and to First
National Bank of Springfield whose address was also listed. The letter further
advised that first publication of notice of
granting letters testamentary had occurred
on September 15 in the St. Louis Countian.
JP°Py of that letter was sent to counsel for
defendant but no copy is indicated to counsel for the plaintiffs^ On December 28 the
personal representatives, utilizing Arbeitman's attorneys, filed a motion for substitution to make the personal representatives
the successors to Harold Arbeitman. That
amotion specifically stated that it was made
**to permit the prosecution of this Appeal
and by doing so Respondent does not waive
its argument that Appellant has failed to
comply with Rule 52.13(a)(1) of the Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure.'' On January 4,1993, appellants filed their "Adoption
of Motion for Substitution by Appellants,
Jerry < and Martha Ann Holmes" in which
they sought the substitution of the Estate
of Harold Arbeitman for Harold Arbeitman, and requested that the motion be
allowed "out of time". On January 6, the
Chief Judge granted the plaintiffs' motion
to adopt. Respondent raises as the first
Pjoint in the brief that the substitution was
untimely and this court has no jurisdiction
to proceed. We agree.
Rule 52.13(a)(1) provides:
If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court may, upon
motion, order substitution of the proper
parties. Suggestion of death may be
made by any party or person in interest
by the service of a statement of the fact
of the death as provided herein for the
service of a motion. A motion for substitution may be made by any party or by
the successor or representative of the
deceased party. Such motion, together
with notice of hearing shall be served

upon the parties as provided in Rule 43.01, and upon persons not parties in the
manner provided for the service of a
summons. Unless a motion for substitution is served within 90 days after a
suggestion of death is filed, the action
shall be dismissed as to the deceased
party without prejudice.
Rule 52.13(a)(1). (Emphasis supplied).
[1-4] Courts have jurisdiction to render
judgments for or against viable entities
only. A dead person is by definition not a
viable entity. An appellate court decision
issued after the death of a party to an
appeal has no legal effect in the absence of
a substitution of parties. Gardner v. Mercantile Bank of Memphis, 764 S.W.2d 166
(Mo.App.1989) [3-5]. The time limitations
contained in the Rule are "in the nature of
a statute of limitation". Id. at [6-8]; Hartvedt v. Maurer, 359 Mo. 16, 220 S.W.2d 55
(1949) [2]. Rule 52.13 is applicable to appellate proceedings. Metropolitan .St
Louis Sewer District v. Holloran, 751
S.W.2d 749 (Mo. banc 1988) [I.e. 751];
Gardner, supra. Rule 44.01(b) authorizing enlargement of time for actions required by the Rules specifically provides
that the court may not extend the time for
taking any action under Rule 52.13. We
lacked the authority therefore to allow the
substitution after the 90 days from the
suggestion of death and to the extent the
order of January 6 purported to allow the
out-of-time substitution it was beyond our
jurisdiction. The 90 day limitation was
clearly exceeded here. The service difficulty involved in the Holloran case is not
present here.
Plaintiffs, relying upon federal cases typified by Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983
(D.C.Cir.1969), assert that decedent's counsel lacked the standing to file the suggestion of death and that it was ineffective
because it did not identify the representative of the estate who could be substituted
for defendant. We note that the federal
rules upon which the federal decisions are
based differ from those of Missouri. See
Rule 6 and 25 Fed.R.Civ.P. Notably the
federal rules authorize extensions of time
to comply with the substitution rule and in
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that respect appear to be more lenient than
the Missouri rules. Further the federal
rules specify with particularity who may
make the suggestion of death, limiting
those persons to "any party or . . . the
successors or representatives of the deceased party . . . " Our rule authorizes the
suggestion of death to be made by "any
party or person in interest". Because an
attorney's representation of his client terminates upon the client's death, the attorney is not a successor or representative 0 f
the deceased party under the federal rules.
But an attorney is a "person in interest"
under the Missouri rule. The attorney j s
still listed as the representative of the
client in the court records and until the
suggestion of death is filed is held accountable by the court to meet court deadlines
and represent the cheat The attorney is a
person with an interest in advising the
court of the death of his client and the
change in his status and obligations to the
court. Further the practical reason for
requiring the suggestion of death and the
substitution is so the court may proceed
with its business and not be held in a state
of judicial impotence. Gardner, supra at
[3-5]. The most logical person to advise
the court of the death of the party is the
attorney representing him. We are unable
to conclude that the Rule is intended to
preclude the suggestion of death being
made by the most logical person to mak^ it
Plaintiffs' other contention is that the
suggestion of death does not advise the
court or the plaintiffs of the identity of the
person to 6e substituted. This seemecf to
be a concern of the Rende v. Kay coiirt.
The short answer is that the rule does hot
require such information. Such suggestion
may be made by "a statement of the fact of
death". The representatives of the decedent here have no interest or incentive j n
the continuation of this appeal because the
decedent won in the trial court. Plaintiffs
have a great deal of interest and incentive
for the appeal to continue. In an adversary system the burden of continuing the
jurisdiction of the appellate court shouid
rest upon the party whose interest j s

apparent belief of the Rende v. Kay court
that the burden should be differently
placed. The suggestion of death was filed
on August 18 and by October 9 the file of
this court contained the information necessary to make the substitution required.
Plaintiffs' counsel was notified of our re-^
quest for this information on or about October 3. Plaintiffs still had 38 days after
October 9 to make the substitution and did
not do so. This is not to suggest that
absence of such information tolls the 90
day limitation but is mentioned only 'to
demonstrate that no difficulty of obtaining
information was involved here. The re-'
quirements of Rule 52.13 were not met and
the rule directs that the action be dis^
missed.
Appeal is dismissed.
GARY M. GAERTNER, P.J, and
STEPHAN, J., concur.

Darrick BARBER, Movant/Appeilant,
•.

STATE of Missouri, Respondent
No. 62679.
Missouri Court of Appeals,
Eastern District,
Division One.
June 8, 1993.
Motion for Rehearing ancf/br IVansfer to
Supreme Court Denied July 14, 1993.
Application to Transfer Denied
Aug. 17, 1993.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of St
Louis County; Bernhardt C. Drumm,
Judge.
Dave Hemingway, St Louis, for movant,
appellant
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen.,
Joan F. Gummels, Asst Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

N. Brown v. Wheeler, 437 So.2d 521 (Ala. 1983).

BROWN v. WHEELER

Ala.

521

Citeas437So.2d 521 (Ala. 1983)

ty notary public, so presumably the parties
executed it there. The indemnity agreement refers to the bonds, so they were in
existence when the agreement was executed in 1978. Morrison refers to C & G
Coal's failure to reclaim the land as occurring after the dissolution of the corporation,
so presumably the cause of action arose in
1979 or thereafter. Thus, for all the record
shows, the last business done between C &
G Coal and Morrison took place in Marion
County.
[3] In some cases, a continuing agreement executed in the forum county might
be a proper b^sis for venue. In this case,
however, although C & G Coal had done
some business in Jefferson County, its connection to that forum is too attenuated, and
the instances of doing business there are too
remote, for venue to be proper there. The
trial court committed no error in granting
the motion to transfer, so the writ of mandamus is denied.
WRIT DENIED.
, TORBERT, CJ., and FAULKNER, EMBRY and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
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Dane BROWN
v.
Malcolm L. WHEELER, Administrator of
Estate of WUliam V. Phifer, Deceased.
Maiy Gail BROWN
v.
Malcolm L WHEELER, Administrator of
Estate of William V. Phifer, Deceased.
82-80, 82-81.
Supreme Court of Alabama.
Aug. 26, 1983.
In suit arising out of an automobile
accident, the Jefferson County Circuit

Court, Josh Mullins, J., set aside the appointment of administrator ad litem for deceased defendant's estate, dismissed the
claims against that defendant, and plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court, Adams, J., held that: (1) it was proper for
attorney who represented the defendant to
suggest his death upon the record, and (2)
the suggestion of death on the record was
sufficient to trigger the running of sixmonth period for filing a motion for substitution despite failure to include name of
successor or representative in the suggestion, and plaintiffs' failure to make motion
within six months warranted dismissal of
claim.
Affirmed.

1. Parties «=>60
Suggestion of death filed by attorney
for deceased party to litigation initiates
running of period for filing motion for substitution if suggestion is otherwise properly
made. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 25(aXl).
2. Attorney and Client *=»76(2)
Notwithstanding general rule that attorney's authority to act on behalf of client
ceases on death of that client, attorney for
a party continues to have duty to the court
after demise of client and, in discharge of
that duty, must inform court and other
parties to litigation of the death.
3. Abatement and Revival $=>70
Parties <*=>60
Although attorney for deceased party
to litigation may be in best position to know
who representative of estate is, that is not
sufficient basis for requiring attorney to
identify entity in suggestion of death, and
statement of fact of death which includes
name of deceased and date of death is sufficient suggestion of death to trigger period
allowed for filing motion for substitution.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 25(aXl).
4. Abatement and Revival $=>70
Executors and Administrators *=>22(3)
Suggestion of death filed by deceased
defendant's attorney was proper even
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though it did not contain name of a succesIn May 1980, appellants separately filed
sor or representative of decedent's estate;; complaints in the Circuit Court of Jefferson
the suggestion of death triggered runningI County, Alabama, against Phifer and Harof six-month period for filing a motion forr bert Construction Company. The suits
substitution and, accordingly, plaintiffs' ap-• arose out of an automobile accident that
plication for appointment of an administra-" occurred in November 1979.
tor ad litem for decedent's estate was ap]
On March 1, 1981, Phifer died. Ten days
propriate, but untimely, where not filed unlater, Thomas R. Elliot, Jr., "as Attorney
til one year after the suggestion of death.
for William V. Phifer," filed a suggestion of
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 25(aXl).
death in the circuit court. He did not include in the suggestion the name of a sucLarry W. Harper and J. Mark Naftel of^ cessor or representative of the deceased's
Porterfield, Scholl, Bainbridge, Mims &' estate, since one had not been appointed.
Harper, Birmingham, for appellants.
In fact, there were no assets in the estate,
Thomas R. Elliott, Jr. of London, Yancey,»
On March 10, 1982, appellants' attorney
Clark & Allen, Birmingham, for appellee.• filed an application for appointment of an
ADAMS, Justice.
These appeals are 6y Dane Brown and'
Mary Gail Brown from an order of the trial'
court setting aside the appointment of an
administrator ad litem and dismissing the
claims against William V. Phifer, a deceased defendant.
The issues on appeal are as follows:
1. Was it proper under Rule 25(a)(1)1
of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure*
for the attorney who represented defendant Phifer to suggest his death upon the
record?
2. Was the suggestion of death sufficient to trigger the running of the sixmonth period for filing a motion for substitution under Rule 25(aXl), A.R.Civ.P.,
despite a failure to include the name of a
successor or representative of Phifer's estate?

administrator ad litem to represent Phifer's
estate in the lawsuit. The court appointed
Malcolm L. Wheeler, the General Administrator for Jefferson County.
On March 15, Elliot, "as former attorney
for William V. Phifer/' filed a motion to
dismiss the claim against Phifer because the
appellants had failed to file a motion for
appointment of an administrator ad litem
within six months after the suggestion of
death upon the record, as prescribed by
Rule 25(aXl), A.R.Civ.P. The motion to
dismiss was granted. Subsequently, however, the trial court set aside the order
granting the motion, denied the revival of
the claim against Phifer, and dismissed that
claim. On October 13, 1982* this order was
made final pursuant to Rule 54(b), A.R.
Civ.R

The facts of the case are as follows:

Appellants have conceded that if the suggestion of death was properly made under
Rule 25, then the claim against Phifer was
due to be dismissed. However, they rely on
the authority of Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983
(D.C.Cir.1969), for an attack on the suggestion of death filed by Elliot. In Rende, the
court considered whether the suggestion of

1. "If a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court may order substitution
of the proper parties. The motion for substitution may be made by any party or by the
successors or representatives of the deceased
party and, together with the notice of hearing,

manner provided in Rule 4 for the service of a
summons, and may be served in any county.
Unless the motion for substitution is made not
later than six months after the death is suggested upon the record by service of a statement of
the fact of the death as provided herein for the

We answer these questions favorably to
the estate of Phifer and affirm the trial
court's order dismissing the claim against
Phifer and setting aside the appointment of
an administrator ad litem.

BROWN v.
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the death of a defendant, filed by defendant's counsel without identification of a
successor or representative of the deceased,
was sufficient to initiate the running of the
90-day period for filing a motion for substitution pursuant to Rule 25(aXl) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court
held that "the suggestion of death, which
was neither filed by, nor identified a successor or representative of the deceased, such
as an executor or administrator, was ineffective to trigger the running of the 90-day
period provided by the Rule/' Rende v.
Kay, 415 F.2d at 984.
In support of its holding, the court in
Rende cited a oortion of the Committee
Notes for the Inderal Rules of Civil Procedure,2 and also the form for suggestion of
death recommended by the Advisory Committee,8 On the basis of these sources, the
court concluded that the Advisory Committee
. . . plainly contemplated that the suggestion emanating from the side of the
deceased would identify a representative
of the estate, such as an executor or
administrator, who could be substituted
for the deceased as a party, with the
action continued in the name of the representative
[And,] [although the
attorney for the defendant was retained
to "represent" the deceased as his counsel, he is not a person who could be made
a party, and is not a "representative of
the deceased party" in the sense contemplated by Rule 25(aXl).
415 F.2d at 985. For the reasons that follow, we are not persuaded that this authority should control our construction of Rule
2. "Present Rule 25(a)(1), together with present
Rule 6(b), results in an inflexible requirement
that an action be dismissed as to a deceased
party if substitution is not carried out within a
fixed period measured from the .time of death.
The hardships and inequities of this unyielding
requirement plainly appear from the cases. * *
The amended rule establishes a time limit for
the motion to substitute based not upon the
time of the death, but rather upon the time
information of the death is provided by means
of a suggestion of death upon the record. * *
A motion to substitute may be made by any
party or by the representative of the deceased
party without awaiting the suggestion of death.
Indeed, the motion will usually be so made. If

25(aXl) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure.
[1,2] In contrast with the federal Committee Notes, neither the plain language of
Rule 25(aXl), A.R.Civ.R, nor the Committee Comments to the rule indicate who may
properly suggest upon the record the death
of a party. Moreover, Frank W. Donaldson,
a member of this court's Advisory Committee on Civil Practice and Procedure, has
noted that in drafting Rule 25, A.R.Civ.P.,
"[t]here was no question whatsoever but
that an objective of the Committee was to
reveal and make plain that there is a duty
of an attorney to suggest the death of his
client upon the record." Donaldson, 4
Cum.-Sam.L.Rev. 210, 227 (1973). This objective of the Committee reflected a widespread concern regarding defense counsel's
strategic failure to notify the court and
opposing parties of a client's death. We
approve the objective, and concur with
those jurisdictions that have held that a
suggestion of death filed by the attorney
for a deceased party initiates the running of
the period for filing a motion for substitution under Rule 25(aXl), if the suggestion is
otherwise properly made. See Farmers Insurance Group v. District Court of the
Second Judicial District, 181 Colo. 85, 507
?2d 865 (1973); Mullis v. Bone, 143 Ga.
App. 407, 238 S.E.2d 748 (CtApp.1977);
King v. Tyree's of Tampa, Inc., 315 So.2d
538 (Fla.DistCt.App.1975). And, notwithstanding the general rule that an attorney's
authority to act on behalf of a client ceases
on the death of that client, we adhere to the
view that the attorney for a party continues
a party or the representative of the deceased
party desires to limit the time within which
another may make the motion, he may do so by
suggesting the death upon the record. (Emphasis added.)" 415 F.2d at 985.
3. "A.B. [described as a party, or as executor,
administrator, or other representative or suecessor of CD., the deceased party] suggests
upon the record, pursuant to Rule 25(a)(1), the
death of CD. [describe as party] during the
pendency of this action. Added Jan. 21, 1963,
eff. July 1, 1963. (Emphasis added)" 415 F.2d
at 985.
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to have a duty to the court after the demise
necessary inquiries to determine the idenof that client and, in discharge of that duty,
tity of a person to be substituted for the
must inform the court and other parties of
deceased defendant, and to file a motion
the death. See Farmers Insurance Group v. for substitution in accordance with our
District Court of the Second Judicial Dis- Rules of Civil Procedure.
trict, supra; Mullis v. Bone, supra.
Farmers Insurance Group v. District Court
[3,4] We now address appellants' argu- of the Second Judicial District, 181 Colo, at
ment that Elliot's suggestion of death was 90, 507 P.2d at 867-68.
not proper because it did not contain the
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the
name of a successor or representative of trial court's order dismissing the claim
Phifer's estate. Appellants would have us against defendant Phifer.
adopt the Rende court's position that it is
AFFIRMED.
not correct to saddle a plaintiff with the
responsibility of identifying the successor or
TORBERT, C.J, and FAULKNER, ALrepresentative of the estate of a deceased MON and EMBRY, JJ., concur.
defendant See 415 F.2d at 986. We decline to do so. Although the attorney for
the deceased may be in the best position to
O I KEYNUMBERSYSTEM
know who the representative of the estate
is, that is not a sufficient basis for requiring
the attorney to identify that entity in a
suggestion of death. We agree with the
Georgia Court of Appeals, which said:
Although our legal tradition places a
Mary M. LAND
premium on fairness, litigation still inv.
volves an adversary system. The burden
of ascertaining the proper party to be
Forest F. BOWYER, et aL
substituted for a deceased litigant is
82-77.
properly placed on the party who would
effect the substitution. We hold, thereThe Supreme Court of Alabama.
fore, that " . . . a statement of the fact of
Aug. 12, 1983.
the death . . . " which includes the name
of the deceased and the date of death is a
sufficient suggestion of death . . . to trigCase in which widow ha£ claimed dowger the 180-day period allowed . . . for er interest in husband's land was removed
filing a motion for substitution.
from probate court to circuit court, where
Mullis v. Bone, 143 Ga.App. at 410, 238 suit was subsequently commenced on petiS.E.2d at 750. Therefore, having found no tion for sale for division of land owned by
defect in the contents of Ellfot's suggestion decedent at the time of his death. The
of death, we hold that it was the appellants' Circuit Court, Russell County, Paul S. Milresponsibility to seek substitution for Phifer ler, Jr., J., entered judgment dismissing
prior to the expiration of the 6-month peri- widow as party plaintiff, and widow appealod which commenced upon the filing of the ed. The Supreme Court, Adams, J., held
suggestion of death. Appellants' applica- that: (1) holding in Hall v. McBride invalition for the appointment of an administra- dating as unconstitutional statute governtor ad litem was appropriate under the cir- ing claim of dower by widow where decumstances of this case, but untimely, for ceased husband left will precluded widow
[i]t seems quite basic and reasonable that from claiming dower interest in realty
a plaintiff's attorney who receives notifi- owned by her deceased husband, and (2)
cation of the defendant's death has the trial court properly allowed defendants to

O. King v. Tyree's of Tampa, Inc., 315 So.2d 538 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
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nership. Thereafter, the capital, if any,
of the General Partners shall be repaid to
them, and subsequently the profits, if any,
of the limited partnership shall be distributed. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)

It is impossible with the state of the record for us to adjudicate the issues and
bring finality. We respectfully remand for
a new trial in accordance with the views
here expressed and these instructions:

We find that, except for the conduct of
Faye Hurley, P & H had at some point in
time prior to the filing of suit adequate resources to reimburse Faye Hurley, per
agreement, thereby entitling Carl Paul and
A. B. Hurley to delivery of the assignment.

(1) A determination should be made as
to when the assignment should have been
delivered by Faye Hurley;

To put it another way, Carl Paul and A.
B. Hurley were entitled to delivery of the
assignment as soon as the improper disbursements of the partnership capital totaled $55,000, because these are funds
which should have been used in contemplation of the parties to repay Faye Hurley.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

[2] Carl Paul and A. B. Hurley can be
excused for the failure of P & H Seawall
to pay these funds to Faye Hurley because
it was prevented by her (and her adviserhusband, Ray Hurley) from performing.
The basic premise for our decision is the
principle found in 7 Fla.Jur., Contracts, §
145 (1956):
"Where a party contracts for another to
do a certain thing, he thereby impliedly
promises that he will do nothing which
will hinder or obstruct that other in
doing the agreed thing."
7 Fla.Jur., Contracts § 148 (1956); 5 Williston on Contracts, Excuses for Non-Performance, §§ 676, 677 (1961); Casale v.
Carrigan and Boland, Inc., 288 So.2d 299
(4th DCA Fla.1974).
If the assignment had been delivered, the
interests held by Carl Paul and A. B. Hurley would have been 49^% each (with 1%
still held by Robert E. Rogers).
Going on, the trial court has found that
$100,000 was improperly disbursed. However, there has been no detailed and specific accounting made of the partnership assets, income and disbursements to support

(2) Based upon that decision there
should be an accounting as to the entitlement of the parties to the partnership assets.

OWEN, C. J., and MORIARITY, W.
HERBERT, Associate Judge, concur.
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Ear! KING, Appellant,
v.
TYREE'S OF TAMPA, INC., d/b/a Tyree's
Inc., a corporation, et al., Appellees.

No. 74-1169.
District Court of Appeal of Florida,
Second District
July 2, 1975.
Rehearing Denied July 25, 1975.

Action arising from automobile accident. The Circuit Court, Hillsborough
County, Walter N. Burnside, Jr., J., dismissed action, and plaintiff appealed. The
District Court of Appeal, Scheb, J., held
that where no motion for substitution was
filed within 90-day period after filing of
suggestion of death of plaintiff, it did not
appear that plaintiff's counsel had attempted to obtain any extension of time, and
there was no showing of any difficulties in
securing appointment of personal representative which may have caused delay in
filing motion for substitution, action was
subject to dismissal on plaintiffs motion.

KING v. TYREE'S OF TAMrA, m u .
Cite as, Fla.App., 315 So.2d 538

Parties <§=>60
Where no motion for substitution was
filed within 90-day period after filing of
suggestion of death of plaintiff, it did not
appear that plaintiffs counsel had attempted to obtain any extension of time, and
securing appointment of personal representative which may have caused delay in
there was no showing of any difficulties in
filing motion for substitution, action was
subject to dismissal on plaintiffs motion.
30 West's F.S.A. Rules of Civil Procedure,
rule 1.260(a)(1).
2. Parties <S»63
Rule authorizing petition to relieve
party or his legal representative from effect of judgment where there has in fact
been excusable neglect was available to
plaintiff whose action was dismissed for
; failure timely to seek substitution following suggestion of death. FeARules Civ.
Proc. rule 6(b), 28 U.S.C.A.; 30 & 31
West's F.S.A. Rules of Civil Procedure,
rules 1.090, 1.540, 1.540(b)(1).

William A. Seacrest of Peterson, Carr,
Harris & Seacrest, Lakeland, for appellant.
M. W. Graybill and Ted R. Manry, III,
of Macfarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly,
Tampa, for appellees.
SCHEB, Judge.
[1] This appeal is from dismissal of
the appellant/plaintiffs suit and focuses on
the applicability of RCP 1.260(a)(1) as relates to the time for substitution of a successor for a deceased party plaintiff.
In 1971 the plaintiff
sued the
appellees/defendants on a cause of action
arising out of an automobile accident. The
plaintiff died on February 9, 1974, during
the pendency of the litigation and on May
3, 1974, his attorney, pursuant to RCP 1.260(a)(1), filed a suggestion of death with
the trial court. On August 5, 1974, the defendants moved for dismissal on the
ground that no motion for substitution had

00&

been filed within the 90-day period after
the filing of the suggestion as required by
RCP 1.260(a)(1). On August 22, 1974,
Lee Hubbard was appointed administratrix
of the estate of the deceased plaintiff, and
on August 28, 1974, filed her motion for
substitution through the same attorney who
had filed the suggestion. Thereafter, the
trial court granted the defendants' motion
and dismissed plaintiffs cause of action.
We hold that under the circumstances of
this case, failure to file the motion for
substitution within the time prescribed by
RCP 1.260(a)(1) subjected the plaintiffs
cause to dismissal. Therefore, we affirm.
Rule 1.260(a)(1) provides:
If a party dies and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, the court may order
substitution of the proper parties. The
motion for substitution may be made by
any party or by the successors or representatives of the deceased party and, together with the notice of hearing, shall
be served on all parties as provided in
Rule 1,080 and upon persons not parties
in the manner provided for the service
of a summons. Unless the motion for
substitution is made within 90 days after
the death is suggested upon the record
by service of a statement of the fact of
the death in the manner provided for the
service of the motion, the action shall be
dismissed as to the deceased party.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that since the
suggestion of death did not specify the
name of a person who was eligible to be
appointed as successor, the trial court's dismissal should be reversed on authority of
Rende v. Kay, 1969, 134 U.S.App.D.C 403,
415 F.2d 983, which construed Rule 25 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
rule identical to RCP 1.260. True, in
Rende the court held that a suggestion of
death does not trigger the running of the
90-day period unless it specifies the person
available to be substituted. In Rende it
was the defendant who filed the suggestion
and also sought the dismissal. There the
plaintiffs counsel, upon returning to prac-
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tice following an injury, learned of the
motion to dismiss whereupon he filed a
motion to extend the time for filing under
Federal Rule 6(b) along with a motion for
substitution under Rule 25.
In the case sub judice it was the plaintiffs counsel who set in motion the time
requirements under RCP 1.260(a)(1) and
the defendant who then sought dismissal.
Even then the plaintiffs counsel did not
seek an enlargement of time as may have
been available under RCP 1.090(b).
In Farmers Insurance Group v. District
Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Colo.
1973, 507 P.2d 865, the Supreme Court of
Colorado rejected Rende in construing its
substitution rule which is identical to Federal Rule 25 and RCP 1.260. Likewise, we
are not impressed with the Rende view nor
the logic of applying it to the case sub judice. To accept Rende as authority for reversal of the trial court would require us
to engraft an exception to RCP 1.260.
In Staggers v. Otto Gerdau Co., 2nd Cir.
1966, 359 F.2d 292, the court allowed a
substitution to be filed two days late under
Federal Rule 25 because of difficulties in
obtaining appointment of a personal representative. The court in Staggers found
the defendant suffered no prejudice from
the tardy filing.
In Yonofsky v. Wernick, S.D.N.Y.1973,
362 F.Supp. 1005, the plaintiff, Yonofsky,
died on October 26, 1970. A suggestion of
plaintiffs death was filed by the defendant
on October 28; and 118 days later the executor of plaintiffs estate moved to be
substituted. In justification for late filing
of the motion for substitution, the executor
contended there were significant difficulties encountered in bringing about his appointment as a personal representative of
the deceased plaintiffs estate. The trial
court, upon finding the plaintiffs had made
the required showing of excusable neglect
and since there was no showing of prejudice to the defendant, held the plaintiff

Federal Rule 6(b) and allowed the motion
for substitution.
[2] In the case sub judice the record
does not reflect any attempt on the part of
the plaintiffs counsel who filed the suggestion to obtain any extension of time authorized under RCP 1.090. Nor is there
any showing in the record of any difficulties in securing appointment of a personal
representative which may have caused the
delay in filing the motion for substitution.
We recognize, however, the possibility that
some unusual delay may have been encountered in obtaining appointment of a personal representative since the deceased died
intestate. Therefore, we point out that
RCP 1.540(b)(1) furnishes a basis for a
party to petition the trial court to relieve
him or his legal representative from the
effect of a judgment where there has, in
fact, been excusable neglect.,
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court,
without prejudice to the plaintiffs right to
file a motion under RCP L540 should appropriate grounds therefor exist.
HOBSON, A. C. J., and GRIMES, J.,
concur.
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Defendant was convicted in the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County, Robert W. Rawlins, Jr., J., of second-degree
murder in the shooting death of his wife,

